Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Berlin Crisis, 1958–1959, Volume VIII

153. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

Washington, February 3, 1959, 11:33 a.m.–noon.

SUBJECT

• Berlin and Germany

PARTICIPANTS

• M. Hervé Alphand, French Ambassador
• M. Charles Lucet, Minister, French Embassy
• The Secretary
• Mr. Livingston T. Merchant, Assistant Secretary
• Mr. Matthew J. Looram, WE

The French Ambassador stated that he had seen General de Gaulle last week and had found him absolutely firm on the Berlin issue. De Gaulle believed that the Western powers should use every means necessary—not excluding force—to maintain free access to Berlin and that this position should be made known to the Soviets. De Gaulle felt that if the GDR authorities were to insist on our presenting documents at control points, we should refuse to comply and continue on through to Berlin. Similarly if obstacles were erected, they should be removed and we should proceed to Berlin. General de Gaulle felt, however, that we should not be provocative or be the first to use force.

M. Alphand stated he thought it would be useful for the Secretary when in Paris to explain to de Gaulle his views regarding an air lift. He felt that if an air lift were considered no more than a tentative possibility, de Gaulle would understand.

Regarding a foreign ministers conference, the Ambassador stated that General de Gaulle felt very strongly that we should not propose a specific date in our reply to the Soviets and certainly not a date prior to May 27. To do so, de Gaulle felt, would be a sign of weakness and an indication that we were desperately seeking a compromise solution. Despite the foregoing, de Gaulle was disposed to having talks with the Soviets and in fact hoped that there would be a conference on the overall issues affecting Germany. De Gaulle did not believe that we should consider recognizing the GDR, but he thought it might prove feasible to arrive at a modus vivendi which would involve de facto relations between the Federal Republic and the Western powers on the one hand and the GDR on the other.

M. Alphand stated that the French realized that the official U.S. position on Germany was absolutely firm, but at the same time they regretted the current press speculation to the effect that the U.S. position was flexible and that discussions with Congressional leaders had indicated a willingness on the part of the U.S. Government to accept alternative solutions for Germany including something along the lines of the Rapacki plan. The French felt that these rumors gave an unfortunate impression of hesitation and disunity on the part of the West. For this reason the French welcomed all the more the Secretary’s imminent visit to London, Paris and Bonn.

The Secretary stated he did not think there was any disposition in the country to be anything but firm on Berlin; however, it was more difficult when it came to the precise actions to be taken. He felt there was a danger that the Western position might be “nibbled away” by reluctance on our part to stand firm on apparently minor points that might not appear worth making an issue of. He believed, however, that we had a sound position, which could be dramatized, in maintaining that for one of the German victors, namely the Soviet Union, to turn over to the defeated element controls affecting the other victors was intolerable. Technically there was still a state of war with Germany. We should accordingly not accept substitution of the GDR authorities for the Soviet authorities on control of access to Berlin. We would be willing to identify ourselves at control points, but we would not accept control or inspection by the GDR authorities. Details as to the precise actions that might be necessary would require further study.

Regarding the date for a possible foreign ministers conference, the Secretary said that it has not been our opinion that suggesting a date prior to May 27 might be interpreted as a sign of weakness, particuarly in view of the fact that as of last September 30,¹ we had already suggested a conference with the Soviets on German reunification and European security. Moreover, irrespective of the Soviet proposals, we would not be disposed to limit the agenda solely to discussion of the Berlin issue. Nevertheless, the Secretary stated in our reply to the Soviets it might be preferable to propose holding a conference “at a mutually satisfactory time and place”.

The French Ambassador stated this was the wording in the French draft reply.² Moreover, de Gaulle had told him that if the Soviets came back with a subsequent reply suggesting a date prior to May 27, he would then have no objection to accepting such a date.

The Secretary mentioned the likelihood that as a result of our proposing a conference on Germany and European security, the Soviets might raise the issue of composition at such a conference. He added that he had just received a letter from Chancellor Adenauer³ saying he thought it would be undesirable to focus the conference on the issue of German reunification. Adenauer thought if we did this, public pressures would mount for settling this question, even on unfavorable terms, under the illusion that this would resolve all outstanding East-West issues. Adenauer accordingly preferred that the principal subject for a conference be disarmament.

The French Ambassador thought that taking such a line would be unrealistic. The Secretary said he was inclined to agree, particularly in view of the fact that the current nuclear test suspension conference in Geneva was on the verge of collapse. In this connection, the Secretary stated, he thought the Soviet position insisting on unanimity for the control commission was ludicrous. It tended to confirm his earlier impression that the Soviets would be unwilling to accept genuine controls.

In conclusion the Secretary stated that he thought the French and U.S. positions were close together and agreement should be able to be reached between them on these matters. M. Alphand concurred, but stated he thought the British position was less firm. The Secretary agreed and mentioned that he had heard a news broadcast to the effect that Prime Minister Macmillan might visit Moscow.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/2–359. Secret. Drafted by Looram and approved by Greene on February 11. The time of the meeting is from Dulles Daily Appointment Book. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers) A summary of the conversation was transmitted to Paris in telegram 2785, February 3. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/2–359) Alphand had just returned from a 5-day visit to Paris, January 28–February 2, for consultations. For his brief account of the visit and his conversation with Dulles on February 3, see L’Etonnement, pp. 300–301.
1. For text of the Western notes of September 30, 1958, proposing the establishment of a four-power working group to draft a solution to the German problem, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, pp. 584–587.
2. This draft was delivered to the Department on January 28 and transmitted to the Embassy in Paris in telegram 2683 the same day. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/1–2859)
3. See Document 151.