Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, Volume IX

155. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

US/MC/6

Paris, May 14, 1960, 11 a.m.

MEETING OF CHIEFS OF STATE AND HEADS OF GOVERNMENT

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The Secretary of State
  • Mr. Merchant
  • Ambassador Houghton
  • Ambassador Eaton
  • Mr. Farley
  • Mr. McBride
• France
  • Foreign Minister Couve de Murville
  • Ambassador Alphand
  • M. Lucet
  • M. Moch
  • M. Legendre

SUBJECT

• Disarmament—French Missiles Control Proposals

M. Couve de Murville opened the meeting suggesting that there should be an exchange of views on nuclear disarmament and delivery means. The Secretary noted that we and the French have exchanged papers.¹Couve referred to the French paper and said that the last two pages contain a proposal which could be made. The Secretary asked if, before passing to the final two pages of the French paper, he could refer to the last sentence of paragraph two on the first page which refers to the problem of control and of making a study of this problem of control. He assumed there would be no commitments made in advance of this study. Couve said he would rather put it that any commitments would be conditional on the outcome of the control study.

The Secretary said that we had been troubled by the idea of making even conditional commitments to abolish nuclear weapons delivery systems prior to studying control and making sure this problem could be taken care of. Couve summarized the US position as wanting control and inspection without disarmament. He said the US position was that there could be no commitment in advance even on the assumption the outcome of the control study would be satisfactory. He said the French view on the other hand was that there could be a commitment on nuclear disarmament in advance on the basis of a satisfactory outcome of the control study.

The Secretary said there was another difference. In the Western disarmament plan,² it had been agreed to propose first steps in which the control problem was the simplest. This would determine whether or not the Soviets were operating in good faith and avoid a battle of words at the Summit. Therefore, our approach had been that it was better to pick out some relatively simple things; however, the French had selected the most complex issues where the controls would be most difficult to apply. Couve said that the French paper followed the US approach to the nuclear testing problem, but he noted we had been at these discussions for two years with relatively little result. The Secretary referred to the six points advanced by Lloyd in Istanbul. The Secretary inquired if it were the French intention to exclude consideration of other measures beyond those in their paper. Couve added that, as he had said in Istanbul, there was no intention to eliminate consideration of cut off nor conventional disarmament.

Couve then said that, if the French tabled their paper, the US could indicate its understanding that the points raised therein were third stage measures and came at the end of the disarmament scale. The Secretary said he had been under the impression that the French were re-drafting their paper. Couve replied that the re-draft would not alter their basic position. Couve said the US at the Summit could give its views on control and the danger of hiding certain things.

The Secretary asked if the French paper had in mind the Chinese problem. Couve said this would depend on whether or not China adhered to the proposal. He noted the importance of nuclear disarmament in connection with China.

The Secretary said he felt that if we went the whole hog in nuclear disarmament, as the French were proposing, without an international control organization, it would be impossible. Couve indicated agreement. The Secretary said he feared jumping into a dismantling of the one deterrent we had. Couve said the Soviets had this same deterrent; to which the Secretary replied that, if we eliminated the existing stalemate, we would change the whole existing balance of power. Couve said that all of the foregoing was true and should be stated by us.

Ambassador Eaton inquired if the French paper were a spelling out of certain phases of the Western plan. Couve said he considered it an addition to the Western plan addressed to the question of nuclear delivery means. He recognized that the Western plan covered other things as well such as conventional disarmament and the organization to be established. Ambassador Eaton asked if it were the French intention to table this as a separate paper. Couve replied that the French contemplated tabling this separately as an addition to the Western plan. The Secretary noted that it leaps from stage 1 to stage 3 of the Western plan. Couve said that only satellite control would be involved now, and that implementation of all of the measures would be dependent on the outcome of the control study. The Secretary noted that this would mean the elimination of surface vessels, planes, submarines, etc., and the destruction of existing stocks. He asked when this ban on construction would begin. Couve replied that all of this would be coupled with the Western plan.

The Secretary asked for confirmation of his understanding that nothing would happen until the study of controls was completed. Couve said that this was a correct understanding. Couve added the French thought we should concentrate on strategic rather than tactical weapons. Ambassador Eaton said if the French paper were a separate document, that was a different problem from its being fitted into the Western plan. Couve said that the Western plan had already been tabled and rejected, and that it was planned to table the French paper as an additional document. The Secretary referred to the danger that the Soviets would accept this paper and reject the Western plan. The Secretary said we could never accept this paper by itself. Couve said we should so state, and that he did not believe there was any difficulty in our making such a statement when the French put their paper in. The Secretary said he remained concerned that the Soviets would accept solely the French paper as the basis for resuming the Geneva negotiations.

Couve then said he thought the Soviets would raise the question of disarmament principles. The Secretary said this boiled down to one thing—the Soviets want complete disarmament with no controls. Couve agreed we should stick to the points in our principles paper, but remarked he thought Khrushchev would be embarrassed if we accepted his own proposal. The Secretary pointed out that in our principles paper we say we should begin with specific measures, and ones relatively easy to put into effect. By taking the French paper, we give the Soviets a choice of several proposals. Couve agreed there should be no disarmament without control, and that we should see what was possible and undertake such disarmament as is controllable. The French were talking about a long period of study and negotiation, and believed everything should be in the hands of the international body.

The Secretary said that, if the French tabled the paper, we would have to say that it appears to be a refinement of stage 3 of the Western plan, and that we could consider it only as a part of this plan. He asked again what we should do if Khrushchev accepted only the French proposal. Couve admitted he didn’t know the answer. The Secretary said it would be awkward if we split on this issue. Couve asked wherein lay the danger of the French paper. The Secretary added that it omitted conventional disarmament, the international control body, etc. Couve repeated that the French plan committed us only to a study. He said we could speak our piece also on conventional disarmament and the international body.

In response to a further remark from Ambassador Eaton, Couve said that the French proposal was both separate and a part of the Western plan. If the Soviets accepted it there should be a continued effort to get discussion also of the remainder of the Western plan. The Secretary asked if the French intended to table this at the Summit or in Geneva. Couve said it was to be submitted to the Summit. In response to a question from the Secretary, Couve said it was not planned to discuss this with the Italians or the Canadians in advance or with NATO. The Secretary said we had both been part of a five-man team at Geneva and it would be difficult for the French to table an entirely new proposal at the Summit, and would leave the others in an awkward position. Couve said it had always been envisaged that we would discuss disarmament at the Summit. The Secretary said that the best which could result was a directive to three of the five Western nations. The Secretary said it would be unfortunate if the directives to the US and French delegations were different.

The Secretary stated that the French had lifted the nuclear portions of stage 3 of the Western Plan and promoted them to stage 1. Couve said everything was conditional on control. The Secretary said it should also be conditional on the rest of the disarmament package. Couve said the US should so state if that were our view. He thought it would take many years to carry out the French plan. The Secretary believed it was a question of emphasis. Couve thought public opinion generated pressures for nuclear disarmament, which should be responded to so long as it was not too risky. The Secretary expressed fears that the Soviets would jump on nuclear disarmament and attempt to get a commitment in this field. Couve said the only commitment would be to study the possibilities. In the meantime the Geneva talks should go forward on the rest of the package. The Secretary said that, at least, there would be a commitment to study this aspect. Couve said he thought the Soviet reaction to the French proposal would be that it was more of the same, that is, control without disarmament. The Secretary said he was still worried that the Soviets, for propaganda purposes, would profess an interest in the French proposal.

On another topic, Couve said, in response to the Secretary’s question, that the de Gaulle-Khrushchev meeting on Sunday, May 15, had been undertaken at Soviet initiative, and was, to the best of his knowledge, for courtesy purposes only. He could not say whether disarmament would arise at that meeting. With regard to the Summit agenda, Couve said it was always the French intention not to begin with Germany, but with disarmament and East-West relations. However, he thought Khrushchev might insist on starting with Germany and Berlin. He said the French did not believe we should engage in procedural battle. If he insisted, we should let Khrushchev begin with Berlin and Germany. He would see that deadlock had quickly developed, at which time we could pass to other things and revert to Germany at the end. The Secretary made it clear that if a deadlock on Berlin and Germany developed at the outset, we could make no commitments on other subjects.

Reverting to the French missile paper, the Secretary said he was still worried about the Soviets accepting it. Couve averred that, if this were the case, the US could insist on going ahead with other aspects of the Western plan which we thought necessary. The Secretary remarked this might leave us alone, and make it appear we alone were blocking progress in disarmament. Couve said this would not be the case if others supported us. In response to the Secretary’s question, Couve said the French would give us support on the need for progress in other aspects of disarmament.

The Secretary said he could still see inescapable embarrassment. He had thought the agreement reached at Istanbul was to put forward some specific measures and not something along the lines of the French proposal. Furthermore, if there were some new plan along these lines, we felt a commitment to so inform the Italians, Canadians and NATO.

Couve said that the problem was that the Soviets had a plan,³ the West had a plan and both and been tabled and rejected at Geneva. The problem was therefore to give the Geneva Conference some new terms of references which were beyond either of the previous plans. M. Moch noted that Khrushchev had said in France that the Western plan was unacceptable as it represented no disarmament. Therefore, a move was needed to break the Geneva deadlock.

The Secretary stated that if the French plan were merely for study then it was similar to the Western plan except that it placed greater emphasis on the nuclear features. Couve repeated that it adopted a similar approach to ours in the case of the nuclear testing problem except for the moratorium feature. The Secretary said it was different in that potentially it called for the scrapping of weapons, and would be seriously embarrassing if picked up by the Soviets out of the whole package proposed by the West, and this were the only instruction to the Geneva Conference. Couve said that instructions to the Geneva Conference should not be limited to the French plan. He thought a special technical committee for the study of the French plan could be established and the ten-power group could continue separately along current lines.

The Secretary concluded that if the French were determined to proceed along this line, the US would have to reserve its position vis-à-vis the Canadians and Italians, as well as NATO, and reserve the right to talk to them. If the French table this document, we will have to determine what lines we will follow. This matter would have to be discussed with the four principals on Sunday afternoon. Whether or not this issue would come up on Monday in the Summit itself was, of course, uncertain.

Moch repeated that in the disarmament field, the Soviets would raise the question of general principles. In this field, we should stick to the agreement we have already reached, the Secretary thought. Couve said the Soviets would repeat their proposal for general and complete disarmament under conditions we had already refused.

There then ensued a brief discussion of force levels in conventional disarmament. The Secretary noted that we had not tabled force levels for other countries. The Soviets had said they would reduce from 3.7 to 2.4 million but the question of verification remained open. Couve said the stumbling block for us here also was the control question. The problem of reserves was also unsettled the Secretary pointed out, noting there was no agreed definition on reserves. Ambassador Eaton said the Soviets had agreed to permit verification only of the reduction itself not of remaining men. Moch referred to the gap between the 2.1 and 1.7 million figures for the US and the Soviet Union which had been discussed at Geneva. There was mention of the problem of China in connection with conventional disarmament, and Couve and the Secretary agreed that the Soviets had always insisted on parity for the Chinese with themselves and the US. In discussion of existing conventional forces, Couve said the French now had about 1, 000,000 men under arms. He thought the satellites probably had about 1, 000,000 men under arms also. Moch thought it might be possible to reach agreement on conventional disarmament on a figure somewhere between 2.1 and 1.7 million. Couve said he doubted this issue would be discussed in detail at the Summit.

Couve pointed out again his view that what the Soviets would raise at the Summit in disarmament would be the general principles problem. He also said again he thought the worst possible thing from the Soviet viewpoint would be for us to accept this idea.

Couve asked if the Secretary had seen the new Soviet paper on Germany which they had given to the French.⁴ The Secretary replied in the affirmative and thought it did not add much to their 1959 proposals except that it provided for a two-year period for an interim agreement whereas they have previously spoken of a year-and-a-half. The Secretary asked if Mr. Bold were coming to the Conference and Couve answered in the negative. Couve said there had been some pressure from the Soviets to have an East German delegation on the grounds there would be one from West Germany. He added that we need not worry about Bolz as he had no visa. Couve added that in Luxembourg at the recent meeting of the Community of Six Foreign Ministers, he had been obliged to convince Brentano, who wanted to remain in Paris throughout the Summit Meeting, that he should return to Germany after the talks with the Chancellor.

The Secretary reverted to the problem of handling the French missile paper. Couve said the three Heads of Government should discuss this on Sunday evening. He asked if there were anything else which should be discussed tripartitely, such as Germany. The Secretary thought that, as of now, we had firm agreement on this subject. Couve thought the Soviets would open the discussion of Germany at the Summit with their peace treaty proposal, but would not stick on this long because they knew the Western position already. The main discussion on this item, Couve thought, would revolve around an interim agreement for Berlin and how to achieve one without prejudicing our position. The Secretary said we could not tell how the first hour on Monday with the four Heads of Government alone would proceed, but believed not too much could be discussed because of the time element and the double consecutive translation problem. Couve thought discussions at this session would be entirely on conference procedures.

The Secretary, in conclusion, referred to the US paper which he had given Alphand in Washington on on-site inspections to help prevent surprise attack. Couve said he had read this. It was, he said, an open skies proposal and he wondered if it had any zonal limits. The Secretary answered in the negative and said it was intended to cover everything without zonal limits. Couve said the French had no objection to the paper. Moch said Khrushchev would call the US proposal control without disarmament. Couve referred to the US open skies proposal in 1955 which covered the US and USSR. The Secretary referred to the discussions in 1957 of various zonal suggestions. Moch concluded on this point saying that he was sure Ambassador Eaton would agree that the essential was that whatever Summit directive on disarmament might be sent to Geneva, it should be clear and not subject to months of haggling over interpretation.

At the end of the meeting, the Secretary inquired whether the French thought Khrushchev wanted a short-term modus vivendi on Berlin. Couve said he thought it was unlikely. The Secretary said that the conclusion of the 1959 meeting in Geneva represented our last position on Berlin. Couve thought Khrushchev probably wanted some result from the Summit to justify its having been held, and perhaps it did not matter to him much in what field and that he hoped to take something back with him either in the Berlin or disarmament field.

The meeting adjourned at 12:20 p.m.⁵

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1664. Secret. Drafted by McBride, cleared by Farley, and approved in S on May 16. The conversation took place at the Quai d’Orsay. Secretary Herter arrived in Paris on May 13 for discussions preliminary to the summit conference. In a conversation on May 13, Farley went over the same ground with Lucet. (Memorandum of conversation (US/MC/2); ibid.)
1. A copy of the U.S. paper, entitled “World-Wide Missile Site and Air Base Inspection,” was handed to Alphand at a meeting with Herter on May 10. (Tab A to a memorandum of conversation, May 10; ibid., Central Files, 396.1–PA 5/1060) The French paper has not been identified further.
2. For text of the March 16 Western disarmament plan, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, pp. 696–699.
3. For text of the Soviet principles for general and complete disarmament, April 8, see ibid., pp. 699-700.
4. See Document 154.

5. At the end of the conversation, Merchant spoke to Alphand and Lucet about the French proposal. According to his memorandum of the conversation, the discussion went as follows:

   “Following the break-up of the bipartite meeting with the French on disarmament, I told both M. Lucet and Ambassador Alphand that the French proposal on means of delivery and their decision to present it as a proposal at the Summit was to us a matter of utmost seriousness. I said that they were proposing to offer controls over weapons which they did not possess. Moreover, the controls necessary were so far-reaching and complicated that we would never contemplate this project in any other phase of the Western disarmament plan than in stage 3. Finally, I said it seemed to me that it opened up the very real possibility that the President would have to repudiate De Gaulle’s proposal in front of Khrushchev. Both of them deprecated the seriousness of the matter, but I did not feel that their hearts were in the defense of the proposal.” (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1664)