157. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State0
Secto 4. During meeting late this afternoon at FonOff Secretary and Selwyn Lloyd discussed principally Berlin and related problems. Lloyd said it seemed Western powers were in state of disarray in development their positions. However van Scherpenberg on Thursday1 had given British impression that Federal Republic prepared to show some flexibility on such issues as frontiers and areas of limited armament. Lloyd noted that he opposed agreement on latter point if it involved discrimination against foreign troops, but thought that concept area of controlled limitation had merit.
FonSec outlined British view that meeting with Soviets should take place late April or early May, that note to Soviets should suggest specific time and place, and that further meeting 4 Foreign Ministers (presumably at time NATO meeting) would be necessary before Western substantive position formulated.
Secretary said problem seemed to fall into two parts: (a) Berlin and what Western powers should do if Soviets proceeded to hand control of access over to GDR; (b) what Western powers did about possible negotiations with Soviets and how and when they should try to bring these about. Re date of meeting he indicated it desirable to start before May 27. French, however, did not share this view. In conversation yesterday Secretary with Ambassador Alphand,2 latter reiterated point [Page 318] that asking for meeting before May 27 would be sign of weakness. Secretary said he had agreed to accept either naming of date in note to Soviets, or merely saying that date and place should be mutually agreed, leaving specific arrangements to Ambassadors. Advantage of meeting with Soviets before May 27, Secretary continued, was that it might provide Soviets with way out of their extreme Berlin position if they wanted to find it. If meeting were held Western powers would face many problems, both substantive and procedural.
Re substance, Secretary said he thought Western position might be basically same as that of November 1955,3 though it could be embellished to some extent. Actually Western powers had never been able to get across merits their position. Molotov had clearly put them on defensive by misrepresenting proposals at outset. US was prepared to consider thinning out of forces, giving considerable weight to military views as to desirability, but agreed there should be no discrimination either as to foreign troops or as to country covered. Our thesis is that no nation today is strong enough to protect its own security; countries must help each other. If we admit that foreign troops in Germany are per se evil, then the whole concept would be undermined. Thinning out could therefore be considered, but not elimination of foreign forces. In general if discriminatory provisions were applied to Germany in any settlement, we would again reap consequences similar to those of Versailles. Some formulation which still kept portion of our forces in Germany and which was broader than Germany in application, preferably broader than Poland and Czechoslovakia as well, might be considered.
After Lloyd had stated that one of basic questions was whether Germans really wanted reunification or not, Secretary referred to letter he had just received from Adenauer.4 He described it as essentially devoted to lengthy argument as to why Western powers should not concentrate on reunification.
Secretary noted that reasoning was quite fallacious. Point emphasized that partition of Germany was not cause but effect of present tensions. It was scarcely necessary to emphasize this to Western powers. However Chancellor drew conclusion that because they allegedly held this view they were under great pressure to pay too big price for German reunification which theoretically would solve all world problems. Lloyd commented that, out of loyalty to Adenauer, Western powers had been saying, somewhat tongue in cheek, that division of Germany is basic cause of tensions. Secretary noted that Adenauer took position that we should almost drop German question and concentrate on disarmament.
[Page 319]After our two recent experiences at Geneva we do not feel that this is a particularly fruitful field at present time. Attempt to shift entire attention to disarmament field would be futile. We could not get away from problem which Soviets were posing, making Germany and Berlin focal point.
Lloyd commented that this consonant with what Scherpenberg said. Latter said re reunification that all that was needed was a little light at end of long tunnel. However any neutralization formula was unacceptable, and most Germans saw this.
After Lloyd had noted that Scherpenberg had indicated some UN interest in Berlin might be useful Secretary said he believed that once troops of three Western powers left Berlin game would be up. At least people of West Berlin felt that way. He mentioned that Brandt was arriving in US next week, and would undoubtedly have effect on American opinion. Secretary said that talk about UN involved resort to vague formula. It was not corporate body with forces of its own. If agreement could be reached that UN would designate three Western powers to act for it in Berlin, that would be satisfactory, but Soviets could hardly accept. He added that one could conceivably find UN troops to replace Western forces. This would be difficult to arrange. Berliners might have sufficient confidence if these forces had adequate strength with clear mandate, but experience proved UN forces tended to disintegrate.
Lloyd said he regarded UN aspect as essentially move in game. He could not see it as effective, but idea that whole of Berlin might be under UN tutelage with guarantee of access had appeal. Soviets probably could not accept. During discussion possibility UN guarantee, Secretary noted that UN as such could not give guarantee.
Jebb who also present noted that under Article 51 of Charter members would be in position to take such action as deemed desirable. Secretary reiterated that he did not see any real practical substitute to having our troops in Berlin. Mikoyan had emphasized that East Berlin belonged to GDR and could not be included in any plan. Best to hope for was that Soviets would allow their Berlin proposals to lapse.
Lloyd then asked to hear latest thinking re contingency plans. He noted that in case Quemoy–Matsu British were able to help by focusing on issue improper use of force by Red Chinese. In recent instance problem was to make certain issue selected was one public would support.
Secretary noted that there had been some differences in US Government as to how to deal with problem. Some wanted to start right away with military preparations of far-reaching character. He was inclined to doubt wisdom of these, but would go along, if European Allies desired them. However paper threat to do this, especially if negotiations envisaged, would not work. He doubted that military measures should be [Page 320] taken before May 27 which would disturb public, such as evacuation of dependents, partial mobilization in US, etc. This seemed premature until there had been some overt Soviet act. Secretary was inclined to think that Western powers might take some preliminary measures Soviet intelligence could pick up but which did not attract public attention.
Secretary stressed his belief that we should not accept substitution GDR officials for Soviets at check points. Such acceptance would constitute crossing Rubicon. Once we had done this, a whittling down process would begin moving inevitably towards acceptance authority of GDR. We must adhere to position that we are in Berlin as victors. If GDR allowed to exercise controls over us it would substantially undermine foundation our position.
Secretary noted that, under American concept, if it developed that Western attempt to send military truck through accompanied by scout car or by MPs were prevented, either by shooting or by obstruction then effort would be dropped at that point and we would move into second double-barrelled phase of political offensive and military preparation.
Lloyd said British had not yet made up their minds, but stressed that they could not see how Allies could have expanding military action without taking certain military preparatory measures. If you did not do latter Soviets would know West was bluffing. He felt air lift should be kept in reserve. If plane were shot down this would present clear issue.
Secretary said we did not like airlift concept. When Lloyd queried whether this applied to garrison air lift, Secretary noted that garrison had ample stocks for provisional period. If civil traffic were stopped, that would be another matter. Complete blockade would raise new issues. Situation in Berlin was different than in 1948, apart from Soviet jamming capabilities.
Lloyd said Scherpenberg expressed belief GDR would not want to stop Allied traffic initially, but would gradually convert into attempt to impose controls.
Secretary said it was important to see purpose behind Soviet moves. They wished minimize psychological effect of free Berlin. He had been impressed on visit last May with dynamic nature West sectors. This was contrast with unpopular regime in East Germany. Discussion Berlin ended with remark by Hoyer Millar who also present that one concession West might make would be to cut down propaganda and related activities in West Berlin.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/2–559. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Transmitted in two sections and repeated to Moscow, Bonn, Paris, and Berlin. The meeting was held at 5 p.m. on February 4 at the Foreign Office. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers, Dulles Daily Appointment Book)↩
- January 29.↩
- See Document 153.↩
- Documentation on the Geneva Foreign Ministers Meeting, October 27–November 16, 1955, is in Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. V, pp. 632 ff.↩
- Document 151.↩