Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

286. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

PVC/MC–9

Ottawa, July 10, 1958, 1 p.m.

PRESIDENT’s VISIT TO CANADA

Ottawa, Ontario, Canada, July 8–11, 1958

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The Secretary of State
  • The Hon. Tyler Thompson
  • Mr. Joseph N. Greene, Jr.
• Canada
  • Secretary of State for External Affairs Sidney Smith
  • Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs Jules Léger
  • The Hon. Norman Robertson

SUBJECTS

• 1. Geneva Talks
• 2. Lebanon
• 3. OAS
• 4. NATO
• 5. Cyprus
• 6. Summit

1. Geneva Talks

The Secretary described to Mr. Smith the Aide-Mémoire which Gromyko had given Ambassador Thompson on July 9.¹ He went on to say that he thought the Soviets were laying the ground work for breakup of the conference on political grounds, in case they find that the experts are unable to agree on what is required to supervise a cessation of testing. The Secretary thought that if a wide gap developed between the Western and Communist sides on this point, the Soviets would not want a breakup on that account but would force one on political grounds. They would probably find some assistance in this respect from the French position on a cessation of testing. This led to a general discussion of De Gaulle’s position, the Secretary noting that the people around him seemed diffident of expressing any views differing from his.

2. Lebanon

The Secretary said that this problem had struck him as particularly noticeable in the question of Lebanon and that he had made it a point to express to General De Gaulle his concern that if there had to be Western intervention there, which we still hope to avoid, it would be most undesirable for France to participate, because of the ancillary issues this would raise in the Middle East and North Africa. General De Gaulle had, however, been firm in his view that France would have to participate.

The Secretary then elaborated on the disadvantages of both intervention and non intervention in Lebanon, not only in terms of Lebanon itself but in terms of the effect on the governments of neighboring countries and indeed on the governments of countries surrounding the eastern Mediterranean. He noted that he had said to Foreign Minister Malik that it is the duty of statesmanship to try to achieve solutions of problems without recourse to military means; and explained that in the United States’ view we must assure that, while independent states must feel they can rely on our coming to their assistance with force if this is required to maintain their independence, we must at the same time encourage them to seek political solutions to political problems. This is the course we are now following in Lebanon.

During the discussion the Secretary also expressed the thought that it might be better if Lebanon could be recognized and accepted by the international community as being under some sort of UN protection. This would be designed to get Lebanon out of the pulling and hauling between the East and West. In response to Ambassador Robertson’s inquiry he said he had discussed this thought with Secretary General Hammarskjold and thought that Hammarskjöld agreed. The Secretary also emphasized that he was speaking quite informally and without benefit of the considered views of his Department; accordingly he asked that his thoughts be taken in this light and Mr. Smith assured him that they would be.

The Secretary said that he thought Hammarskjöld has some influence with Nasser and has used it effectively to persuade Nasser to cut off support of the rebels in Lebanon.

Mr. Smith said that the British had told him of an Arab Union idea that, possibly as an alternative to Arab Union intervention, Lebanon might enter into an alliance with the Union; it was also noted that the idea had been advanced that Lebanon might join the Baghdad Pact. During the ensuing discussion the Secretary expressed negative views on both these ideas and Mr. Smith said he would take a negative line with the Lebanese Ambassador if the matter came up when he saw the Ambassador later in the afternoon.

3. OAS

Mr. Smith and Mr. Leger described approaches they had had from first the Colombians and then the Brazilians about various possibilities for an Inter-American Foreign Ministers Meeting and asked the Secretary for his views. The Secretary described briefly the origins of the Colombian proposal and said that the United States would not in any event attend a meeting of Inter-American Foreign Ministers, the purpose of which was to organize a caucus for subjects coming up in the United Nations General Assembly. He said that during his visit to Brazil in August² he expected to discuss the matter further with the Brazilians, and also the possibility of an Inter-American Heads of Government Meeting; he thought the picture might become a little clearer at that time. There was inconclusive discussion of the possible timing of such a meeting and the thought was expressed that it might take place in New York during the General Assembly.

The Canadians evinced some interest in the possibility of their having somewhat closer association with the OAS, perhaps as observers on the several committees and even at the headquarters in Washington. The Secretary noted that we have a somewhat similar relationship with the Baghdad Pact although we actually are members of its committees.

4. NATO

Mr. Smith asked whether the Secretary had any impression of how De Gaulle would deal with the problems of Tunisia and Morocco and this led directly to discussion of the problem of Bizerte and whether it could some how be covered with the NATO mantle. The Secretary outlined the history of the genesis of NATO and said he thought that it would be increasingly difficult to hold NATO together if NATO were any further extended beyond its present membership to include nations having different political and cultural backgrounds and institutions. In this connection he referred to General De Gaulle’s idea on extending NATO to cover at least a large part of Africa.

Later in the conversation, Mr. Smith brought up the problem of countering the Soviet economic offensive and wondered whether this might be something NATO could deal with. The Secretary thought not.

5. Cyprus

In answer to Mr. Smith’s question the Secretary said he thought the Cyprus issue could become a really severe strain on NATO. He expressed the thought that Averoff had gone to see Tito and Nasser at Brioni as a sort of warning to Greece’s friends that if they did not do right by Greece, Greece would find friends elsewhere.³

6. Summit

In answer to Mr. Smith’s inquiry about the prospects of having a Summit meeting, the Secretary said that he thought the Soviets’ motive last winter had been to rush the West into such a meeting which would largely have the effect of endorsing the Soviets’ position in Eastern Europe. Since, during the ensuing months, it has become apparent that this Soviet objective is unlikely of accomplishment, the Secretary thought that their zeal for a Summit had lessened considerably. While it was not to be excluded that there might be a Summit meeting, he thought it less than likely.

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International File. Confidential. Prepared by Greene. The meeting was held at the Rideau Club.
1. For text of this aide-mémoire, see Department of State Bulletin, August 11, 1958, pp. 236–237.
2. Dulles visited Brazil August 3–7.
3. Nasser visited Yugoslavia July 2–10; he was joined by Greek Foreign Minister Averoff July 8–9.