Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

274. Memorandum of Discussion at the 468th Meeting of the National Security Council⁰

December 1, 1960.

[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda item 1.]

2. NATO in the 1960’s (NSC 6017; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Special NSC Meeting”, dated November 16, 1960; Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject, “NATOMRBM Force”, dated November 29, 1960)¹

Mr. Gray called attention to the draft Record of Action of the 467th NSC meeting held in Augusta on November 17.² That draft Record of Action contained a paragraph which stated that “the U.S. will make a commitment to maintain those nuclear weapons required for approved NATO military plans, deployed under U.S. custody in accordance with agreed NATO plans.” The President had tentatively approved this paragraph but Defense had requested reconsideration and had suggested the following language as a substitute: “The U.S. will make a commitment to keep in the European NATO area, under U.S. custody, its contributions of nuclear weapons to meet the requirements for the accomplishment of approved NATO military plans.”

Mr. Irwin said the Department of Defense did not disagree with the substance of the tentatively approved paragraph but both Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that some “tightening up” of the language would be desirable. The Defense proposal differed from the tentatively approved paragraph in four respects. In the first place, Defense proposed to use the word “keep” instead of the word “maintain”. The President said he had no objection to this change. Continuing, Mr. Irwin said that in the second place, Defense proposed to use the phrase “in the European NATO area” in order that the language would be more specific as to the geographical region covered. The President asked whether the five Polaris submarines which the U.S. would commit to SACEURmight not be stationed in international waters. He had not favored the Defense language when it had been shown to him earlier because he had thought it could be interpreted to mean that the U.S. contribution of nuclear weapons would necessarily be stationed within the NATO countries. Mr. Irwin said that the word “European” might be deleted from the Defense proposal. Mr. Gray asked whether the Defense proposal did not refer to weapons other than Polaris submarines. Mr. Irwin said the Defense paragraph referred to the whole nuclear weapons stockpile. The President said that the paragraph could, therefore, include Polaris submarines. Mr. Irwin agreed.

Mr. McCone felt that the paragraph should contain a provision that we could withdraw nuclear weapons from the NATO stockpile. He was becoming alarmed at the projected size of the NATO stockpile. Secretary Dillon said we were committed to keep in the NATO area only those nuclear weapons required for the accomplishment of approved NATO plans. The President wondered whether we should not say that the U.S. would “keep at any time the nuclear weapons to meet the requirements.”

[2 paragraphs (43 lines of source text) not declassified]

Continuing his exposition of the differences between the Defense proposal and the tentatively approved paragraph, Mr. Irwin said that, in the fourth place, Defense wished to use the expression “to meet the requirements for the accomplishment of approved NATO military plans” instead of the term “required for approved NATO military plans”. The President said it seemed to him that Mr. Irwin’s fourth point described a distinction without a difference. Mr. Irwin said that the language in the tentatively approved paragraph, “deployed in accordance with agreed NATO plans”, could be interpreted to mean a more specific deployment than was suggested by the Defense change.

The President said he was still disturbed by the expression “NATO area”. He did not know how the NATO area would be defined. Mr. Irwin explained that the tentatively approved version of the paragraph did not mention the area at all. Defense thought it was desirable to specify the area in which the U.S. would be committed to keep nuclear weapons. The President suggested that the paragraph might say that we would keep weapons promptly ready for NATO use. He wondered whether that was not the meaning we were trying to express. [13 lines of source text not declassified]

[1 paragraph (21 lines of source text) not declassified]

Mr. Gray then referred to the draft statement of policy on the NATOMRBM Force which had been revised at the Augusta Council meeting on November 17. After the Augusta meeting Mr. Stans had made a suggestion for a revision of the second sentence of Paragraph 2 of the paper and this suggestion had been tentatively approved by the President. Other agencies had requested reconsideration and under cover of a memorandum dated November 29 the NATOMRBM paper had been circulated to the Council with two versions of the second sentence of Paragraph 2 in parallel columns as follows, the left-hand version being taken from the original paper and the right-hand version being Mr. Stans’ proposal.

“The U.S. would consider the five Polaris submarines as a contribution to the NATOMRBM Force, described in paragraph 33 below and, in the event of its establishment, would undertake not to withdraw them from NATO without NAC consent during the life of the Treaty.”

“The United States would consider the five Polaris submarines as a contribution to the NATOMRBM Force, described in paragraph 3 below and, in the event of its establishment, and subject to the measures called for in paragraph 6 below,4 would undertake not only to commit them to SACEUR but to agree not to withdraw them from NATO without NAC consent during the life of the treaty.”

Secretary Dillon called attention to an error in the right-hand version of the sentence which contained the phrase “would undertake not only to commit them to SACEUR”. The sentence was intended to refer to our commitment of five Polaris submarines to the NATOMRBM force, a commitment which was not the same as the original commitment to SACEUR referred to in the first sentence of Paragraph 2 of the NATOMRBM paper.⁵ The words he had just quoted were confusing because they seemed to be talking about the first phase of the commitment. Mr. Dillon then turned to the expression in the right-hand version, “subject to the measures called for in Paragraph 6”. He said this was a difficult question which brought up the problem of how the U.S. proposal on NATOMRBMs would be presented in Paris. Secretary Dillon had no objection to Mr. Stans’ suggestion that our contribution of five Polaris submarines to the NATOMRBM Force should be linked to the measures called for in Paragraph 6 as a statement of our own understanding of our objective. However, he felt very strongly that if the U.S. proposal were presented to the NATO countries with our commitment of Polaris sub-marines to the NATOMRBM Force linked to the measures in Paragraph 6, the proposal would be unacceptable because we would be asking our NATO allies to provide 100 MRBMs unconditionally while we were willing only to commit ourselves on condition that we were unilaterally satisfied as to the additional measures which these countries would carry out, measures which were not spelled out. Secretary Dillon reported that in Europe last week he had presented the substance of the NATOMRBM proposal orally to Adenauer, Couve de Murville, and Lord Home as well as to Senators Johnson and Fulbright.⁶ He discovered there were divergent views as to the substance of the proposal in the three capitals but there was agreement on principle. The Germans had welcomed our proposal as it stood; the French had also welcomed it although not unreservedly. Some of the French officials with whom the proposal was discussed felt that it would provide De Gaulle with an escape from his commitment to develop French national nuclear capabilities. The French had indicated, however, that if we table all the details of this proposal for a multilateral force, they would have difficulty in accepting it. The U.K. had been opposed to the idea, contained in the NATOMRBM paper [5-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. The U.K. hopes that our NATOMRBM proposal will not be presented in any detail. If we should present a detailed scheme, the U.K. would have to mention its reservations. Ambassador Burgess and General Norstad agree that it would be undesirable to present a detailed proposal. Secretary Dillon therefore felt that the concept of a multilateral MRBM Force should be put forward as a concept but that the text of the NATOMRBM paper should not be distributed to the other governments concerned. Chairman Holifield of the Congressional Joint Committee concurred.⁷ Secretary Dillon said the Department of State therefore believed that Ambassador Burgess and Secretary Herter should present (1) our stockpile proposal, (2) our specific offer of five Polaris submarines to be used under present NATO procedure for the use of national forces made available to NATO and (3) the hope that other NATO governments would wish to consider a NATOMRBM Force involving 100 additional medium-range ballistic missiles. In connection with the third point, the U.S. would indicate that it would be prepared to consider a permanent MRBM Force if NATO could see its way clear to the establishment of such a force. We would further state that we realize the establishment of a permanent force would raise a large number of technical military and political problems as well as problems of ownership which would require discussion. Secretary Dillon said this procedure which he had just outlined would be a substitute for the tabling of a detailed paper which would imply that we have a blueprint ready. He felt it was important to discuss this matter with NATO on an equal basis rather than to confront NATO with a complete scheme. He had talked the matter over with Secretary Gates who had agreed with his idea of presenting the NATOMRBM Force as a concept rather than as a detailed plan.

The President inquired whether Mr. Dillon was indicating that our policy paper on the subject should say what our objective is and should then indicate what our tactical approach to NATO should be in view of the doubts of our NATO allies. Secretary Dillon said that Mr. Stans’ suggestion for revision of the second sentence of Paragraph 2 of the NATOMRBM paper was acceptable as a statement of U.S. policy but was not acceptable as a statement of the way we should approach NATO. Mr. Stans said he had no objection to eliminating from his proposal the expression “not only to commit them to SACEUR.” He thought the problem of words in the NATOMRBM paper was becoming more important all the time. He had assumed that as we completed the five Polaris submarines and deployed them, there would be concurrent action by NATO to buy 100 MRBMs and also to strengthen MC-70 forces. There was also a question as to whether we were deploying the five Polaris submarines to NATO permanently. The President said the proposal involved two phases. In the first phase we had complete control of the Polaris submarines; in the second phase, we transferred them to NATO.

Mr. Irwin said that with respect to Mr. Stans’ desire to make the contribution of five Polaris submarines to the NATOMRBM Force subject to the measures in Paragraph 6 (i.e. additional vigorous measures by the other NATO nations to strengthen their other forces), the Department of Defense had serious problems, not only in connection with the presentation of the NATOMRBM proposal but also in connection with the secret statement of U.S. policy. The NATOMRBM Force was intended to solve some of the political and military problems of NATO, including the problem of multiplicity of nuclear weapons. If we inserted in the proposal a condition which indicates that NATO must proceed to acquire 100 MRBMs, after which we will decide subjectively whether other NATO nations have accomplished enough improvement in MC-70 forces, we would be ensuring defeat of the proposal before it is presented to NATO. Even if the condition suggested by Mr. Stans is included only in our own policy statement and is not revealed to NATO, the condition three or four years from now will arise to haunt us.

Secretary Dillon suggested that we should tell the other NATO countries that the NATOMRBM Force could not be established at the expense of improvement in MC-70 forces. He agreed with Mr. Irwin that in the presentation of the NATOMRBM proposal, we could not give the other NATO countries the impression that our willingness to commit Polaris submarines to the NATOMRBM Force is subject to our unilateral interpretation as to improvement in MC-70 forces.

Mr. Stans believed that the President’s recent decision to reduce U.S. troop deployments abroad renders it especially necessary to make the MRBM Force contingent on MC-70 improvements.⁸ The President remarked that the MRBM paper referred to “the life of the treaty”. He pointed out that if the treaty were denounced, the present discussion would be very academic. We should assume good faith on the part of our allies or we will not have allies. At the same time we must make clear to our allies what we expect of them.

Mr. Irwin said that Defense was satisfied with the NATOMRBM paper. He had been with Secretary Dillon when the latter had presented the NATOMRBM proposal in Europe. He himself had talked with Defense Minister Strauss and to the Defense Ministry in London.⁹ Secretary Dillon had presented the proposal during his recent trip to Europe in the manner in which Defense would like to see it presented to the North Atlantic Council. Secretary Dillon spoke to the paper but did not provide a copy of it to the governments with which he discussed it. Mr. Irwin felt there should be both a presentation and a paper. If substantial changes were made in the MRBM paper, Mr. Irwin felt sure the Secretary of Defense would like an opportunity to consider them. Mr. Stans suggested that after the Council meeting those principally concerned might be able to devise some words which would meet the difficulties which had arisen. Secretary Dillon reiterated that he wanted to avoid making a flat, detailed proposal to the NATO countries. The President said he would like to strengthen NATO through the things we do at home in order that we might redeploy some of our U.S. divisions from Europe. He regarded the maintenance of 5-1/2–6 U.S. divisions in Europe as unproductive.

Mr. Gray suggested that the second sentence of Paragraph 2 of the NATOMRBM paper might contain the phrase “and assuming reasonable action under Paragraph 6” as the statement of the condition under which we would contribute Polaris submarines to the NATOMRBM Force. The President commented that he understood the anxiety expressed by Mr. Stans but he believed the left-hand version of the second sentence of Paragraph 2 of the paper was the most desirable version. Mr. Irwin said the point of Paragraph 6 of the paper was to provide the U.S. with an opportunity to encourage other NATO nations to strengthen their MC-70 forces. Mr. McCone felt that Paragraph 6 should not be made a condition precedent to the contribution of Polaris submarines to the NATOMRBM Force. Mr. Stans expressed anxiety lest the policy in Paragraph 6 not be conveyed to the other NATO countries if the NATOMRBM paper was to remain a U.S. statement of policy and was not to be tabled. Secretary Dillon said the substance of Paragraph 6 could be conveyed in an oral presentation on our proposal. The President suggested we might even put a footnote to Paragraph 2 referring to Paragraph 6 but he did not want to use the phrase “subject to the measures called for in Paragraph 6.” Mr. Gray suggested that in Paragraph 6 the expression “the U.S. should make clear” might be substituted for “believes.” As a counter-suggestion, Mr. Irwin proposed the substitution of “emphasis” for “believes” since the NATOMRBM paper might subsequently be tabled.

Mr. Gray said he had intended to bring up the question of whether the five Polaris submarines would be internationalized in the second phase but he believed this was now a detail and need not be considered.

The National Security Council:¹⁰

a. Discussed a revised paragraph 2-b-(1) of the draft Record of Actions of the 467th NSC Meeting, distributed at the meeting, and agreed that it should read as follows:

“(1) The United States will make a commitment to keep in the European NATO area (including Turkey), under U.S. custody, such U.S. nuclear weapons as are furnished for the accomplishment of approved NATO military plans.”

b. Discussed the paper on “NATOMRBM Force”, as amended at the NSC meeting on November 17, 1960, transmitted by the reference memorandum of November 29, 1960; and adopted it as a statement of U.S. policy subject to the following amendments:

(1) Page 1, paragraph 2, second sentence: Include the version in the left-hand column and delete the version in the right-hand column.

(2) Page 3, paragraph 6, first line: Substitute the word “emphasizes” for the word “believes”

c. Agreed with the proposal by the Acting Secretary of State that the following procedure should be used at the NAC meeting:

(1) The United States should present as a firm proposal the commitment regarding nuclear weapons (as agreed upon in a above).

(2) The United States should present a concept for a NATOMRBM force and in that context offer to commit five Polaris submarines to NATO as an interim MRBM force. The remainder of the statement of policy on “NATOMRBMs” adopted by b above should link the interim force to the permanent force but generally be presented in terms which make it clear that the establishment of a permanent MRBM force will require study and consideration by NATO and that U.S. participation therein will require Congressional approval.

(3) In making the presentation, the United States should emphasize the great importance it attaches to parallel efforts by the European NATO nations to improve the defensive strength of the Alliance in the ways described in the statement of policy on NATOMRBMs.

Note: The above action, as approved by the President, subsequently reflected in the Record of Actions of the 467th NSC Meeting, and circulated to the National Security Council for appropriate implementation under the coordination of the Secretaries of State and Defense.

[Here follow the remaining agenda items.]

Marion W. Boggs

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Boggs.
1. Regarding NSC 6017 and the November 16 memorandum, see footnote 2, Document 273. The November 29 memorandum transmitted the paper on NATOMRBMs, as amended at the November 17 NSC meeting, for further NSC consideration. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, NSC 6017) The memorandum of discussion at the November 17 NSC meeting is printed as Document 273.
2. Attached to a memorandum of meeting with the President on November 25, prepared by Gray on November 28. (Eisenhower Library, Project Clean Up, Meetings with the President)
3. See footnote 16, Document 273.
4. See footnote 6, Document 273.
5. This sentence, as amended at the November 17 meeting, reads: “As a modification of the proposal made by the United States on April 1, 1960, the United States offers to commit to SACEUR as an Interim NATOMRBM Force, five Polaris submarines which will be operational prior to the end of calendar year 1963.”
6. Memoranda of Dillon’s conversations with Adenauer (US/MC/1), with Couve de Murville (US/MC/12), and with Senators J. William Fulbright and Lyndon B. Johnson (US/MC/22) are in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 559, CF 1781. Secretary of the Treasury Anderson accompanied Dillon on this trip and participated in the meetings. Dillon’s briefing of British Foreign Secretary Lord Home was summarized in telegram 2353 from London, November 26. (ibid., Central Files, 740.5611/11–2660)
7. Congressman Chet Holifield, Vice Chairman of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, and other Congressmen met with Department officials on November 25. (Memorandum of conversation; ibid., 740.5611/11–2560)
8. See footnote 8, Document 273.
9. No other record of Irwin’s talks with Strauss and the British Defense Ministry have been found.
10. Paragraphs a-c and the Note that follows constitute NSC Action No. 2336, approved by the President on December 17. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council) Minor remaining difficulties were resolved at the 469th NSC meeting on December 8, and the resulting NSC Action No. 2340 was approved by the President on December 17. (ibid.)