Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

318. Memorandum of Discussion at the 446th Meeting of the National Security Council⁰

May 31, 1960.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1–3.]

4. Certain Aspects of United States Politico-Military Relationships With Canada (NSC 5822/1; NSC Actions Nos. 2210-b and 2219–b–(2); Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated May 24 and 27,1960)¹

Mr. Gray recalled that after Secretary Gates returned from the NATO Defense Ministers meeting early in April, he told the Council he thought we needed to examine our relations with Canada, particularly in the military field. Accordingly, the Department of State has prepared a Discussion Paper on Canada. As indicated in the Planning Board comments on this paper,² this discussion is being held in anticipation of Prime Minister Diefenbaker’s visit later this week and the meeting of the Ministerial Committee on Joint Defense in July. Mr. Gray then read the Planning Board comments, and called on Secretary Dillon.

Secretary Dillon said that the break-up of the Summit Conference had considerably modified the “soft” attitude of the Canadian Government toward the East-West struggle. In fact, Diefenbaker had made a very strong speech in Parliament on May 18 and had repeated it on television.³ Secretary Dillon believed that both Diefenbaker and Green had had their eyes opened with respect to East-West relations by the recent events in Paris.

Secretary Dillon said Canadian nationalism all across the board was increasing in intensity. However, we had discovered in the economic field that our problems with Canada could be solved by high-level conversations. This experience would lead to the conclusion that there is need for high-level talks with Canada in the defense field. One defense problem is the fact that the former Chief of General Staff, General Foulkes, had been put in power by the Liberals and was known to disapprove of the Conservative government. He did not always pass all the information in his possession to the members of the government. General Miller, who is replacing General Foulkes, is a retired Air Marshal who has the confidence of his civilian superiors and the Canadian Cabinet. It appeared likely that any agreements made with General Miller would be supported by the Canadian Government.

Secretary Dillon said the Canadians desired conversations about the over-all long-term defense plans of the United States. The Canadians feel that we are in fact abandoning continental defense and putting all our emphasis on our retaliatory capability. The Canadians see themselves lost between the United States and the USSR in this situation.

Secretary Dillon felt it was important for us to lead the Canadians further into our thinking and to be frank about such matters as BOMARC. Incidentally, BOMARC was a difficult problem because Canada gave up the Arrow in the expectation that it could rely on BOMARC. Secretary Dillon felt it would be helpful to give the Canadians a briefing on the future of our reconnaissance satellites and our outer space effort, in order to prevent any possible misunderstanding.

He then referred to a current proposal that we purchase CL–44 transport planes from Canada and at the same time sell to Canada F–101B aircraft, which are effective planes but which do not fit into the standardization program.

Secretary Douglas said that he was enthusiastic about the proposed trade of F–101B’s plus cash for CL–44’s.

The President seemed to recall that the Department of Defense had recommended the elimination of BOMARC. Secretary Douglas said the Department of Defense had recommended the reduction of BOMARC, which had been envisaged as a large program at a time when we accepted the estimate of 600 to 700 Soviet bombers. Research and Development officials and the Air Force had recommended that BOMARC be curtailed in order to get a simpler and more effective defense posture at an earlier date. We kept Canada advised of these developments, and the Canadians appeared to accept them with good grace. However, the House Appropriations Committee eliminated BOMARC completely. He believed that either the Senate or a Conference Committee would restore the BOMARC program. He also felt that the F–101B program was important regardless of the outcome on BOMARC, because if BOMARC were eliminated the Canadians might want more F–101B’s.

The President asked whether we could fulfill our commitments to Canada if Congress restored a reasonable BOMARC program. Secretary Douglas said we could fulfill our commitments to Canada with two squadrons of BOMARC and one SAGE center.

The President requested that the Department of Defense send him a memorandum on the BOMARC situation, containing a solution which he might suggest to Diefenbaker.⁴ The President said that Diefenbaker was not difficult to deal with if he were kept informed in advance, even though he was inclined to make impetuous statements and then to refuse to modify them if they turned out to be wrong.

Secretary Anderson said that Canada was sometimes sensitive about taking the initiative in requesting economic benefits for Canada. If we could take the initiative in matters which would economically benefit Canada, this action would have considerable psychological impact on Canada.

Secretary Douglas said that subject to Congressional approval we would like to sell 66 F–101B aircraft to Canada for $105 million, and purchase 35 CL–44’s from Canada for $155 million. Canada has assured us that it could never take the F–101B’s without paying for them. The President asked what Secretary Douglas meant by his last remark. Secretary Douglas replied that we might be interested in supplying F–101’s to Canada without receiving any payment at all, because such action would put fighter planes in the best possible position for defense of the North American continent. However, Canada is insisting on paying for the F–101’s, but wants us to buy CL–44’s.

The President said he had not believed the estimate of four or five years ago that the Soviets would have 600 to 700 bombers. Secretary Douglas said General Twining had told a Congressional committee that he (Twining) did not believe this estimate.

Mr. Gray said that Mr. McCone was out of town, but had asked that the Council be informed that our relations with Canada were excellent on all matters relating to atomic energy.

The National Security Council:⁵

Discussed the subject on the basis of the Discussion Paper prepared by the Department of State, transmitted by the reference memorandum of May 24, 1960; in the light of comments thereon by the NSC Planning Board, transmitted by the reference memorandum of May 27, 1960.

[Here follow agenda items 5 and 6.]

Marion W. Boggs

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Boggs on June 1.
1. NSC 5822/1 is printed as Document 293. NSC Action No. 2210-b, April 4, noted the importance of relations between the United States and Canada especially in the military sphere. NSC Action No. 2219-b, April 23, noted that a paper on certain aspects of U.S.-Canadian relations should be submitted to the Council before a possible Diefenbaker visit to Washington. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) The May 24 memorandum transmitted Document 317 to the NSC. The May 27 memorandum transmitted a two-page Planning Board memorandum that summarized the May 24 memorandum. (Department of State, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 63 D 351, NSC 5822 Series)
2. Regarding both these papers, see footnote 1, above.
3. On May 25, President Eisenhower wrote to Diefenbaker thanking him for his statement to Parliament. A copy of this letter is in the Eisenhower Library, White House Office, Project Clean Up, Canada.
4. No Department of Defense memorandum has been found in Department of State files or the Eisenhower Library, but on June 2, in a memorandum for the President, John Eisenhower reviewed the Bomarc B program and proposed a mutual sale of planes to ease the situation. (Ibid.)
5. The paragraph that follows constitutes NSC Action No. 2243, approved by the President on June 11. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)