Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

320. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

June 3, 1960, 4:20-5:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Meeting With Prime Minister Diefenbaker

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The President
  • Secretary of State Herter
  • Ambassador Wigglesworth
  • Livingston T. Merchant
  • General Goodpaster
• Canada
  • Prime Minister Diefenbaker
  • Ambassador Heeney
  • Robert Bryce, Secretary of the
  • Canadian Cabinet Basil Robinson

The President and the Prime Minister had just concluded over an hour’s private conversation.¹

As the others joined them, the President remarked that the Prime Minister had said that the price proposed for the F–101B’s seemed too high and that he, the President, had already asked the Department of Defense to check on this matter.

The Prime Minister then opened the conversation by referring to the open skies proposal by the President to be presented before the UN.

The President confirmed that we intended to present such a proposal to the General Assembly but that he did not intend to present it personally.

The Prime Minister said that he thought there would be virtue in having the proposal co-sponsored by several countries in addition to the U.S. when it was presented to the United Nations, and he stated that Canada would be happy to be a co-sponsor, recalling various offers made in the past by Canada for opening its own territory for observation on a reciprocal basis with the Soviet Union.

The President and the Secretary both indicated that they would be delighted to work out the proposal with others and to present it as a joint proposal of several countries including Canada.

The Prime Minister then raised the question of our recent four-year wheat deal with India. He said that there had been consultation in advance with Canada on this but that one serious effect seemed to be that it was driving Australia out of the Indian market with the result that Australia was seeking imports in Latin America to the competitive detriment of Canada. He said that many past frictions connected with our surplus wheat disposal had been effectively removed but that the Indian deal gave trouble to Canada.

There followed a considerable discussion of the relative size of Canada’s and the United States’ wheat surplus and the problem thereby created.

The President observed that there was a basic anomaly in hungry mouths in many parts of the world and food surpluses elsewhere. He wondered whether improved methods of cooperation with Canada and other surplus-producing countries might not be devised to ameliorate the problem.

The Prime Minister at this point said that the credit terms offered by CCC were hurting Canada’s wheat sales in certain Latin American countries. He then went on to talk of the proposals he had made in 1957 for the establishment of a food bank by NATO² and the failure of any constructive response to his proposal. He agreed on the seriousness of the problem the President had described and thought that we should continue our consultations on the matter.

The Prime Minister then raised the question of NATO. He felt that there was a need to reassess its purpose and its plans for the next ten years. In reply to a question, he said that he was considering the possibility of its extension on a broader scale into economic matters. He also spoke disparagingly of the 1957 NATO Heads of Government meeting which had not achieved, in his judgment, anything of significance. He added that he desired to inform the President that within the next few days he intended to make the public suggestion that another meeting of the Heads of Government of NATO should be called in the not distant future.

The Secretary of State observed that at the December Ministerial meeting he had proposed that NATO embark on a ten-year planning exercise to be conducted through the Permanent Council. He told the Prime Minister of the establishment of a task force under Dr. Bowie’s chairmanship on the basis of whose work the United States Government hoped to have constructive proposals to raise before the NATO Council this summer with a view to our thoughts and those of others being debated at the December Ministerial meeting. He added that we would be glad to consult with Canada during the process of our own preparation to make a contribution to this project.

The Prime Minister then indicated that he would make his NATO Heads of Government proposal at De Pauw University where he will be speaking in a few days.

The President then raised the question as to whether Canada should invite the NATO Council to meet at some future time in Canada.

The Prime Minister said he would be delighted to issue such an invitation and confirmed that in Quebec they had all the necessary facilities.

The President reiterated his belief that it would be desirable to hold a meeting in Canada, particularly since the Tenth Anniversary meeting a year ago had been held in Washington. (The President presumably was not suggesting that the Prime Minister’s impending proposal for a Heads of Government meeting of NATO necessarily be linked with its being held in Canada.)

The Prime Minister then raised in somewhat critical fashion the fact that he had learned recently from Harold Macmillan that there was a proposal under consideration by the UK, US and USSR to conduct seismic research through establishment of 20 or more stations on Canadian soil in connection with underground tests. This would involve US, UK, USSR and neutral inspection teams in Canada. He expressed surprise that such a proposal had gone so far without our consulting Canada.

Both the President and the Secretary expressed surprise and complete ignorance of any such proposal.

It was finally developed through interventions by Ambassador Heeney and Mr. Bryce that there had been over a period of time consultation at the scientific expert level between Canadian and British, and possibly US, scientists of the UK making its contribution to a joint research program with the Russians in connection with sub-threshold nuclear underground explosions by means of establishing British seismic stations on Canadian soil to take distant readings on US underground nuclear explosions approved under a joint research program.

The Prime Minister seemed reasonably satisfied with this explanation, but he then went on to mention his disturbance over a proposal made by the US Atomic Energy Commission some months ago to conduct an atomic explosion in the Alberta oil fields. There was some inconclusive discussion of this and it appeared that the Prime Minister had not been made at the time fully aware of the actual facts.

Skyshield was then raised and the Prime Minister reported that in his private discussion with the President he had agreed that there should be further joint examination of the project at the military level and that he would then make his own decision as to approval by June 15.³ (Subsequently, Mr. Bryce informed Mr. Merchant that he had every expectation that Canadian approval would be forthcoming by that date.)

The Prime Minister then reverted to the nuclear test negotiations in Geneva and his concern over Canada’s possible involvement with inadequate consultation.

The President requested the Secretary of State to look into the matter with a view to ascertaining the facts concerning any plans affecting Canada and to communicate the results of his investigation to the Canadian Government.

The President reaffirmed that nothing affecting Canada or its interest in this general connection had reached the political or governmental level in the United States.

(General Goodpaster came in at this point.)

The Prime Minister and the President then briefly referred to Bomarc which had been a subject of discussion in their private talk. The Prime Minister indicated that he understood that the appropriation of the necessary funds for going ahead on this program depended upon action in the Senate and that the Administration was working to secure favorable action.⁴

The Prime Minister then reverted to wheat and said that he had gone over with the President the difficulty which our provision of credit terms for export sales to Latin America and Africa was creating for Canada. The President inquired as to our machinery for consultation and the Prime Minister agreed that it existed and was functioning well. He thought, however, we should try to work out some sort of a plan to pool a percentage of our food surplus to feed the hungry.

The Secretary of State reminded the Prime Minister of the President’s earlier proposal for Food for Peace and the amount of effort within the United States Government being devoted to this matter.

The Prime Minister closed that aspect of the discussion by saying that it was impossible for allies to be successfully united in common defense and then take actions which harmed one another economically.

The conversation then turned to the general question of aid for the underdeveloped areas of the world on the part of the industrialized countries. The President said that he had talked at length to Adenauer, De Gaulle and Macmillan on this subject. Possibly some plan could be worked out whereby this help could take in part the form of donations from food surpluses.

The President then remarked that he was most anxious that on both sides we should seek to avoid news stories designed to upset the other and to maintain so close a relationship that speculative stories based on misinformation did not in fact give rise to concern.

The Prime Minister discoursed at some length on the extent to which the Canadian air and press are filled with news of America whereas for weeks on end there will not be, in Time, for example, even one line on Canada.

The Prime Minister and the President then briefly discussed the various Cabinet committees, Defense Joint committees, and parliamentary groups and agreed that they were all functioning well. The Prime Minister said he felt the Parliamentary Joint Committees had been extremely helpful.

The Prime Minister then raised the question of US attitude toward Communist China and inquired whether the President’s views had changed since he imparted them to the Prime Minister in Ottawa, July, 1958.⁵ He inquired particularly as to how Communist China would be handled in any disarmament program.

The President said that there had been no change in his views with respect to Communist China. He said that he always qualified such a statement by the phrase “under existing circumstances.” He felt confident of one thing and that was that, if Communist China was admitted to the United Nations, it would be impossible for the United Nations headquarters to remain in the United States. He said that Communist China was one subject on which the American people were almost unanimous and that those who proposed UN membership for Peking should take into account the almost certain result this would have of American withdrawal from the UN. As for disarmament, the President said, of course, to be meaningful in any world wide agreement Communist China would have to be party. He did not see, however, why this would require recognition or admission to the UN.

The Prime Minister then raised the question of the Columbia River negotiations.⁶ He and the President agreed that they seemed to be going very well. The President inquired as to General McNaughton’s health and told one or two anecdotes dealing with General McNaughton during the war.

Reverting to the Far East, the Prime Minister inquired whether the President was worried over the situation with respect to Formosa and also whether we were expecting serious difficulty over Berlin, in which latter subject Khrushchev had been very explicit.⁷

The President said in effect that he was not worried about any sector of the free world’s defenses. He was satisfied with one thing and that was that Khrushchev was not at this time going to deliberately provoke the West into a nuclear war. He commented vehemently on Khrushchev’s thesis that when he signs a treaty with the German Democratic Republic our rights in Berlin are automatically liquidated. He said there is nothing we can do to prevent Khrushchev’s signing such a treaty if he so desires but that it would not and could not affect in any respect our rights.

General Goodpaster then reported the information he had just received from Deputy Secretary of Defense Douglas relative to the costs on the F–101B’s. He reported that Mr. Douglas said that the price would be about $1,600,000 per plane based on fly-away costs of the last plane off the assembly line with no research and development overhead expenses included. This would be the price per copy for 66 planes. The USAF had already about 200 planes off the assembly line. Hence it could not be a question of the price to the Canadians being inflated by R&D costs. It was uncertain, however, as to whether the figure of $1,600,000 included spares and spare engines. Mr. Douglas said Defense was anxious and ready to talk to the Canadians in detail on the question of F–101B’s and CL 44’s.

The Prime Minister expressed his satisfaction.

The President then said, “By the way, when are you people going to join the OAS?”

The Prime Minister said that during his recent visit to Mexico City⁸ Mexican top governmental officials had raised this question with him. He said that there had been powerful arguments in the past against Canada joining the OAS but that he felt now the matter should be reconsidered. Mr. Green was returning soon from a trip to several South American countries and he would be discussing this matter with Mr. Green.⁹ He thought it fair to say that the matter was “under active advisement.” He said he would not be surprised if at the Quito Conference next year there were to be a Canadian observer present. This might constitute a first step.

This subject was discussed further with the President indicating how warmly [the] United States would welcome Canadian participation.

After a brief discussion of the draft communiqué, during which the President and the Prime Minister agreed that in the past several years relations between the two countries had never been better, the meeting ended at about 5:45 p.m.¹⁰

0. Source: Department of State, Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 64 D 199. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Merchant and approved by Herter and the White House. The meeting was held at the White House.
1. No record of this conversation has been found in Department of State files or the Eisenhower Library, but according to the notes on a memorandum of conversation between Goodpaster and Merchant on June 7 no subjects other than those discussed in the general conversation were raised during the private meeting. (Ibid., Conference Files: Lot 64 D 599, CF 1709)
2. In a speech to the NATO Heads of Government meeting on December 16, 1957, Diefenbaker had proposed that a food bank under NATO direction be established to assist countries that were in danger of being infiltrated by the Soviet economic offensive. The text of the proposal is included in the verbatim record of the meeting, C-VR(57)82, December 16, 1957. (Ibid.: Lot 63 D 123, CF 950)
3. On June 16, Ambassador Heeney told Kohler that the Canadian Cabinet had approved exercise Sky Shield. (Memorandum of conversation, June 16; ibid.: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1709) The exercise was subsequently held on September 10.
4. On June 29, President Eisenhower wrote to Prime Minister Diefenbaker to inform him that a House-Senate Conference Committee had restored $244 million for the Bomarc B missile program. (Ibid.)
5. See Document 285.
6. Documentation on the Columbia River negotiations is in Department of State, Central File 611.42321.
7. Presumably Diefenbaker is referring to Khrushchev’s speech at Baku, April 25, in which he outlined proposals to make Berlin a free city.
8. Diefenbaker visited Mexico April 21–24.
9. Green had been in South America May 20–30.
10. No copy of the draft communiqué has been found in Department of State files or in the Eisenhower Library. For text of the final communiqué as released on June 4, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, p. 309.