Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

276. Airgram From the Delegation at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting to the Department of State⁰

Paris, December 17, 1960.

Polto A–234. From USDel. Following is text Secretary’s statement under Agenda Item II—“NATO Long-Range Planning”—presented at NATO Ministerial Meeting December 16, 1960:¹

When we met last December, the Council agreed that we undertake long-range planning to define our tasks for the decade ahead.² Since then, a good start has been made to implement this decision.

Alliance long-range planning does not aim at developing tidy blueprints for future periods. Rather, it involves development of agreed long-range views to guide our year-to-year actions.

An essential step is to define the enduring purposes of the Atlantic Community.

As I see it, these purposes are twofold:

Creatively, to try to shape the basic forces of change toward a viable order, which will accommodate the basic aspirations of free men.

Defensively to prevent the Communist bloc from undermining this nascent order and substituting its own.

The creative task calls both for helping less developed countries, whose “nation building” needs are far more extensive, and for forming ever closer and more complex political and economic ties among the Atlantic nations.

The defensive task calls for an effective NATO defense in an era of mounting nuclear and missile capabilities on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

The Atlantic nations must find common answers to these needs or face the prospect of declining viability and a revival of inadequate and divisive national approaches to what are really common tasks. It is the purpose of long-range planning to provide a basis for agreed action to this end.

I would like first to develop for you the present views of my Government on the principal military aspects of long-range planning for the Alliance.

Our progress in meeting NATO defense requirements over the past decade has been substantial. The task has been not merely to offset Communist manpower and material. It has also involved the creation, for the first time in history, of a coalition of sovereign countries, whose political and military policies have been so harmonized as to constitute a real deterrent to Communist armed attack. Without such unity in the Atlantic Community, the politico-military position of a monolithic Communist system would have created an overwhelming superiority. That is why the Soviets persistently seek to weaken and divide the Alliance. That is why it is so important that we approach the military tasks of the sixties, as we have discharged those of the fifties, in a spirit of common effort and common purpose.

The U.S. welcomes and is prepared fully to participate in the study being undertaken by the Standing Group at the direction of the Military Committee with respect to long-range military planning. We will be particularly interested in the results of the initial studies of the Von Karman Committee³ to provide the Standing Group with an estimate of scientific advances, through and beyond 1970, upon which such long-range military planning can be based. Such a truly long range forecast may prove most enlightening and useful. We must also cope of course with certain immediate tasks that have long range implications.

First, there is the need to maintain an effective NATO nuclear capability in the Alliance.

Second, there is the urgent and equally important need to meet other Shield requirements.

I shall take up the nuclear field first. There are three principal areas for consideration here, as General Norstad indicated in his speech to the NATO Parliamentarians.⁴

First, there is NATO’s mid-range ballistic missile requirement.

My Government offers the following concept for consideration by the Alliance as a means of meeting this requirement. We suggest that the Alliance consider creation of a special kind of force to operate this weapons system. As we conceive it, such a force would be truly multilateral, with multilateral ownership, financing and control, and would include mixed manning to the extent considered operationally feasible by SACEUR.

A suitable formula to govern decision on use would have to be developed to maximize the effectiveness of this force as a deterrent and to establish its multilateral character.

Let me say a word about the reasoning underlying this concept, which seems to us a logical extension and development of the consideration which NATO has been giving to this whole ballistic missile question since 1957.

We believe that creation of additional national nuclear weapons capabilities would have a marked divisive effect on the Alliance. It would mean duplication of effort and diversion of resources and tend to stimulate competition within the Alliance in the nuclear weapons field.

We believe, therefore, that the multilateral concept offers the best means of providing a collective basis for the common defense in the MRBM field. Its fulfillment would have immense political significance for the cohesion of the Alliance. My Government believes that this concept offers a rational approach to the problem of the MRBM power of the Alliance and, if successfully fulfilled, might offer a precedent for further moves in this field.

We do not discount the many difficulties involved in creating such a force. The legal, technical, financial, and political problems would need to be carefully considered and jointly resolved by the Alliance. Participation by the United States in a multilateral force would of course require Congressional action, and we assume that parliamentary action would also be required in other NATO countries. But NATO has had successful experience with multilateral approaches, e.g., in our infrastructure programs and our NATO military headquarters. If the other members of NATO should wish to pursue this approach, we would be prepared to explore it with them and believe that the task would be well within the bounds of the possible.

As an initial step, and to meet SACEUR’s MRBM requirements for 1963, my Government offers to commit to NATO before the end of 1963—as an interim MRBM force—five Polaris submarines [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. During this interim phase, these submarines would operate in accordance with existing procedures. This step would not only greatly enhance NATO’s military capabilities; it would also reaffirm the continuing U.S. commitment to Europe’s defense by the fact that this newest component of U.S. nuclear striking power will be available as part of that defense. In taking this step, we would expect that other members of NATO would be prepared to contribute approximately 100 missiles to meet SACEUR’s MRBM requirements through 1964, under the multilateral concept which I have already indicated. The U.S. would be prepared to facilitate NATO procurement by sale of Polaris missiles and of the necessary equipment and vehicles for deployment in such a multilateral force. It would seem desirable that this force be deployed at sea. Our concept contemplates that the five U.S. Polaris submarines would be a contribution to the multilateral force upon its establishment and that there would be made available under U.S. custody nuclear warheads for the Polaris missiles.

Decisions on NATOMRBM requirements beyond 1964 and how such requirements should be met should be considered subsequently, taking into account the prospect for new weapons and conclusions reached in the process of NATO long-term planning.

The second point which General Norstad referred to was what he termed the “extremely interesting thought” of a NATO strategic force.

I would merely point out here that the nature of MRBMs gives them a character somewhat different from the delivery systems they are designed to replace. It would seem that SACEUR should plan the targeting for the MRBM force in coordination with the other retaliatory forces of the Alliance, in order to gain the greatest deterrence for the Alliance as a whole. While those MRBMs are required as modernization of the tactical strike capability, the line between “tactical” and “strategic” capabilities in the nuclear field is becoming ever more blurred.

The third point is the question of broader sharing in the control of nuclear weapons. Creation of a multilateral NATOMRBM force would of course represent a major step in this direction. It appears that there may be a desire for further assurance that the U.S. will continue to make its nuclear weapons, including those for other systems, available for use by other NATO powers when needed to carry out their Alliance obligations. There should be no doubt on this score. It is the firm policy of the United States to keep in the NATO area, under U.S. custody, nuclear weapons contributed by the U.S. to the Stockpile for the execution of approved NATO plans.

Our suggestion for consideration of a multilateral NATOMRBM force does not preclude exploration of the concept of increasing the authority of the Alliance over the atomic stockpile as a whole. As the Council considers a multilateral force, its examination of that possibility will bring into sharper focus the question of increasing Alliance authority over the Atomic Stockpile.

I turn now to the second of the long-range military tasks that we face: the strengthening of other Shield forces.

It is equally urgent that NATO fulfill its established requirements for its other Shield forces as well as for its MRBMs. In case of an attack, NATO forces should be able to meet the situation with a response appropriate to the nature of the attack. In speaking to the NATO Parliamentarians, General Norstad said that “our forces must have a substantial conventional capability,” that they should be “made up of army, navy and air force elements of suitable types and equipped with a balance of conventional and nuclear weapons,” and that “the threshold at which nuclear weapons are introduced into the battle should be a high one.” Unless all NATO Shield goals are substantially achieved, NATO Military Commanders will not have that flexibility of response that will enable them to meet any situation with the appropriate response.

Whether or not the Soviets carry out their announced force cuts, they will maintain large and ready ground, as well as air and missile, forces which will continue to pose a grave threat to the forward areas of NATO. Soviet progress in ballistic missiles may increasingly encourage them to believe mistakenly that they can threaten the forces of NATO without serious danger of general war. Thus, failure to achieve adequate NATO Shield forces in the near future will place our Alliance in growing peril of general war by Soviet miscalculation.

Let us be under no illusion that by deploying MRBMs we can afford to skimp on the equally important task of building up other Shield forces. The addition of MRBMs to the forces of NATO would not, in any way, substitute for other contributions to the Shield, except that in the case of NATO tactical air squadrons, it is our understanding that the meeting of MRBM requirements should permit some reduction.

We believe that most of the other members of the Alliance now have ample economic and military potential to provide more fully for NATO defense. I can speak frankly here since my Government, in spite of having to carry tremendous financial and technical burdens in other areas vital to Alliance defense, is substantially meeting its MC–70 requirements.

I urge that each of your governments consider, in the course of our long-range planning what increased contribution it can make to this goal, not only in amount, but also in quality, with all that this involves in the way of training, supporting facilities, supplies and reserves.

These then are the two overriding military needs that I believe we must address in the course of long-range planning: the MRBMs and other nuclear weapons needs, and the necessity to meet our other Shield requirements. Action to meet both these needs should be planned and concerted closely as related elements of our long-range military program for the decade ahead.

That program will only be effective if it is mounted by an alliance that is united on basic political—as well as military—issues. The basic purpose of our armed forces is to maintain the security of the NATO area, but these forces will only be effective to the extent that agreement regarding political issues creates the will and determination to use force if and when necessary. Effective consultation and coordination on basic political issues is thus a vital element in the Alliance deterrent.

I would like now to turn briefly to the international payments situation, which has an importance beyond the financial field. For the third successive year, 1960 has been characterized by a large deficit in the international payments of the United States and further large accumulations in gold and dollar resources by a number of other countries. We are closing a three-year period in which the United States has paid out over $10 billion more than it has received, and nearly half of this has taken the form of an outflow of gold. To a very substantial part, the U.S. deficit finds its reflection in the strong surplus position of Western European nations.

Though there have been considerable changes during the course of the past year, the deficit in the U.S. balance of payments for the year as a whole is likely to be close to the $3.8 billion deficit of the preceding year.

I think you will all agree with me that this situation cannot long continue and that you will view in this light the measures which my government has taken to protect the U.S. dollar which has come to play such a central role in the international payments structure.

The very large gold movements and the growing deficit in our overall payments during the second half of this year have led the United States Government to take more vigorous action in recent months. These measures were taken because we reached the conclusion they were needed to provide early and direct benefit to our balance of payments and to make clear at the same time our determination to maintain the position of the U.S. currency.

The President accordingly issued a directive on November 16, which we believe will contribute significantly toward a basic improvement in the international payments structure.⁵ We have also initiated bilateral discussions on measures affecting the balance of payments situation.

Just as our national elections do not affect our profound national commitment to NATO, as I have already indicated, neither do the measures we are taking to correct the imbalance in our payments situation.

We know that this alliance is vital to the security of the United States, no less than to that of the other NATO Allies. We will continue to contribute our fair share to the constructive and defensive tasks that it has assumed.

However, we believe that due account must be taken of certain factors in determining the U.S. share of that effort.

• First, despite the strength of the U.S. economy, we must keep in mind the heavy burden which the U.S. bears in providing strategic forces for the defense of NATO and the free world, in mounting costly military space and weapons development programs, and in conducting aid programs of great importance to the free world.
• Second, account must be taken of the changed economic relationship between the United States and Europe. In the early years of the Atlantic Community, the European economy was greatly weakened in the aftermath of war. Today, Europe has not only recovered but is surpassing its pre-war economic strength.
• Third, there is the large and continuing deficit in the U.S. balance of payments, and at the same time there are continuing European surpluses, leading to an imbalance in the world payment position. I do not think I need to point out to the group assembled here that a sound U.S. balance of payments and a strong dollar are essential to the free world.

These factors will not induce the U.S. to shirk its fair share of the hard struggle that we are waging for peace.

We wish to continue to make a maximum contribution to Free World security, but, as indicated in our Annual Review submission,⁶ we are increasingly concerned with how to allocate our resources in the best manner. As was stated in that submission, some further changes in U.S. force deployments may become advisable as studies of overall U.S. programs progress. In fact, some redeployment may become a necessity unless our balance of payments can be brought into a more reasonable equilibrium.⁷ As the President recently stated, “I think we should never want to reduce our forces so far that people would think we had abandoned the area, or we had lowered our Flag in that area. Not at all. But I do think that the time is coming when all of us will have to study very carefully what should be our proper portion of the load.”⁸ In reaching decisions about the U.S. contribution to the military and non-military tasks of the Atlantic Community, we look to our Allies to undertake a greater share of the common effort.

In the non-military area of long-range planning, the intimate, frank discussions amongst our Permanent Representatives on this subject have been most valuable. They have pointed the way to the type of consultation, within the bosom of the family, that builds the trust, confidence and understanding upon which true unity within the Alliance can be based.

For the United States, I reiterate our pledge to continue to support the maximum possible development of consultation in the political field within NATO on important international issues, regardless of geographic area.

In the economic field, a major contribution to the unity of the West and to the strengthening of the Free World with particular emphasis upon the less-developed countries, has occurred in the establishment of the OECD. The U.S. intends to help make the OECD a strong organization in order to assure that it will be an effective instrument in achieving the economic goals of the Atlantic Community.

For the next decade, we shall have to cope not only with Communist military capabilities, but with a political and economic offensive on their part directed against us and against all other free nations of the world. Communist dogma has forced upon the democracies a struggle by means short of war—a struggle for freedom.

The NATO countries must find the ways to defend our freedoms and to help other countries who need our help to defend their freedom. We will need all our resources—political, economic, psychological—in order to prevail.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–PA/12–1760. Secret. Pouched to the NATO capitals and Moscow.
1. Herter read this statement to the afternoon session of the Ministerial Meeting on December 16.
2. For text of the communiqué issued on December 17, 1959, see Department of State Bulletin, January 4, 1960, p. 3.
3. Reference is to Dr. Theodore von Karman, chairman of the Advisory Group for Aeronautical Research and Development, NATO. The classified studies of his group on scientific advances are in the U.S. Army Military History Institute, Classified Documents.
4. In a speech to the annual conference of NATO Parliamentarians in Paris on November 21, General Norstad gave the outline of U.S. proposals for the establishment of NATO as the “fourth nuclear power.”
5. The President issued his directive on the balance-of-payments problem on November 16.
6. Not found, but it is summarized in the country chapter on the United States in the Report on the 1960 Annual Review ((C–M(60)103, Part II), in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1807.
7. In a message to the President, transmitted in Cahto 1, December 13, Herter said he had just met with Secretary Anderson, Burgess, Generals Norstad and Lemnitzer, Ambassadors Houghton and Dowling, Dillon, and Irwin, and they agreed on the insertion of this sentence after considerable discussion. (ibid., Central Files, 396.1–PA/12–1360) A copy of the message bears the President’s initials. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, Dulles–Herter Series) The President approved the text of the sentence in a message transmitted in Tocah 6, December 14. (Department of State, Central Files, 396.1–PA/12–1460) The President and Herter also discussed this issue on the telephone. A memorandum of their conversation is in Eisenhower Library, Herter Papers, Telephone Conversations.
8. The quotation is from President Eisenhower’s news conference on November 16; see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1960–61, p. 865.