Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

479. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Delegation to the Foreign Ministers Meeting at Geneva⁰

Berlin, July 28, 1959, 9 p.m.

61. Bonn eyes only Ambassador. Urtel 30.¹ Gufler temporarily in FedRep on special business. General Hamlett has given us following which he believes is substance of subjects discussed Saturday morning at Ambassador’s residence.

Secretary started discussion by asking Hamlett to comment on Russian proposal for reduction of forces. Hamlett answered in substance as follows:

Setting aside all political considerations and admitting that, in event Russian armed forces brought to bear, Allied garrisons in Berlin would be in effect only token force. Overriding reason for not reducing Allied garrisons Berlin is effect such a reduction would have on our ability to cope with large civil disturbances. We know that East German regime backed by Soviets capable of instigating mob violence in West Berlin of such magnitude that combined strength of West Berlin police force and Allied garrisons (at present levels) would be taxed to the extreme to provide security for all installations and neutralize the actions taken by galr [goon?] squads and mobs in various sectors of city. This assertion is not based on pure theory. We have an integrated Civil Defense Plan which has been war-gamed in a joint command post exercise involving the three Allied garrisons and West Berlin police. This combined exercise clearly indicated that the combined capability of the Allied garrisons in Berlin and West Berlin police force is already marginal for coping with large civil disturbances.

Mayor Brandt made several comments on Gen. Hamlett’s statement. He said that it was known that Communists had plans for civil disturbances. He also stated that any reduction of Allied garrisons would, he felt certain, cause deterioration in the morale of West Berlin police since they feel that physical support of strong Allied garrison essential to security of West Berlin. He added that, if size of police force were increased, in event a reduction of Allied garrison occurred, the same feeling would prevail and in his opinion, would nullify the effectiveness of such an increase.

In answer to several general remarks made by others present concerning ways to provide West Berliners with arms for self-protection, General Hamlett stated that a plan was being studied to increase the size of the police force by organizing and training auxiliary police. Further, that this appeared to be only logical way to develop additional forces from local resources. Mayor stated he felt plan should not be implemented during Geneva conference. All present agreed.

General Hamlett asked Secretary if he felt Soviets really attached great importance to reduction of forces. Secretary replied that this seemed to be subject in which Gromyko intensely interested since he consistently brought it up at meetings. General Hamlett remarked it appeared to him that if Soviets so anxious for reduction they must certainly be considering instigating civil disturbances which made his reasons for not reducing size of Western garrisons even stronger.

Short discussion followed concerning number of effective troops in all three Allied garrisons. Mr. Merchant stated that detailed figures furnished by USBER available in Geneva (USBER’s 25 to Dept).²

Secretary then asked Gen. Hamlett and Mayor Brandt to give their views on paragraph 1(b) of Western proposals of June 16.

General Hamlett stated that in his opinion this paragraph, if agreed upon by the four powers, would not cause the three Allied garrisons in Berlin any more trouble than they were accustomed to in dealing with the Soviets on access matters; that on access our arguments with Soviets usually involved meaning of word “control” and that arguments of this nature would continue under any agreement stated in broad terms. On other hand, he felt that agreement expressed in such broad terms would leave West Berliners and economy of West Berlin open to all types of harassments such as increased tolls on autobahn, interference with railroad shipments and movements of personnel or even prohibitive charges for canal traffic similar to those experienced last year. In his opinion, he felt that to protect people and economy of West Berlin an agreement on access should be spelled out so that harassment of this nature would be forestalled.

Mayor Brandt agreed with General Hamlett but added he not sure such a detailed agreement should be worked out by Foreign Ministers but could be evolved at lower level. Apparently Mayor Brandt intended to indicate that the broad agreement should contain a clause to provide for later working out of detailed arrangements.

Mr. Gufler commented that he felt very important factor concerning access arrangements (Allied or German) was provision for four power appeal commission of some type. He stated that failing provision for such four power commission we might find ourselves in Berlin with no one to negotiate with on local access problems.

At one point during discussion General Hamlett recalls—though he is not sure of exact wording—that Secretary asked Mayor Brandt what he felt would be results in event Soviets sign separate peace treaty with East Germans. Mayor Brandt made rather broad statement to effect that in such event Allies would have great deal more difficulty than West Berliners since East Germans already handling German access.

During course of discussion Secretary asked several questions indicating great interest in morale of the Berliners. Mayor Brandt assured him that the rank and file of Berliners were as strong as ever and that the healthy economic situation reflected optimism on part of businessmen and industrialists. General Hamlett stated that as an indication of morale of US garrison, including dependents and civilians, not one family had requested to be sent home from Berlin because of situation existing here, nor to his knowledge had any Department of Defense or statement [State] personnel arriving here as replacements made provision for maintaining their families in United States. He stated further that apprehension which we had reported from here (ourtels 43 and 45 to Geneva)³ in his opinion had developed in political circles and did not reflect general attitude of rank and file. Mayor Brandt made no comment.

Gufler

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1395. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution.
1. Telegram 30 to Berlin (Secto 395 from Geneva), July 27, requested a record of this meeting. (Ibid., Central Files, 396.1–GE/7–2759)
2. Telegram 25 from Berlin, July 6, transmitted detailed figures on the strength and types of troops in the Berlin garrison. (Ibid., 762.0221/7–659)
3. Telegram 43 is printed as telegram 111, Document 470. Telegram 45 is the same as telegram 113, which is summarized in footnote 2, Document 470.