Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

470. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State⁰

Berlin, July 22, 1959, 9 p.m.

111. Paris for Embassy, USRO, Thurston and West. Geneva for Hillenbrand. Reference: Ourtel 37 to Geneva, 95 Bonn, 102 Department.¹ At informal meeting with Commandants and Deputy Commandants convened at his request, Mayor Amrehn presented at behest of Senat lucid statement of Senat’s concern over extent to which Senat considered Western powers had departed from stand on Berlin taken in November and December and over apparent deterioration in Western determination to resist Soviet pressures. Amrehn’s statement clearly the most pessimistic evaluation so far made officially even though couched in polite and reserved phraseology. Senator Klein told me personally Sunday morning that Saturday’s Senat meeting was “gloomy” session.²

Amrehn statement follows in summary form:

Mayor Amrehn, speaking in English, stated he wished to inform Commandants of conclusions drawn by Senat in Saturday meeting during which Senat reviewed events since November and Geneva outlook, Senat confirmed stand taken in November that ultimatum must be withdrawn and that no concessions should be made without concessions in return. Senat wished Mayor Amrehn to emphasize to Commandants desire of Senat to maintain this strong position, particularly now when “some other opinions” are being revealed at Geneva. Geneva has left impression that Western position had deviated from the one unanimously accepted at beginning of crisis. In admittedly cautious statement Amrehn said June 16 proposals went “a little beyond” limit Senat would have approved and Senat would have made its objections known if consulted beforehand.

In commenting specifically on June 16 proposals, Amrehn said he was surprised to read that Western powers would be willing accept agent theory which would have been discarded months ago. Regarding Western proposal to agree no nuclear weapons in Berlin, Amrehn said this understandable proposal but Senat hopes that price will be required from other side for any such concession. He referred to views already expressed by Brandt on limitation or reduction size Allied troops and called attention to fact that Senat has good evidence that a policy paper prepared by GDR authorities includes plans for Soviet Zone German Communist directed and manned “revolts” in West Berlin which will have as targets police stations, radio transmitters, city hall, etc. Therefore certain number of Western troops vital to maintain public order. Proposals on prohibition certain activities in Berlin difficult carry out without jeopardizing constitutional rights.

Regarding second phase Geneva Amrehn noted that Gromyko in proposing all-German committee maintained that Berlin problem cannot be separated from all-German problem. Gromyko now gives appearance of having accepted original Western opinion, whereas Allies have only discussed interim Berlin solution. Amrehn agreed it necessary to come to some interim agreement on Berlin to give time to discuss all-German problem. As indicative of change in atmosphere of discussion at Geneva which has caused Senat alarm, Mayor Amrehn cited recent article in Le Monde, reflecting semi-official view, which stated that Berlin is untenable and must be sold to Russians as expensively as possible and that Allies should facilitate evacuation of Berliners wanting to leave and construct “Chinese wall” along the Iron Curtain. (French Commandant afterwards explained that Le Monde not semi-official mouthpiece but that regrettably many were under impression it is.)

Amrehn then presented certain principles which in Senat view are essential: (1) West should not offer any concession without demanding counter-concessions. Amrehn suggested that weakness of June 16 proposals lay in fact that West did not say to Russians if you prepared grant free access, recognition Allied rights Berlin, ties of Berlin with FedRep, etc. (matters on which no concession by West should be made), we will discuss problem of limitation of troops, etc. (2) No solution should be acceptable in which date of expiration fixed short of reunification. As long as time period fixed, Russian threat to Berlin kept alive and Berlin remains hostage for Russian demands. (3) Any form of recognition GDR cannot be considered. No steps should be taken towards recognition or towards formation all-German committee. (Amrehn cited, as type of occurrence causing “sorrow” among colleagues, a July 20 London Times article reporting Lloyd attempt persuade Von Brentano that FedRep should agree, to some form East-West German talks.) Senat realizes certain technical conversations necessary of type already carried on (e.g. commercial talks); Brandt’s proposal of inter-administrative commission provides for discussion between experts but only under responsibility four powers. (4) Because of impossibility of reaching agreed basis for restricting certain activities involving public media of expression, UN control would not be practicable.

Senat colleagues, Mayor Amrehn revealed, alarmed pver fact that, because in second phase Geneva West started from June 16 proposals and Gromyko proposed all-German committee, a new compromise would be required going beyond June 16 proposals. Mayor Amrehn tried to calm colleagues by saying compromise might be sought on another plane by West’s proposing UN control of traffic to Berlin. This would be consistent with Senat contention that any UN involvement should be additional to, and not supplant, Allied rights and responsibilities. Any UN control should be exercised by UN’s own officials rather than by representatives of other countries.

Amrehn stressed importance of avoiding unclear formulations in any possible agreement, citing as example that should West agree accept GDR personnel as agents in “control” of access, “control” must be clearly defined as it has not been so far.

Amrehn confirmed that Senat paper on proposals for improvement in access field under preparation. Since proposals technical in nature and therefore not appropriate for discussion on FonMin level, they will not be forwarded to conference. Discussions on proposals will continue with FedRep representatives and paper will be readied for possible future need. Amrehn also touched on relationship Berlin to FedRep. Senat is of opinion that integration of Berlin into FedRep must continue in the future but main problem presently is that measure of integration already achieved be maintained. Small Senat committee will begin discussions in fall on problem of strengthening Berlin-FedRep relations. Mayor Amrehn also remarked that Berlin population remains calm and trusts fully in its own moral force and in protection of Allied authorities.

In closing, Amrehn stressed again Senat’s hopes that policy of November-December will be continued and that West will remain as firm and strong as possible.

Gufler

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/7–2259. Confidential. Transmitted in two sections; also sent to Bonn; and repeated to London, Paris, Geneva, and Moscow.
1. Telegram 37, July 21, reported that Amrehn himself wanted to brief the three Berlin Commandants on the results of the Berlin Senat meeting on July 18. (Ibid., 762.0221/7–2159)
2. In telegram 113, July 22, Gufler reported that the outlook of Berlin’s political and other leaders had reached the “gloomiest level since Berlin crisis began last November.” He also noted that several observers who had returned to the city after prolonged absences were impressed by the decline in morale in the city. (Ibid., 762A.00/7–2259)