Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

84. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State⁰

Bonn, December 11, 1959, 7 p.m.

Secun 6. Eyes only Ambassadors. Department repeat to Murphy in Tomur series. In private 30 minute meeting with Adenauer he described his recent talk with Macmillan.¹ He said there had been certain personal difficulties in that Macmillan felt that the Chancellor had inspired German press to attack Great Britain and Macmillan individually. When Adenauer proved to Macmillan that he was in error Macmillan apologized and Chancellor said this incident was now closed.

Chancellor said the other subject he discussed with Macmillan was relationships between Six and Seven. Chancellor said Macmillan took this very seriously and told him unless satisfactory relations could be worked out between EFTA and EEC within reasonable time there were bound to be serious unfortunate consequences of a political and military nature in UK’s relations with EEC countries. Chancellor took this as thin veiled threat to withdraw British troops from Germany. When Chancellor suggested early negotiations between the two groups Macmillan’s response was not favorable and Macmillan did not seem pleased about Adenauer’s suggestion that US should take part in talks between Six and Seven. On other hand Adenauer said Macmillan told him that US now recognized political usefulness of Common Market and was fully prepared to accept its continued existence as a constructive part of European scene.

I informed Chancellor that my conversation with Macmillan² had closely paralleled what Macmillan had told Chancellor except for total lack of threat regarding British political and military action if relations between EEC and EFTA not settled to UK’s satisfaction. I also said that British had appeared to welcome my suggestion that US take more active part in European trade talks, specifically in talks between Six and Seven.

Chancellor’s overall estimate of situation was that British were reassured regarding economic consequences to UK of creation of Common Market and therefore were in no particular hurry to commence negotiations. However, British did not look with favor on creation of strong political grouping on the continent of which they were not a part. Since they were not prepared to join Common Market in its terms and since agreement between Common Market and EFTA on British terms appeared unlikely British were intentionally keeping whole matter in certain state of flux in the hope that some solution would develop. This appraisal of current British policy seems reasonable to me.

Chancellor finished his private remarks by emphasizing the necessity for close relations between France and Germany as the basis for European survival in face of pressures from the East, and that therefore value of EEC was primarily a political one in that it bound France and Germany together in a framework of European integration.

Dillon

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 375.42/12–1159. Secret. Repeated to London, Bonn, and New Delhi.
1. During his November 17–19 visit to London.
2. See Document 82.