Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

481. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Ogorevo, July 26, 1959, 3:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • Vice President Nixon
  • Dr. Milton Eisenhower
  • Ambassador Thompson
  • Mr. Foy Kohler
  • Mr. Alexander Akalovsky
• USSR
  • Chairman Khrushchev
  • First Deputy Chairman Mikoyan
  • First Deputy Chairman Kozlov
  • Mr. V.V. Kuznetsov
  • Mr. S.R. Striganov
  • Mr. Yuri Zhukov
  • Mr. Troyanovsky
  • Mr. Lepanov

[Here follows a 10-page discussion on unrelated subjects; for text, see volume X, Part 1, Document 99.]

The Vice President interjected that Khrushchev had said that he had hopes for success in Geneva.

Khrushchev confirmed that, saying that otherwise the Soviets would have recalled Gromyko and their delegation. The key problem in Geneva, he went on, was liquidation of the state of war with Germany. The solution of this problem would lead to the solution of other problems—just like a knitted fabric, if one thread is pulled, the whole garment comes apart. Soviet proposals on this subject were formulated in such a way as to make clear that the Soviet Union was seeking no advantage for itself. As far as the legal position was concerned it was quite clear: the West had settled with West Germany without regard to Soviet interests. The Soviet right to reparations had been disregarded, a monetary reform had been introduced, and a trizonal arrangement had been made. The West also had recognized Adenauer’s government. Soviet moves in East Germany were similar to those by the West in West Germany and they only followed later. Now the USSR had no claim against West Germany. The West had violated the Potsdam agreement not to rearm Germany; now it permitted Germany’s rearmament, even with atomic weapons. What the Soviet Union wanted to do now was the same that the Western powers had done earlier—it wanted to liquidate the state of war with Germany. It had proposed reasonable solutions to this problem which were being refused by the West, which still insisted that German reunification was a four power responsibility. Khrushchev went on by contending that there was no document in which that responsibility was set forth. (The Vice President indicated that he wanted to respond but Khrushchev kept the floor.) Khrushchev then cited Viet Nam as a parallel example. He said that there were not two correct answers to these questions but only one and the whole world knew that. U.S. policy with regard to Viet Nam was not understood by the world: Ho Chi Minh wants elections while the U.S., contrary to the agreement reached over three years ago, opposes them. What was the reason for that? It was not just the refusal by Diem, since everybody knew that the West pulled the strings on him.

The Vice President interjected here that he was wondering who pulled strings in North Viet Nam—the people?

Khrushchev continued by saying that the three powers had signed an agreement regarding Viet Nam’s unification, to which the U.S. had also subscribed, whereas in the case of Germany no such agreement had been signed. In any case historical progress was not determined by legal documents. In the Soviet Union the Soviet system had been established by a decree of their majesty the people—it had been the people who had decided whether Russia should be Socialist or bourgeois. The decision had been for socialism and the Russian people had thrown out of their country foreign troops, including American troops. Similarly, it was the German people who should decide the question of Germany’s reunification, while the great powers must recognize the fact that now there were two Germanies. In this connection, Khrushchev said, he wanted to refute reports in the Western press alleging that he had said in Poland that he was against a united Germany and was demanding that all of Germany go socialist. To this he could say the following, “You have no intention of making war over West Germany, neither do we; what you want is that all Germany be capitalist. Isn’t it?” Yet all that the great powers can do is express their opinions, but the people themselves do not have to take those opinions into account. The present situation in Germany, Khrushchev emphasized, cannot be changed without war.

Dr. Eisenhower noted at this point that what the U.S. wants for the German people is what the German people want for themselves.

To this Khrushchev stated that the people in West Germany had pronounced themselves and that this was also true with regard to the people in East Germany. The fact is that a mother cannot control the birth of her child—and a father is even less capable of doing that—so why does not the U.S. let East Germany be socialist if the people there prefer that system?

The Vice President observed that he did not propose to rehash postwar history. The Soviets obviously had their views, we had ours, and we disagreed with what had happened in Viet Nam and East Germany. However, he said, he wanted to make a few points. First, he was glad to hear that Mr. Khrushchev agreed with the principle of free elections; but if Mr. Khrushchev was for elections in Viet Nam, why was he against elections in Germany?

Khrushchev claimed he had not said that; he was not against elections but simply wanted the Germans to decide this question themselves.

The Vice President resumed by saying that if the people were to express their views, then such views must be properly recorded. Yet North Viet Nam did not permit the International Control Commission to operate in its territory. Thus the reason for not holding elections in Viet Nam was the impossible conditions created by Communists in the northern part of that country.

Khrushchev interrupted the Vice President and said that he wanted to make an additional point regarding Germany. He said that the Soviet Government was concerned about the question of West Berlin; the prestige of the Great Powers was involved there and the Soviet Union did not want to be misunderstood in the world. As a lawyer, Mr. Nixon would understand that the strictly legal solution to this problem would be for the Western Powers to pull out of West Berlin, with West Berlin becoming a part of East Germany. The reason for that was the fact that the Potsdam agreement had provided for Berlin to be the capital of all Germany, with the Control Council meeting there and governing the entire territory of Germany. The three Western Powers had not recognized this council and had formed Adenauer’s Government, thus depriving the Control Council of its function. At that point Berlin ceased to be the capital of all Germany. Khrushchev emphasized that he was not trying to say who was right and who was wrong in this matter. What he was trying to say was that the logical development would have been for the West to pull out of West Berlin at that time, rather than to stay and create a divided Berlin. Yet the Soviet Union recognizes the fact of West Berlin’s existence, it realizes that the capitalist system prevails there, and it wants to find a way to ensure that the will of West Berlin’s population would not be violated. The best way to achieve that objective would be the creation of a free city of West Berlin. Mr. Khrushchev noted that the Vice President appeared to be smiling and said that this was a serious question. It was a hard nut that had to be cracked and the Soviet Union took a very serious view of it. To safeguard the prestige of the Western Powers the USSR had proposed the creation of a free city of West Berlin so that neither side would feel it had lost something. Yet the West accuses the Soviet Union of wanting to engulf West Berlin. In reply to such accusations the Soviet Union has proposed that an international force be set up to guarantee the integrity of West Berlin. The USSR would be willing to join such a token force under an agreement registered with the U.N. If the Western Powers did not want Soviet participation, then neutral forces should be stationed in West Berlin. (Mikoyan interjected that any forces would be acceptable except occupation forces.) Khrushchev went on by saying that retention of occupation forces meant maintenance of the state of war. Thus, in West Berlin the Western Powers were taking Molotov’s line with regard to Austria. Mr. Macmillan and others had said that the West had 11 to 12 thousand troops in West Berlin. They would be of no military significance in case of war. The question arises why they are stationed there. He said he had told Harriman¹ that if the Soviet Union wanted a war it would want the West to have at least 100,000 troops in West Berlin, because the Soviet Army could liquidate them in one blow. In Stalingrad 90,000 German troops had been liquidated, so what could 11,000 do? Khrushchev emphasized that the Soviet Union would never agree to a perpetuation of the occupation regime in West Berlin and of the state of war with Germany. What they could do, in order not to embarrass either side and avoid injury to their prestige, was to put the brakes on this situation and have an interim arrangement for West Berlin. The West should tell Adenauer to enter into contact with East Germany and negotiate with it. The West should also tell Adenauer that the Great Powers have no intention of quarreling over the Germans and that they will accept any agreement worked out between the two Germanys. If the West did the same, the Soviet Union would also pull out its troops. Khrushchev went on to say that he could see nothing unacceptable or offensive in this proposal, if the West sought peace. However, it appeared to the Soviet Union that by continuing the state of war with Germany the West was trying to prolong the cold war and perhaps turn it into a hot war. If this proposal were accepted, the center of friction, i.e., West Berlin, would disappear. The situation there was fraught with danger, because he, Khrushchev, could not give guarantee against some Red soldier pulling a trigger or engaging in some other irresponsible action. The same was applicable to the U.S. with regard to its troops, and as everyone knew, incidents had already occurred. The interests of the Soviet Union and the U.S. do not cross, they rather go parallel, and all the Soviet Union wants is peace. The U.S. could develop its own way, the Soviet Union its way; the United States wants to pray for the captives of socialism, but the Soviet Union does not do that for the captives of capitalism because they do not need it. Khrushchev then remarked jokingly that if men should fail to agree, then they should appoint their wives to settle their differences.

The Vice President pointed out that Khrushchev’s observations had been answered many times and repeated that neither side was likely to convince the other of the correctness of its views. For example, one could argue endlessly as to who was responsible for setting up the West German or East German governments. The U.S. could point out that the West German settlement fully reserved the rights of the USSR. When Khrushchev refers to 11,000 troops in West Berlin, the U.S. can refer to 18 Soviet divisions in East Germany. It was also obvious that the two sides had different approaches to the unification of Germany. The Vice President stated that he had the impression that Mr. Khrushchev honestly believes that unification would not be practical in the foreseeable future and also that the Western Powers do not want it.

Khrushchev interjected that he was convinced that this was so, especially in view of the fact that representatives of the Western Powers themselves had made statements to that effect.

The Vice President continued by saying that Mr. Khrushchev, being a keen student of history, would realize why reunification is essential for peace. He should know that when a vital and strong nation is divided in two then seeds are planted for the emergence of a future leader who will seek to accomplish reunification. However, the Vice President remarked, he realized that here there were differences of opinion between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Reverting to the question of West Berlin, the Vice President said that as far as the Soviet proposals for a revision of the situation in West Berlin was concerned, Khrushchev must admit that the present situation had been precipitated as a result of Soviet action rather than ours. This was a fact and not an accusation.

However, since there is a crisis in that area the great powers must seek ways and means to find a reasonable settlement. The Vice President said that he believed that Khrushchev himself would agree that the West and the USSR have common responsibility and interests with regard to Germany and Berlin. Under such circumstances no one power can say that the situation must be changed in a certain specific way and that all others must agree. The status quo in all respects must remain and any changes must be discussed and agreed. Khrushchev could not expect President Eisenhower, for example, to agree to attend a high level conference for the sole purpose of accepting the other side’s proposals as to how the present situation is to be revised. Nor would the U.S. expect Khrushchev to do that. Where great powers are concerned each must go to the conference table as an equal, and all of them must be prepared to debate and discuss proposals put forward by any of them. Khrushchev would not want to attend a conference simply to sign Western proposals on the dotted line. As far as the present situation at the Geneva conference was concerned, it was apparent it could not end without progress at least as to the procedure for future give and take negotiations of these problems. Whatever the two sides may think of mistakes either of them may have made with regard to Germany, the American people and the American Government could not accept what in effect is a unilateral action in an area where vital interests of the U.S. are affected. Yet this did not mean, the Vice President continued, that no new arrangements could be made regarding West Berlin and Germany. It only meant that self- and mutually respecting nations cannot be committed in advance by the other side as to what they have to accept. Where big powers are concerned the climate must not be one of crisis and tension. The Vice President then invited Ambassador Thompson to speak in light of his own experience at the Geneva conference.

Ambassador Thompson pointed out that complicated technical questions were involved, which he was not going to discuss in detail, but stressed that the Vice President had underscored the fact that this was a dangerous situation not of our making. The West had first submitted proposals for the settlement of the entire German problem, but after it had recognized that an overall settlement was not possible, it had now taken up a more limited area and made a number of concessions to meet the Soviet point of view on Berlin. Then the West had suggested that the present negotiations be prolonged so that the present situation would be discussed in order not to allow it to come to a crisis and bring dangerous consequences.

Khrushchev interjected that this was a proposal by Adenauer, who had even suggested a ten-year period. The Vice President observed that Khrushchev himself had earlier referred to postponement.

Ambassador Thompson emphasized that this proposal had been introduced by Secretary Herter and then went on to say that if this could not be done, a really difficult situation would develop. He said that it was necessary first to take measures to prevent the development of a crisis and then in the interim perhaps to make progress on such questions as atomic tests and disarmament. If progress could be made in these areas, other problems might be easier to solve.

Khrushchev agreed that the President could not be confronted with a situation of going to a conference only to sign proposals by the other side. However, he should go to a heads of state conference when there is a basis for agreement, but negotiations are needed to develop terms that would be mutually acceptable. He also said that the same was true as far as he was concerned: there would be no sense in his going to a summit meeting only to sign an agreement perpetuating the occupation regime in West Berlin. He would much rather go hunting and shoot ducks.

The Vice President reiterated that it was the Soviet Union which had created the present situation in Berlin. The Soviet Union wanted a change in the status quo. As Ambassador Thompson had pointed out, the respective proposals of the two sides could not be discussed here today. However, it was implicit that if a high level meeting were held its purpose must be to develop new approaches to this question. The position of the U.S. was not that Khrushchev should go to a summit meeting only to perpetuate the status quo.

Khrushchev protested that he could not understand the meaning of “status quo.” He said he was wondering whether the Vice President meant by status quo perpetuation of the state of war. Such status quo could not serve the cause of peace. The Soviet Union favored the status quo but it was also for the liquidation of the vestiges of war. The Soviet proposals did not undermine the situation which had developed after the war: they would retain the present borders and preserve the existing social system.

The Vice President observed that in his remarks he had been referring only to Berlin. To this Khrushchev replied that the status quo in Berlin could be retained only by retaining the state of war.

The Vice President said that he wanted to repeat and emphasize that the U.S. could not accept an ultimatum situation where one side would predetermine in advance what the other side was to accept. The Soviet Union proposed that if no agreement was reached in 18 or 24 months the Soviet Union would take a unilateral action. Khrushchev would certainly not like being confronted with a similar situation. The problem involved must be discussed.

Khrushchev retorted that this was why the Soviet Union had suggested that a peace treaty be concluded with Germany and that it be discussed by all countries concerned.

Ambassador Thompson then summarized the basic differences as follows: the Soviet Union says it cannot agree to an indefinite prolongation of the occupation regime in Berlin; the West, on the other hand, says that it cannot agree to a perpetuation of the division of Germany, as would result from all Soviet proposals put forward—all of them provide for an East German government.

Khrushchev then suggested that the talk be frank. He said that the purpose of so-called free elections as proposed by the West was to engulf East Germany and make all of Germany an ally of the West. The GDR does not want the West German political system and does not want to become a member of NATO. Does the West want the Soviet Union to overthrow the present regime in East Germany and have there a regime which would be identical to that in West Germany? The Soviet Union could present the same sort of demand with regard to West Germany, but this would be absurd and the Germans in West Germany would not agree to that. The inexorable fact was, he continued, that there were two Germanys in existence. If the West is against recognition of the GDR, efforts should be exerted to find a formula whereby the West would not have to sign a peace treaty with the GDR. Yet such a formula should make it possible for the Soviet Union to sign a peace treaty with East Germany and have a state of peace there. As far as West Berlin was concerned agreement could be reached that the social order in that city should be determined by the will of its population and access to that city could also be guaranteed. The Soviet Union recognizes that in the present heated atmosphere any document of this type could be detrimental morally to one of the sides. Consequently, agreement should be reached on the time when such a document could be signed and the source of trouble done away with. As to the provisional arrangements for West Berlin, the Western proposals contained some sound elements; the situation should be discussed on that basis and on the basis of Soviet proposals combined. Yet one should keep in mind that these would be only provisional arrangements.

The Vice President asked whether Khrushchev did not see the position that a time limit would put President Eisenhower in, to which Khrushchev retorted that the West also had put a time period of 2-1/2 years.

Ambassador Thompson clarified that the Western proposals provided for separate elections in East Germany. Nevertheless, the West had recognized that this was now impossible. The West was not satisfied with the present situation in Berlin and since it could not find a solution satisfactory to the Soviet Union it tried to find a situation which would ensure peace and avoid the development of a crisis. It was important now to start moving step by step toward agreement. Yet if the Soviets forced a crisis, it would be difficult to understand how they could reconcile this with their words about peace. Ambassador Thompson suggested that this problem be put off and that the parties concerned try to solve other problems in the meantime.

Khrushchev, raising his voice, retorted that the Ambassador should be careful when using the word peace. What he had said sounded like a threat. The Soviet Union would sign a peace treaty and the West could declare war, if it wished. When peace was at stake the Soviet Union was very sensitive, and if the West chose to fight against a peace treaty everyone would recognize who was to blame. If the Soviet Union did not want negotiation, it would have signed a peace treaty with East Germany—this was its right and also the right of the states bordering on Germany. Khrushchev asserted that he was not stupid and that he could understand the real meaning of Ambassador Thompson’s words.

Ambassador Thompson replied that what he wanted to say was that forcing a crisis would not be a step toward peace. No threat was implied, and it was the Soviets who were threatening to force a crisis.

Khrushchev said he wanted to know what was incompatible with Western interests in the Soviet proposals, if the West wanted peace. What steps did the West propose to take? If it wanted to ensure the present social system in West Berlin and if that system was favored by the population, this could be negotiated and there was no disagreement on that point. But the Soviet Union could never agree to a perpetuation of the West’s occupation rights. Whatever time period is involved it logically follows that a peace treaty, whether concluded by both sides or separately, will end the occupation rights of the Western powers. This, Khrushchev said, was not an ultimatum but only the logic of the situation.

The Vice President pointed out that it should be recognized that vital interests of both sides were involved and that neither side should confront the other with an impossible situation.

Khrushchev interjected at this point, “We propose only peace—you yourself used the slogan today—what’s wrong with that?”

Ambassador Thompson asked whether Mr. Khrushchev thought that such offers as troop limitation and non-stationing of atomic armaments were not peaceful.

The Vice President noted that Ambassador Thompson had mentioned two points that would change the present situation. Other suggestions had been advanced, too, but it was important that changes must be made by agreement. He said that he wanted to reiterate that there should be no predetermined conclusions as to what the other side must accept. The Berlin situation may appear important but in the long run discussion by Khrushchev and the President of such broader matters as disarmament, nuclear tests, trade, etc., might be more important. Progress could be made in these areas, but only in a climate of calm, not of crisis. The Vice President said that it was most important to create as favorable a climate as possible for discussion and progress in these broader areas.

Khrushchev agreed that a calm atmosphere was needed, but suggested that the U.S. should not threaten the Soviet Union with war. Apparently the Vice President did not want to use this sort of language, so he had asked Ambassador Thompson to do so.

The Vice President replied that he had heard the Ambassador’s statement. The Ambassador had said nothing more than Khrushchev himself had said, namely, that if he were confronted with an impossible situation he would have the means to do what was necessary about it.

Khrushchev tried to refute this statement by saying that he had never said that he would use military power. The Great Powers should accept what the Germans want. (Mikoyan interjected “confederation.”) However, Khrushchev continued, he still wanted the Vice President to answer his question whether the U.S. sought to preserve its occupation rights or whether it was trying to preserve access to West Berlin and the social order prevailing there. If the U.S. wanted to preserve the occupation status, this might cause war, because, with U.S. troops stationed there, incidents might occur, U.S. aircraft might collide with Soviet aircraft in air corridors, etc. In fact, U.S. planes have violated Soviet air space, and all this could provoke war. If, however, the U.S. wanted to preserve the existing social order in West Berlin as well as full access to that city, agreement on that could be reached. If the U.S. wants peace there is no reason for it to retain its rights of occupation. Referring then to the question of disarmament and nuclear tests, Khrushchev said that the Soviet Union, on May 10, 1955, had presented as its own disarmament proposals² previously introduced by the West, but the West had renounced them. The Soviet Union was willing to discuss disarmament but not on the basis referred by the West where only one representative of the Soviet side would participate and all other participants would be members of NATO. Parity was necessary for such discussions.

[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]

The Vice President then said that the discussions appeared to boil down to the following: there were broad possibilities for discussion of these and other problems, between Khrushchev and the President or at a Heads of Government meeting, provided there was no atmosphere of crisis. In this connection the Vice President recalled Khrushchev’s statement that the Congressional Resolution on captive nations³ had created an unfavorable atmosphere for the Vice President’s visit. On the other hand, in the U.S. the Geneva conference had more significance to our people and leaders than one would normally expect. The President, of course, had authority as far as conferences and topics for discussion were concerned, but he, just as Khrushchev, must be responsive to public opinion. Because of its symbolic significance to the people of the U.S., it was important that the Geneva conference must not be allowed to fail. Some progress in Geneva would have a very favorable impact on our people and would create a much more favorable atmosphere for discussion of other problems than if the conference ended in failure.

Khrushchev pointed out that he had just spent ten days in Poland, where the problems under discussion at Geneva were of vital importance. However, he had not once during his visit mentioned Geneva publicly so as not to make Gromyko’s work more difficult.

The Vice President observed that in the final analysis any results, positive or negative, at Geneva would be ascribed by public opinion not to the Foreign Ministers but rather to the Heads of Government. Under these circumstances, the Vice President continued, he believed that there were possibilities for reasonable solution. This was why he was happy to hear Khrushchev say that he was hopeful that Geneva could reach the success awaited by the whole world. This, however, did not mean that the U.S. demanded that the conference should solve all problems, and he personally was not authorized to present any specific proposal, but it was necessary that the climate be improved as a result of the conference.

Khrushchev replied that the latest Soviet proposals were flexible. They provided for new negotiations after 18 months if the two Germanys failed to reach agreement between themselves. This does away with any reference to what the West calls an ultimatum. It also gives an opportunity for governments to explain to their peoples the reasons for a summit meeting. He said it was necessary to realize that to go any further would mean perpetuation of the occupation regime. In that case there would not be any need for a conference because that state of affairs was already in existence. He then said that Mikoyan had reported to him that President Eisenhower had told Mikoyan during his visit in the U.S.⁴ that the U.S. must also reckon with the German danger, since Germany had broken the peace four times within the past hundred years. This appeared to be the position of the U.S. Of course, the French would prefer to see Germany divided into even more parts, perhaps three, while England would like to see Germany broken up into four or even more parts. Therefore the question arises why the U.S. follows Adenauer’s line.

The Vice President replied that Khrushchev must realize that if the President of the U.S. and the Prime Minister of the USSR agreed that any nation must not threaten peace in Europe, then it could not. After all, the U.S. and USSR had fought together quite recently for the same cause and both of them were even more powerful now. Or was it that the Soviets were afraid of Germany?

Khrushchev replied in the negative but said that the situation now was different than that before the war. He said he did not want to brag or be disrespectful toward his high guests, but the fact was that during the period of Hitler’s aggressions in Europe the Soviet Union had been the only socialist state and had been in isolation. The French and the British had been against the USSR and had had U.S. sympathy. Now, of course, Japan is defeated and in this connection, Khrushchev noted, it should be said that the U.S. contribution in the war against Japan had been the greater, although the Soviet contribution had not been very small either; after all, it had been the Soviet Army who had liquidated the Japanese forces in Manchuria. Italy was also a defeated country, while China had been united and covered the USSR’s eastern flank. Half of Korea was socialist. In Europe the socialist bloc was united with the exception of Yugoslavia, which is neutral, but which, he believed, would fight on the Soviet side if the Soviet Union were attacked. Thus today there remained in Europe only England, France and Spain, while the Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands and Belgium, do not count militarily. Oh yes, Khrushchev added laughingly, he forgot that Luxembourg could constitute a threat to the Soviet Union. In this situation could Germany threaten the Soviet Union? Yes, by provoking a war and drawing other countries into it. The Soviet Union has no doubt that it would destroy Germany, France, England and other countries the very first day of the war. The Soviet Union would, of course, suffer losses too. But the other countries would become deserts. This would be a calamity and we should not allow it to happen. We should not allow Adenauer to threaten all of us with conflict but rather we should try to build a better life for our children and grandchildren.

The Vice President said he wanted to ask one question, namely, whether Mr. Khrushchev thought there was any room for negotiation in the Soviet position. Mr. Khrushchev should imagine that the President was sitting across the table and, without going into any specifics, should say whether there was room for negotiation. The Vice President said that Khrushchev himself would not want to come to a meeting if the President were not prepared to negotiate.

Khrushchev said that this was a fair question and that it would be easier for him to give a reply to it in terms of what the Soviet Union could not accept. President Eisenhower could then form his own judgment as to the Soviet willingness to negotiate. The Soviet Union could never accept a perpetuation of the occupation regime in West Berlin, regardless of whether there were a summit meeting or not. As to the solution of the entire Berlin problem, the Soviet position was flexible and fluid except on this one point of occupation status. There would be no point in meeting at the summit if the participants were to perpetuate a situation that already exists. The West could present to the Soviet Union any proposals to ensure the present social order in West Berlin and access to that city. As far as a peace treaty with Germany is concerned it could ensure the status quo of the two Germanys until time becomes ripe for the liquidation of military blocs. The treaty could contain the most liberal provisions and provide even for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from East Germany and Poland, perhaps a gradual one.

[Here follows discussion of other subjects; see volume X, Part 1, Document 99.]

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1416. Confidential; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Kohler and Akalovsky and approved by Kohler on August 31. The meeting was held at the Soviet Government summer house near Moscow. Vice President Nixon was in Moscow to open the U.S. exhibit at the Sokolniki Fair. For his account of this conversation, see Six Crises, pp. 268–271.
1. See Documents 417 and 420.
2. For text of this proposal, see Department of State Bulletin; May 30, 1955, pp. 900–905.
3. For text of this resolution, approved on July 17, see 73 Stat. 212.
4. See Document 137.