Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

235. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

MVW USDEL MC/10

Camp David, March 20, 1959, 6:30–7:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Prime Minister Macmillan’s Visits to Paris and Bonn

PARTICIPANTS

• The President
• The Prime Minister
• Mr. Herter
• Mr. Selwyn Lloyd
• Ambassador Whitney
• Sir Norman Brook
• General Goodpaster
• Sir Frederick Hoyer-Millar
• Mr. Merchant
• Sir Harold Caccia
• Mr. Bishop

The Prime Minister gave a brief report on his visit to Paris.¹ He said in general he found the French relaxed, but firm on Berlin. Debre he thought very nice. General de Gaulle talked a great deal and left on Mr. Macmillan a firm impression that he is the boss. De Gaulle seemed obsessed with the atom bomb in terms of its constituting the ultimate weapon which left nations not possessing it in a secondary role. According to Macmillan, de Gaulle felt there was no use preparing for possible difficulty by mobilization or other preparedness measures. Macmillan indicated that this attitude was incomprehensible to him. De Gaulle also was reported as considering the main issue or crucial point [was] that at which there was actual blockage of the Allied access to Berlin. In conclusion Macmillan said that the French “agreed with them on everything.”

With respect to his visit to Bonn, the Prime Minister said that he and the Chancellor agreed well.² He mentioned that in his private talk with Adenauer the latter had suggested securing a commitment from the Russians as a condition precedent to holding a summit meeting an undertaking that the status quo would be preserved for five years. Macmillan said he did not agree to this and that in the subsequent plenary session the idea was explicitly abandoned.

The Prime Minister believed that the Chancellor had moved into a fundamentally different position from the past. He thinks that he can now live with the status quo though it would be wrong to abandon public lip service to this objective. He said that the Germans agreed with the British in believing that a fixed date for the summit meeting should be offered in the Western replies to the Soviet note. It was also agreed between them to make as a condition for a summit meeting either through diplomatic channels or by incorporation in the note the understanding that there would be no unilateral alteration of the status quo prior to and during the process of negotiation.

Mr. Macmillan said that the Chancellor then inquired about the British ideas for an area or zone of inspection. Macmillan felt that his explanation satisfied the Chancellor and relieved his fears. He said that he told the Germans what he had in mind was an inspection zone within which there would be ceilings on both sides of the lines on force levels and limitations on armaments. Its establishment, however, would be subject to the following three principles: First, there should be no alteration of the present balance of forces to the disadvantage of the West; secondly, its terms should be such that NATO would not be broken up; nor, thirdly, the United States be forced out of Europe. On the latter point he expressed his view that if United States forces were removed from Germany they would in fact have no place to go except home.

Mr. Macmillan said he went on to emphasize to the Chancellor that he was not thinking of disengagement nor of the creation of a great neutral no man’s land which would constitute a dangerous vacuum under modern conditions of war. What he was trying to do was to quell the appeal of the Rapacki plan which had caught the imagination of many unsophisticated people.

The President interjected that he was still confused concerning Adenauer’s understanding on the question of prior conditions for a summit meeting because he had been very explicit in telling Bruce after the Macmillan visit that Macmillan had agreed to a five-year standstill as a condition precedent.

Mr. Macmillan replied that when they had heard of this apparent misunderstanding they had sent their Ambassador back to von Brentano who assured him that there was no misunderstanding on the Chancellor’s part nor on his own.

The President then said jokingly that if we could get a commitment from the Russians to make no change in the status quo for five years then we could postpone going to the summit until the end of that period. He then went on to say with utmost seriousness that he would not go to a meeting under circumstances which made it appear that he had his hat in his hand. To him there was an elemental requirement which must be met and that was the Soviets negotiate at a foreign ministers’ meeting in good faith and progress be revealed. He said with finality that he would not agree at this time to go to a summit meeting on a fixed date.

There then followed some conversation on the report which had been received of a statement by Adenauer before his party members to the effect that the Federal Republic might or should extend de facto recognition to the GDR. It was noted that if this report was confirmed it represented a very substantial shift in Adenauer’s position on relations with the GDR.

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1214. Secret. Drafted by Merchant. The meeting was held at Aspen Lodge. The beginning of the conversation is recorded in MVW USDEL MC/9, during which Macmillan reported on his visit to Moscow. (Ibid.) For the President’s account of this conversation, see Waging Peace, pp. 353–354; for Macmillan’s account of the sessions at Camp David, see Riding the Storm, p. 645.
1. See Document 213.
2. See Documents 217 and 219.