Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1959–1960; Germany; Austria, Volume IX

117. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

US/MC/6

Washington, April 11, 1960, 2:15–3:15 p.m.

FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING

Washington, D.C., April 12–14, 1960

SUBJECT

• NATO Relation to Summit Preparations

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Mr. Merchant—M
• Mr. Bohlen—S/B
• Mr. Kohler—EUR
• Mr. Tobin—RA
• M. Paul-Henri Spaak, Secretary
• General, NATO
• M. Andre Saint-Mleux, NATO
• International Staff
• M. Alexander Boeker, NATO
• International Staff

1. East-West Relations

The Secretary opened with the remark that he had not yet seen anything solid coming out of the East-West relations group.¹ M. Spaak replied that it was difficult to find good proposals since all the suggestions put forward have dangerous aspects. He observed that while it would be difficult to have an agreed statement of general principles, perhaps a “code of good conduct” could be agreed. He realized, however, that the negotiators would need great latitude with respect to its presentation.

M. Spaak later raised the question as to how the West would respond if Khrushchev tried to insert the “principles of peaceful co-existence” into the communiqué. Mr. Bohlen pointed to the adverse impact of such a declaration having either regional or universal application, which Spaak countered with reference to possible difficulties vis-à-vis public opinion if we failed to meet such a Soviet initiative. Mr. Bohlen said that if a declaration is in order we are thinking in terms of a Western rather than an agreed statement. Mr. Spaak admitted the difficulties involved but thought it important to determine how to respond in order to make our position clear to public opinion. Mr. Bohlen thought that the riposte to a Soviet peaceful co-existence initiative would not be too difficult. We could use the common propaganda device of identification, pointing out that peaceful co-existence equals cold war.

M. Spaak next presented his views on various other topics in the East-West relations field, namely a declaration of non-interference, control of arms shipments, joint aid to underdeveloped areas, and exchanges. The “contras” far outweigh the “pro’s” with regard to a declaration of non-interference; there would be adverse consequences as to activity of Communist parties in the West, and the situation in Eastern Europe. Control of arms shipments presented great dangers, for it would open the way to Soviet proposals for control of arms supply to members of security pacts—to which the Secretary and Mr. Bohlen remarked that the Soviets had already made it quite clear that they would intend to apply such an agreement to countries such as Turkey and Iran. The Secretary also remarked that such a proposal would be directed toward Africa, and this would raise the Africans “up in arms” against us for trying to control their national behavior.

M. Spaak indicated there was a difference of opinion within the Council on the desirability of joint aid to underdeveloped areas. Exchanges did not seem to him to be a very pertinent topic for the summit negotiations. The Secretary pointed out that the Soviets contribute little or nothing to the various UN agencies dealing with aid to underdeveloped areas; and as their recent resolution introduced in ECOSOC shows, they have a propaganda aim in tying their contributions to underdeveloped areas to arms reduction.

2. Disarmament

M. Spaak suggested the desirability of some concrete proposals in the field of disarmament. The Secretary responded that as we saw at the Geneva meeting, the Soviets constantly seek to get us committed to a set of general principles, it seems purely for semantic reasons. For our part, we would like to see certain concrete steps. Unfortunately, the only precise suggestions we can think of for the Summit are related to the nuclear test suspension negotiations, and encounter opposition from General De Gaulle. M. Spaak thought it important that the West demonstrate to public opinion that its disarmament plan means effective progress.

3. Germany and Berlin

It was generally agreed that Khrushchev was bound to raise the question of Germany/Berlin at the Summit. The Secretary assumed that Khrushchev would begin with a proposal for a peace treaty with the two Germanies, which would bring us to the position at the opening of last summer’s Geneva conference. All present seemed to think that we would go through the same negotiating cycle as the Geneva conference but perhaps, as Mr. Merchant suggested, with the initial Soviet emphasis on the peace treaty telescoped in time.

M. Spaak observed that the Council had shown understanding as to the slow pace of preparations by the Working Group on Germany and Berlin, but it would now like to have a report as the basis for discussion at Istanbul.² Mr. Kohler assured him that such a report would be made to NAC by the Foreign Ministers meeting here this week, in time for the Istanbul meeting.

4. NAC Consultation and the “Agency” Question

M. Spaak raised a question, which he thought might come up at Istanbul, whether the Summit negotiating powers wish to negotiate only for themselves or for all of NATO. The Secretary and his advisers were emphatic in stating that we could negotiate only for ourselves. M. Spaak alluded to the fear expressed by some members of NATO that summit discussion of such questions as non-interference or arms control might give the impression that the Big Four were deciding the affairs of others among themselves. The Secretary acknowledged that this is one of the great dangers of the Summit, which must be avoided. Our intention is not to commit others, and if agreements are reached at the Summit they can only be binding upon ourselves.

M. Spaak then pointed out that while some governments feared they would be bound without their consent, others seemed inclined to favor a certain delegation of negotiating authority to the Western Governments participating in the Summit. Mr. Bohlen responded that many questions, such as contacts or trade, are primarily bilateral in nature, and are really not susceptible of negotiation at the Summit. He assured M. Spaak that the members of NATO need have no worry on the score of a three-power common front to which the other members would be bound. The Secretary in this connection observed that the only question which was uniquely pertinent to the Four negotiating powers was Berlin and Germany. Mr. Merchant thereupon pointed out that NATO has a special responsibility with regard to Berlin, to which the Secretary responded that the negotiating powers at the Summit could of course not commit NATO automatically should they make any changes in the status of Berlin.

Mr. Bohlen referred to a proposal which had been advanced that the four Summit governments would agree to consult in case of a threat to the peace. He explained that the underlying idea is that they would get together only in times of crisis, when there seemed to be an imminent danger of war, but that there would be no intent to establish four-power machinery to settle all international questions.

Mr. Kohler commented that it would of course be useful for the three in going to the Summit to go there with the knowledge of the views of all the NATO allies, but that they certainly would not go in any sense as agents of their allies.

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1624. Secret. Drafted by Tobin, initialed by Kohler, and approved by M on April 16 and by S on April 20. The conversation took place in Secretary Herter’s office. Two other memoranda of conversation (US/MC/2 and US/MC/4), which cover NATO long-range planning and MRBMs, are not printed. (Ibid.)
1. See Document 111.
2. Documentation on the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting at Istanbul May 2–4 is in volume VII, Part 1.