Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

54. Telegram From the Mission at the European Communities to the Department of State⁰

Brussels, April 6, 1959, 6 p.m.

Ecbus 273. Joint USEC/Embassy message for Department and AEC (Wells).

1. USEC and Embassy officers met with EURATOM officials (Staderini and Van Helmont) Friday regarding “Ottawa Powers”¹ project for formulating uniform nuclear safeguards and control policies among principal suppliers and IAEA. EURATOM informed of developments since initial contact made by Schaetzel early March.² Revised sample safeguards article drafted in London meeting handed Van Helmont and possibility joint US–EURATOM approach to Belgian Government discussed.

2. EURATOM officials particularly interested in initial favorable reaction of Goldschmidt (London’s 4878).³ They asked if approach was on basis general principle or if aide-mémoire or other text supplied French Government.

3. Staderini and Van Helmont in basic agreement with general approach and felt desirable Commission cooperate in sounding out Belgians and subsequently Germans. However, decision to participate requires Commission approval, which they would hope be able obtain at April 8 Commission meeting. As principal Belgian official concerned (Acting Commissioner Verwilghen) absent from Brussels until April 14, hope we would be in position to make joint approach around April 15.

4. Staderini and Van Helmont reasonably sure EURATOM Commissioners (as indeed any reasonable European) would agree desirability of minimum standards for safeguards. However, they made it clear could not commit EURATOM acceptance specific provisions draft safeguards article without further study, though initial reaction good. In this connection, and in view firm (but unwritten) EURATOM Commission decision not to administer safeguards outside community, they assumed the “international agency” referred to in draft article would mean in particular IAEA. They also enquired whether was US intention attempt transfer bilateral safeguards (in present US bilateral agreements) to IAEA.

5. Re next steps after initial consultation Belgians and Germans, EURATOM officials thought meeting of Five Powers plus France, Belgium, Germany, and EURATOM would be desirable and they believed EURATOM would participate. This connection, they pointed out meaning proposed safeguards article strongly dependent on underlying principles of safeguards system, such as nature “international agency,” definition of trigger items, exemption minimum quantities, et cetera. They assumed would be opportunity presumably at proposed May meeting to make suggestions and to discuss these questions. Also possible that other participating countries may have views.

6. Re subsequent meeting with broader group EURATOM officials feel strongly it should not be called by ENEA or take place under OEEC auspices for substantially the same reasons mentioned paragraph three London’s 5082.⁴ They feel Swedes or Austrians may confuse issue thoroughly by insisting on discussion ENEA/EURATOM problems which can be worked out with time and patience.

7. During course conversation EURATOM officials asked specifically if US may export source materials outside of provisions of cooperation agreement and if so what are maximum quantities. Department/AEC guidance in replying requested.

8. Proposed Belgian uranium sale to Japan (Deptel 1448)⁵ not discussed in meeting. Van Helmont made clear in private conversation EURATOM aware Belgian plans but gave no indication Commission viewpoint. Belgian Foreign Office informed Embassy this morning they had heard from Groven that US had given its agreement to proposed Belgian sale.

9. Embassy/USEC feel would be useful for Meyers participate in discussions with Belgians. Will inform London when dates fixed.

10. Comment: Believe EURATOM responsive to rationale and principle of uniform safeguard standards. For future discussions, however, we feel will be necessary provide Commission with more definite details of conclusions reached during London meeting. Is it expected summary conclusions London meetings (CA 7827) can be made available in some form to EURATOM when fully cleared?

Butterworth

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 840.1901/4–659. Confidential. Repeated to Luxembourg, Paris, London, Vienna, and Brussels.
1. Apparently a reference to the United Kingdom, Canada, South Africa, Australia, and the United States which had been developing a common policy for nuclear safeguards.
2. Schaetzel met with EURATOM officials on March 2, 4, and 5. A report on these discussions was transmitted in CA–7827, March 13. (Department of State, Central Files, 840.1901/3–1359)
3. Telegram 4878, March 20, summarized a conversation between U.S. and U.K. officials on nuclear safeguards and plans for expanded discussions with other states on this issue. (ibid., 600.0012/3–2059)
4. Telegram 5082 from London, March 3, reported British views on the nuclear safeguard issue. (ibid., 600.0012/4–359)
5. Telegram 1448 to Brussels, April 1, outlined the U.S. position on safeguards for the proposed transfer of 2-1/2 tons of uranium ore from Belgium to Japan. (ibid., 600.0012/4–159)