Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, Volume IX

152. Current Intelligence Memorandum⁰

OCI No. 0064/60

Washington, May 11, 1960.

SUBJECT

• Implications of Khrushchev’s Press Conference Remarks

1. Khrushchev’s statement on 11 May¹ that the aircraft incident has changed his estimate of President Eisenhower raises some urgent questions regarding the Soviet premier’s intentions and attitude toward the summit meeting and the basic issues to be discussed in Paris. The purpose of this memorandum is to place these remarks in perspective and to assess the three principal interpretations of his motivation which suggest themselves to OCI analysts at first reading.

2. Khrushchev’s remark was made during an impromptu news conference held while he was inspecting a display in Gorky Park in Moscow of what is purported to be parts of the downed aircraft. In response to a question posed by an American correspondent as to whether Khrushchev’s estimate of the President formed at Camp David had changed, the Soviet premier replied, “It has, of course.” When asked if he still wants the President to visit the USSR, Khrushchev hesitated and then launched into a rambling reply to the effect that his “hopes” in the President had not been “justified” and that “I am in a difficult position.” He asked the reporters to “imagine” what his welcome would have been if the USSR had sent reconnaissance aircraft over the United States just before his visit last September. Toward the end of his reply, however, he seemed to draw back from the implications of his initial reaction and added that American journalists and tourists “can testify to the discipline and reserve of our people.” Presumably referring to the reception the President will receive in the USSR, Khrushchev said “there will be no excesses.” “I have heard of no incidents against Americans.”

3. Khrushchev has alluded to this problem of Soviet public reaction in a private talk with Ambassador Thompson on 9 May.² He said one thing about the effects of the incident bothered him—that the Soviet public was concerned and “some people” might show their resentment during the President’s visit. He added that, of course, the Soviet authorities did not want any such thing to happen and that they intended to receive the President as a guest.

4. The first interpretation that suggests itself is that Khrushchev’s remarks in an impromptu exchange do not bear the marks of a considered statement of policy or intentions. It seems unlikely that his offhand response signals an abrupt shift in his attitude toward the summit or the President’s visit. In view of his deep personal commitment to the summit meeting, to the importance of high-level exchanges, and to the policy of “peaceful coexistence,” it is difficult for us to believe that this remark was intended as a provocation designed to force the President to withdraw from the Paris meeting and cancel his scheduled trip to the Soviet Union.

5. Khrushchev’s handling of the aircraft incident up to this point suggests that, while he certainly intends to extract the maximum political advantage, he does not wish to slam any doors or to upset at the last minute his long campaign to bring the Western leaders to a meeting under what he considers highly favorable conditions from his viewpoint.

6. Khrushchev’s remark would seem to undermine to some extent the position he took in his Supreme Soviet speeches on 5 and 7 May³ in which he carefully avoided attributing direct responsibility for the aircraft incident to the President. However, in his present mood of arrogant confidence mixed with resentment toward the United States, it probably was difficult for a man of Khrushchev’s temperament and flair for histrionics to suppress an off-the-cuff reaction of this kind.

7. The second interpretation would follow the line that Soviet exploitation of the incident has set in motion a chain reaction which has gone beyond Khrushchev’s control and now jeopardizes the attainment of the goals he has set himself at the summit. Khrushchev’s treatment of the plane incident has forced the Western powers to take countermeasures which can only have the effect of hardening the West’s position at the summit and rallying America’s partners behind Washington’s lead. Should this, in fact, be Khrushchev’s reading of the present situation, his remarks take on a more ominous aspect and raise the possibility that he is deliberately attempting to provoke the President to take a stand that would at least preclude his visit to the USSR, if not result in the postponement or cancellation of the summit meeting. The logic of the interpretation of Khrushchev’s motivation would lead to the conclusion that he now considers that it would be better to avoid a summit confrontation under present conditions and that he is out to place the blame on the United States for wrecking the summit.

8. The third view of Khrushchev’s latest move is that there has been some major, but still unidentified, development inside the Communist bloc which has forced Khrushchev to throw over his entire design for the summit and abandon his détente policy. The most obvious source of such a challenge would be an unequivocal ultimatum from the Chinese Communists confronting Khrushchev with the choice of abandoning his peaceful coexistence line or facing the consequences of some extreme action on the part of Peiping which would make an open rupture in the Nino-Soviet alliance virtually unavoidable. It would seem that in order to make such a challenge stick, the Chinese would have to threaten nothing short of an early military action that would almost certainly involve American forces in the Taiwan Strait.

9. While the fragmentary reports on Khrushchev’s remarks available so far do not permit us to make any firm judgment, it would seem that we can, with fair degree of confidence, rule out the third (Chinese) alternative. The second interpretation (chain reaction out of control) poses the always difficult problem of judging Khrushchev’s real reaction and estimate regarding Western moves and intentions. We are inclined to doubt, however, that the American response to the aircraft incident has either caught Khrushchev by surprise or caused him to reappraise the prospects for obtaining some satisfaction at the summit meeting. One must always take into account his tendency to over exploit what he considers an advantage over his opponents and his histrionic flair.

10. Our immediate judgment is that the first line of interpretation (an off-the-cuff remark not intended as a major policy statement) remains the most likely explanation. The next few hours should provide some additional clues. It will be important, for example, to study the version of Khrushchev’s remarks disseminated by TASS and the Soviet press. One possible straw in the wind suggesting that Moscow is already engaged in some fence-mending is a report from NBC Moscow that unusually heavy press censorship was imposed on 11 May.

Huntington D. Sheldon⁴
Assistant Director
Current Intelligence

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1669. Secret; Noforn. The source text bears Herter’s initials.
1. For a transcript of Khrushchev’s remarks at a press conference on May 11, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, pp. 420–423.
2. In telegram 2771 from Moscow, May 9, Thompson reported remarks made to him in private by Khrushchev at a Czech reception that day along the lines summarized in the following sentences. (Department of State, Central Files, 761.5411/5–960) In telegram 2772, May 9, he commented further that in public statements at the reception the Soviet Chairman had stressed “with great force” that if the Soviet Union signed a treaty with the German Democratic Republic, any attempt by the West to use force to gain access to Berlin would be met by force. (Ibid.)
3. Regarding the May 5 statement, see footnote 3, Document 146. For excerpts from the May 7 statement, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, pp. 415–417.
4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.