482. Telegram From Secretary of State Herter to the Department of State0
Cahto 177. For Acting Secretary. After dinner last evening Selwyn Lloyd and Secretary with Ambassador Whitney and Merchant present began their talk which lasted until after twelve-thirty. Lloyd said he had with him long draft message from Macmillan to President.1 He said it was result of many hours collaboration between Prime Minister and himself and that Prime Minister was prepared to dispatch it immediately himself or have it go forward to Washington as a message concurred in by Secretary or alternatively commented on concurrently by [Page 1070] Secretary. Burden of draft was that matter of our rights in Berlin seemed to have been satisfactorily met by Gromyko and outline of an agreement was now clearly in sight. Under these circumstances Prime Minister thought that Foreign Ministers should wind up their work in two or three days by preparing paper setting forth points of agreement and disagreement for transmission to a Summit Conference to be called by President for August 20 or in any event not later than September 1. Prime Minister in his draft went on to make perfectly clear that from his point of view it would be a terrible mistake to have the exchange of Khrushchev visits unless firmly related to and dependent on a prior Summit meeting. He said that under former circumstances suspicions would be aroused among certain of our allies and his own position made extremely difficult.2
Lloyd supplemented his exposition of the draft with long explanatory commentary. When he finished Secretary first made point that he could not fail to resent implication that our allies could not trust us in a bilateral discussion with Khrushchev and that this came with ill grace from the British in light of their trip to Moscow last winter. This produced long discourse by Lloyd in which he disclaimed any lack of faith but emphasized that by the visits Khrushchev would attain everything he had been seeking without paying a price and that since negotiations would be impossible to avoid in such visits it would constitute new relationship on bilateral basis with our allies excluded from participation.
Pros and cons were discussed at great length. During course of conversation Secretary emphasized that whereas he was as anxious as President to find the grounds to justify convoking Summit Conference he could not in honesty as of now detect really any progress whatsoever. There had been clarification of positions and sharpening of issues but Soviets had made no concessions other than extending their original time period.
As to form of transmission Secretary said that he preferred Macmillan to dispatch that message on his own responsibility that same evening without any indication of concurrence or comment by Secretary himself. Lloyd was obviously impressed by Secretary’s arguments. He emphasized time and time again that domestic politics constituted only minimal element in British view and in general re-emphasized wellknown British arguments for Summit which would be on Western rather than Soviet initiative. At one point late in conversation the Secretary [Page 1071] said that he was expressing thought which had just that moment occurred to him which was possibility of Canadians calling Summit meeting at Quebec City in light of inability of Geneva Conference to resolve Berlin issue. This obviously had great appeal to Lloyd and Secretary reiterated that it was an idea and in no sense a suggestion or considered thought.
Toward end of talk Selwyn Lloyd asked Secretary to read draft message which Macmillan planned to send to President. Secretary demurred for some time since he had expressed his views in general terms and did not want to be in position of making comments on the details of what Macmillan wished to say. When Mr. Lloyd insisted Secretary read over draft and to his surprise found that at very outset it predicated any recommendations to President on Summit on receiving from the Soviets the very concession which we had felt most important, namely, the acceptance of our wording regarding any temporary arrangements for Berlin contained in our June 16 offer. Mr. Lloyd said he was planning to talk to Macmillan on telephone and that he would give us the following day copy of what Macmillan finally decided to send.
At conclusion of talk it was agreed that at lunch Monday Lloyd would push Gromyko hard on the rights question in an effort to ascertain whether the formulation of this point in our document of June 16 was acceptable in its present form.
- Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1329. Top Secret; Priority.↩
- No draft of this message has been found; for the text as sent, see Document 484.↩
- In Cahto 175, July 27, Herter characterized Lloyd’s presentation as follows: “It was obvious from Selwyn’s rather nervous manner and quite long-winded exposition of the British position that he must have found Macmillan very much agitated and terribly anxious to impress us with the necessity of quick action leading to a Summit.” (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1329)↩