Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

307. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

October 20, 1959.

SUBJECT

• Suggestions for Improving Politico-Military Relations with Canada

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. Livingston T. Merchant, Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs
• Mr. John N. Irwin II, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)
• Mr. Charles H. Shuff, Deputy Asst. Secretary of Defense (ISA)
• Col. David Crocker, OSD/ISA
• Mr. E.T. Long
• Mr. James P. Parker, BNA

Mr. Merchant explained that the Department had been studying possible ways of strengthening Canadian-US politico-military relations since Prime Minister Diefenbaker’s disapproval of the NORAD Exercise Operation Sky Hawk. He said that while the Sky Hawk fiasco resulted largely from a breakdown in proper liaison between Canadian military and political channels, it also revealed a lack of appreciation and understanding on the part of Canadian Cabinet Ministers, particularly Mr. Green and the Prime Minister, of the joint aspect of our undertakings in continental defense. It has become evident that they tend to look upon NORAD as another U.S. Command and U.S. financed defense projects in Canada as U.S. projects, rather than projects jointly regarded as necessary for the defense of North America.

Mr. Merchant said that with this background in mind, the Department had been studying possible ways in which to strengthen future Canadian cooperation in joint defense and he suggested the following as areas in which the Department felt action might profitably be taken:

1. Visits by Prime Minister Diefenbaker and other Cabinet Members to the United States, which would include installations such asNORAD, SAC, Headquarters CINCLANT and missile centers

Mr. Merchant pointed out that Mr. Green in particular was almost completely unfamiliar with regard to continental defense matters and that carefully planned trips at spaced intervals would be educational to him, the Prime Minister and other Cabinet Members. Since NORAD was a joint command, an invitation to visit NORAD Headquarters should of course originate from CINCNORAD rather than the U.S. Government.

2. Strengthening the Permanent Joint Board on Defense

Mr. Merchant pointed out that the work of the PJBD within the past year or so had been increasingly devoted to relatively minor matters, whereas previously it had passed on all important joint defense projects in Canada, thereby imparting a joint flavor to such projects even though the majority were built by U.S. funds and initially recommended by the United States. Today, however, the Board is bypassed on most projects and the Canadian Government is concerned with the large number of requests which to them appear to be unilateral U.S. requests for permission to establish more military installations on Canadian soil for U.S. purposes. The Department is interested in the views of the Defense Department as to the wisdom of trying to insure that the important joint, defense items such as Sky Hawk are presented to the Board for consideration at an early stage.

3. Assigning U.S. and Canadian Political Advisers to NORAD

Mr. Merchant said that the assigning of Political Advisers to CINCNORAD and his Deputy would probably be of particular benefit to the Canadians since it would serve to prevent future breakdowns between the military and political channels as occurred in the Sky Hawk incident and would enable External Affairs to keep in close touch with NORAD operations. He asked Defense views.

4. Stationing an RCAF Squadron in the United States

Mr. Merchant said the Department recognized this might pose problems of logistics and cost which both of the Governments might not want to face but that we felt there would be at least a good psychological advantage for the United States to extend an invitation to the Canadian Government to station an RCAF squadron at some nearby base in the United States.

5. Re-Admission of Canadian Officers at the National War College

Mr. Merchant said we felt very strongly that the time had come to readmit both the Canadian and British to the National War College. We realized the problems this posed with respect to resisting pressure from our other NATO allies to attend but he felt this could be dealt with without too much difficulty on the basis of common language and close cooperation in the nuclear field.

Mr. Irwin said that all of these suggestions would receive careful consideration in the Department of Defense. He observed that the present difficulties with Canada in the field of continental defense stem largely from a lack of close liaison between the military and civilian elements of the Canadian Government, and that this was something only the Canadians could correct.

With respect to the question of strengthening the PJBD, Mr. Irwin said that it appeared to be operating effectively in a lesser sphere of influence and that in upgrading its importance we would run the risk of added delays in obtaining Canadian approval of projects. Colonel Crocker pointed out that Service-to-Service cooperation was so excellent that the Services tended to by-pass the PJBD and he asked whether the State Department had in mind a lessening of this cooperation by having more items referred to the PJBD.

Mr. Merchant said that was not the Department’s intention at all. The fact remained, however, that we have a political problem at Cabinet level in Canada with respect to joint defense matters and the Board could serve as a useful vehicle for bringing these matters to the attention of Diefenbaker and the Cabinet at an early stage and for putting a “Joint” stamp on projects which otherwise might appear to be U.S. creations to serve U.S. needs.

Mr. Shuff said that with regard to the stationing of an RCAF squadron in the United States, it might be possible to work out some scheme for rotating RCAF and USAF squadrons in Canada and the United States and thereby avoid many of the problems which would otherwise be involved in permanently stationing an RCAF squadron in the United States.

As for the question of re-admitting Canadians and British to the National War College, Mr. Irwin mentioned that increasing pressure was being brought from many sides on the JCS to change their position. He mentioned that he personally had been approached recently by the British regarding their desire to resume attendance at the War College.

Colonel Crocker added that he felt that only a directive from the Secretary of Defense to the Joint Chiefs would get them to change their present policy of excluding Canadian and British attendance at the War College.

Mr. Merchant thanked Messrs. Irwin and Shuff and Colonel Crocker for their comments and said he would get together with Mr. Irwin again in approximately two weeks, after Defense has had an opportunity to study the suggestions.¹

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 742.5/10–2059. Secret. Drafted by Parker.
1. No record of any further discussion of this question has been found in Department of State files.