Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

290. Memorandum From the Officer in Charge of Canadian Affairs (Byrns) to the Director of the Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs (Parsons)⁰

August 7, 1958.

SUBJECT

• Canadian Defense Minister’s Discussions with the Department of Defense, August 4–5, 1958

The following are the main points resulting from the meetings between Canadian Minister for National Defense George Pearkes and Secretary McElroy on August 4–5, 1958. Also present at the meetings were Secretaries Quarles, Sprague, Douglas and McGuire as well as Ambassador Norman Robertson, Doctor Hannah (Chairman of the PJBD), General Thomas White, and Air Commodore Cameron.¹

1. Mr. Pearkes referred to the high cost of producing the CF 105 Interceptor ($500 million), and asked whether the United States would be willing to equip some of its squadrons, such as those at Harmon and Goose Bay, with the CF 105. This would enable Canada to produce a greater quantity of these aircraft, thus reducing the unit cost. Canada was undecided as to the number of CF 105s it should manufacture. It might be any figure between 50 and 200.

The United States side stated that they recognized that the CF 105 was a good aircraft, but they believed that certain USAF aircraft, notably the F 106 and the F 106A, were probably superior for USAF use. They would therefore not want any CF 105s. There was some discussion of the merits of the Canadian and USAF interceptors, and it was agreed in the meeting of August 4, that Secretary Douglas and Air Commodore Cameron would have a report prepared for the meeting on August 5, appraising the performance of the CF 105 as compared with USAF aircraft ready for production at about the same time.

Mr. Pearkes said that, notwithstanding the political difficulties, the Canadian Government might decide to scrap the CF 105 program, and perhaps turn to missiles. It would be better to take the loss than to tie up a large part of the defense budget for the next five years making an outmoded weapon.

Rather than making a comparison of the merits of the CF 105, and F 106s (as had been planned), the discussions of August 5 centered on the F101B. It was agreed that this aircraft could no doubt be used in place of the CF 105, and had the advantage of being much cheaper. Pearkes seemed to have had second thoughts since the previous day’s discussions and no longer believed that it would be possible to close down the CF 105 production. Canada was so far committed politically and otherwise, that it would have to go on with the program. He expressed regret that the USAF could not use some of the CF 105s. The United States side indicated its understanding of the necessity for Canada to proceed with its CF 105 program.

2. Coordination of Defense Production Doctor Hannah said that the discussion regarding the CF 105 pointed out the need for a more economic use of resources in the joint defense efforts of both countries. It was suggested that Canada and the United States should make a general study of the problem of producing for joint defense. Mr. Pearkes said that a decision regarding joint production could be made in the Canada-US Committee on Joint Defense. He believed it would be wise to hold a meeting of the Committee this fall or early next year. Secretary Quarles suggested that the Joint Industrial Mobilization Committee be rejuvenated and be directed to make this study. Mr. Pearkes agreed. Secretary McGuire was to make a proposal on how JIMCO should be reconstituted, but in the discussions of August 5, it was decided not to use JIMCO. Instead, the Assistant Secretaries of the appropriate divisions of the defense departments of the two countries would meet to discuss what should be done about joint production. The United States side indicated they were ready for this consultation at any time, leaving it to the Canadians to take the initiative on when and where the meeting should be held.

Secretary McElroy said if the United States would get Canadian agreement not to engage in making complex weapons systems, but instead to turn its efforts to components, he believed that the problem of joint production would be solved.

Ambassador Robertson pointed out that there would be numerous domestic political difficulties if the Canadian Government tried to cancel the CF 105 program. Robertson also said that there is a Canadian national feeling that whatever it did in the defense field must be unique and give evidence of independent Canadian initiative and effort. The mere making of components might cause political difficulties at home. Mr. McElroy explained he was suggesting that Canada make major components, not just parts. Mr. Pearkes said that the problem must be given thorough study. Perhaps there was something special that Canada could do, such as make a specialized plane equipped for the task of Arctic inspection, provided this was ever agreed upon. Mr. McElroy repeated that he believed that Canada should make components. Problems regarding the elimination of U.S. tariffs and taxes could be solved. Both Mr. Pearkes and Mr. McElroy agreed that “we should forget the border” and cooperate fully on a continental basis in a joint defense production effort.

3. Royal Canadian Navy May Desire Obtain Submarines Mr. Pearkes said that the Royal Canadian Navy is studying the need for submarines and may desire to acquire some of these vessels, particularly for antisubmarine warfare. Mr. McElroy said that he would push for the necessary legislation to make it possible for the United States Navy to transfer submarines to Canada, if Canada so requested. When the study by the Royal Canadian Navy is completed, Mr. Pearkes will get in touch with Defense regarding the Canadian decision in this connection.

4. Radar What is to be done about additional radar installations in Canada for improvement of early warning systems and in connection with Bomarc and SAGE, depends on a USAF–RCAF costing meeting.² This meeting is to take place at once so that requirements can be entered in the budget estimates of both countries.

[1 paragraph (5 lines of source text) not declassified]

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 033.4211/8–758. Secret.
1. Pearkes had been invited to visit Washington during President Eisenhower’s trip to Ottawa in July. No other record of his discussions with officials of the Department of Defense has been found in Department of State files.
2. No record of this meeting has been found in Department of State files.