132. Letter From the Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs (Merchant) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs (Irwin)0
Washington,
April 21,
1960.
Dear Jack: As you know, it is now planned
to discuss the concept of an inspection zone in Central Europe in
the Four-Power Working Group on Germany and Berlin. The Department
of State, after consultation with the German, British, and French
Governments, proceeded to request the views of General Norstad on past European
zonal proposals and on any views of his own as to an acceptable
proposal for inspection in the European area.
We have now received General
Norstad’s views, a copy of which is attached. The
Department of State, although not necessarily subscribing to all the
specifics in General
Norstad’s proposal, sees considerable merit in his ideas.
We further feel that it would be desirable to be in a position to
present a proposal along these lines at the forthcoming Summit
meeting.
As a first step toward obtaining the agreement of our Allies to this,
we are submitting General
Norstad’s views to the Four-Power Working Group here
in Washington. In presenting his views, we will explain that the
United States Government has no fixed ideas or conclusions on the
specifics of the proposals but that we believe a proposal along the
general lines suggested by General
Norstad is desirable and merits consideration for use
at the Summit. We will suggest that the matter be further discussed
at the Four Foreign Ministers’ meeting in Istanbul, May 1. Depending
on progress in these Four-Power discussions, we also have in mind
proceeding as promptly as possible to consultation on a broader
basis with the other NATO
powers.
In preparation for these further discussions of the proposal, it is
desirable that we now develop a United States Government position on
General Norstad’s views.
It would therefore be appreciated if we could receive the views of
the Department of Defense on General
Norstad’s proposals. It is hoped that these views can
be provided as promptly as possible.
Sincerely yours,
[Page 337]
[Enclosure]
1
GENERAL NORSTAD’S VIEWS
ON A EUROPEAN INSPECTION ZONE PROPOSAL
The various proposals of the past decade for establishing an
internationally controlled zone in Europe have each contained
features which made them unacceptable to the West, at least from
the military standpoint. For example, the Eden plan of 19552
envisaged a demilitarized zone which was too narrow to be of
practical value in the rapidly moving situations of modern
warfare. Furthermore, originally it would have used the boundary
between East and West Germany as a line of departure, an aspect
of the plan which appeared to sanction a divided Germany and was
clearly unsatisfactory. The Rapacki Plan, in its 1958
modification, advocated a limited denuclearized zone in Central
Europe which would essentially have deprived the NATO nations of their nuclear
shield while leaving the massive forces of the Soviets poised
within striking distance of Western Europe. At best it was
dependent on confidence that the Soviets would carry out the
terms of an agreement which could not be controlled or enforced.
As for the recent Soviet disarmament proposals, it is not
necessary to cite their ambiguity and impracticability.
The Western Nations are searching for and require measures which
will maintain and guarantee security while reducing dangerous
tensions. It was to this end that the 1957 Disarmament
Conference in London3
discussed the establishment of an inspection and control system
in various areas involving Europe, the Soviet Union, North
America and the Arctic. From the military point of view, this
was a satisfactory approach to the problem of security, and the
present suggestions on control and inspection in the European
area are related to the general discussions which took place at
that time.
The basic thoughts on this subject were outlined to the NAC in June, 1957, and, since that
time, a zonal system of military inspection and control focusing
on Central Europe has been under study at SHAPE. The points hereafter
outlined derive from this study. Six criteria were established
as essential to any plan of this nature to be put forward by the
West at this time:
[Page 338]
- 1.
- It should strike public opinion in the West and
central countries as an easily understandable and
workable first step towards easing of tensions;
- 2.
- It should not prejudice adversely existing Western
positions on Germany, Berlin or disarmament;
- 3.
- At same time, it should not be wholly dependent upon
acceptance of broader Western objectives by the
Soviets;
- 4.
- It should deliberately be framed to avoid any
provisions requiring a change in the basic power balance
between the West and the USSR at this stage;
- 5.
- It should serve a useful purpose by itself and abate
tensions without further steps;
- 6.
- If found workable in practice over a period of time,
it could lay the groundwork for consideration in the
future of other proposals bearing on European
security.
Following immediately are the main features and operational
elements recommended for a control and inspection system in
Europe:
- A.
- Mobile ground inspection in as large an area as
possible between the Atlantic and the Urals, but to
include as an irreducible minimum the two German’s,
Poland, Czechoslovakia, BENELUX, and at least a part of Denmark, or
the equivalent.
- B.
- Aerial inspection over an area not less than that
covered by ground inspection.
- C.
- Overlapping radar stations, one line to be maintained
by West on Eastern perimeter of inspection and vice
versa.
- D.
- Scope of Inspection:
- (1)
- Exchange of information on types and location
of existing and firmly programmed forces.
- (2)
- Verification of this information.
- (3)
- Advance exchange of information as to
movements.
- (4)
- Periodic reports by mobile teams on grounds
and from aerial reconnaissance.
- (5)
- Each side to have its own line of
communications.
- (6)
- Teams to have full access to areas of military
significance but no right of entry into private
buildings.
- (7)
- No technical inspections of equipment or
access to nuclear storage depots
themselves.
- E.
- Size of inspection group:
- (1)
- Not to exceed 3, 000 inspectors (total both
East and West), including staff.
- (2)
- This would not include personnel for radar
installations or aerial reconnaissance.
- F.
- Nature of Inspection Teams:
- (1)
- Mixed East/West teams operating throughout
entire inspection area (no line down the middle or
Germany).
- (2)
- Reports to their military superiors and
possibility to appropriate UN organ (need to avoid any recognition
of Warsaw Pact or East German regime).
[Page 339]
Conclusions:
- 1.
- Danger of surprise surface attack should be greatly
reduced if not eliminated.
- 2.
- Some increased security against surprise air attack would
be achieved.
- 3.
- No surrender by NATO of
its assets in maintaining deterrent and protecting Western
Europe.
- 4.
- Soviet knowledge of NATO
deployments would not constitute significant loss.
- 5.
- Inclusion of countries other than Western Germany, plus
the device of mixed teams, would help make clear that plan
involves no abandonment of goal of German unity.
- 6.
- Successful operation of this system could also lead to
further steps in direction of effective control and
reduction of armament.
This rough outline obviously offers wide latitude for change;
yet, the basic military purpose of the proposal should not be
compromised. The danger of a surprise attack from within the
zone subjected to inspection must be reduced substantially. It
is recognized that a control and inspection system operating in
the minimum zone indicated would not provide protection against
surprise by air weapons launched from areas outside the zone.
This fact does not invalidate the merit of the system proposed,
which undertakes to provide no more and no less than a reduction
of the chance of surprise attack from the zone agreed upon. If
such a system should prove itself, it is not unrealistic to hope
that it would become the nucleus of broader action to mitigate
even greater dangers.
