Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

271. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany⁰

October 5, 1960, 3:57 p.m.

628. Deliver following message to Chancellor at earliest opportunity before Debré visit.¹ In delivering message, you should make point that this is of course personal communication between President and Chancellor and that the President knows that Chancellor will treat it accordingly in his talks with the French. FYI We wish avoid having Chancellor inform Debré that he has received special letter from President on subjects of visit. End FYI.

Begin text.

Dear Mr. Chancellor: General Norstad and Ambassador Dowling have reported to me on their recent conversations with you.² I understand from them that you expect to have a full discussion this week with Debré and Couve de Murville on General De Gaulle’s views on nuclear matters as well as on NATO and on European integration. I thought it might be useful for you to have some of my thoughts on these matters before your meeting with the French.

On nuclear matters, I have been much impressed with the strong feeling of various European leaders, including yourself and M. Spaak, that the European countries should have an increased role in the nuclear aspect of NATO’s defenses. We are considering, under my personal direction, the possibility of a multilateral, NATO–wide means for dealing with the problem.

On NATO matters generally, I want to say first that I have been most impressed by the strong statements you have recently made in support of NATO. As for your meeting with the French, you are of course aware that there is a very wide divergence between myself and General De Gaulle on several basic points. I have pointed out these differences directly to General De Gaulle, and our representative in NATO has made them clear to the Council. In brief, I feel strongly the importance of integration in the light of modern military technology and strategy. The U.S. has assigned its own forces to NATO on the assumption that they would participate in an integrated defense system for the area. There would be little justification for their continued presence if there were no integrated system.

Although it is clear that my views on how NATO’s defenses are to be organized differ from those of De Gaulle, I should add that we have, on the other hand, recently made limited progress with the French on certain specific NATO defense problems. They have agreed to the concept of integrated air defense in Europe, although insisting on special arrangements for most of French territory. The French have also recently signed a NATO Atomic Stockpile agreement with us for their NATO–committed forces in Germany. It is noteworthy that the French have accepted in this agreement the same provisions for U.S. custody and SACEUR control as appear in our agreement with you and with other countries.

I am heartened by the feeling that your views and mine are very close on these NATO defense matters, and I was most interested to learn from Ambassador Dowling that you intend to speak very forthrightly to Debré and Couve on these questions.

With respect to the political functions of NATO, I have serious reservations about a proposal that suggests the U.S., the U.K. and France as a mechanism for preserving order in other areas of the world, because of the danger that any such structure might take on overtones of a “directorate”. If that should come about, important interests of other NATO countries would be ignored and opposition in other areas of the world would surely occur.

Similarly dangerous to NATO, in my view, would be any Six Nation bloc within NATO, in which separate national states, not moving toward the goal of European unity, acted on political and military matters properly dealt with in NATO.

As a constructive step for improving the political cohesion of the West, I feel that NATO consultation, covering all areas of the world, should be further developed and strengthened. The U.S. has itself sought to make maximum use of the NATO Council for this purpose, and we certainly intend to continue this effort in view of the obvious need to achieve the maximum harmonization of Free World policies in the light of the world–wide Communist threat. It appears to us that the study of means for improving the Alliance is a subject best considered in the discussions of long–range planning in NATO. We ourselves expect to contribute some ideas, and it might be useful to suggest to the French that they also make use of this forum.

Finally, I would like to comment on General De Gaulle’s views on the future development of the Six Country movement.³ I know that in this field also your views and mine have long been very close indeed. We both regard the Six Country integration movement as of very basic importance to the future of our world. A Europe moving toward real unity will strengthen and reinforce the NATO Alliance as a whole. I think we would both be prepared to support any steps designed to further progress toward the concept of true integration embodied in the Rome treaties. Quite frankly, however, I am not aware of the exact nature of De Gaulle’s proposals in this field. If his proposals clearly will contribute to achieving the goals of integration, then I believe they are deserving of the support of other members of the Six. If, on the other hand, they would be likely to weaken the integration concept, a serious question would arise. While the U.S. has a deep interest, it is not of course directly involved in the discussions of De Gaulle’s proposals; this is primarily a matter which the other Five must work out with France. You yourself obviously are in a most influential position in respect to these developments. Perhaps if you and others of the Six were to put up to De Gaulle specific proposals which will unmistakably contribute to further progress toward genuine integration, De Gaulle’s intentions in this field might well become clearer.

I mean for this letter to confine itself to those matters that may have a direct bearing on your talk with Debré and Couve de Murville. There are, of course, many other subjects, especially affecting Berlin, which are much on my mind these days.

With warm personal regard, Sincerely, Dwight D. Eisenhower. End text.

Observe Presidential Handling.

Dillon

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.62A/10–560. Secret; Niact; Verbatim Text; Presidential Handling. Drafted by Fessenden; concurred in by White, Hillenbrand, McBride, and U; and transmitted to the President on October 4 for approval. (Memorandum for the President, October 4; ibid.) Repeated priority to Paris for Thurston.
1. French Foreign Minister Debré visited Germany October 7–8.
2. Regarding Norstad’s conversation with Adenauer, see footnote 1, Document 267. Dowling talked with the Chancellor on September 30. During the discussion, Adenauer had said: “De Gaulle has deceived me. For two years he talked like a good European and now see what he proposes.” (Telegram 491 from Bonn, October 1; Department of State, Central Files, 762A.00/10–160)
3. See Document 120.