Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

235. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

US/MC/7

Paris, December 14, 1959, 10:30 a.m.

NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING

Paris, December 15–17 and 22, 1959

PARTICIPANTS

• United States
  • The Secretary of State
  • Ambassador Houghton
  • Mr. Merchant
  • Mr. Kidder
• France
  • The French Foreign Minister
  • M. Jacques de Beaumarchais

SUBJECT

• General Twining’s Statement to the Military Committee

The Secretary, after discussing our abstention on the Algerian item at the UN (see separate memorandum),¹ turned to NATO and said he assumed that the Foreign Minister was referring to the statement made by General Twining. This statement, he said, was made by a military man in a military committee and it was a quite proper one.² The line followed by General Twining was the same as that used by the President in his talks with General De Gaulle in Paris.³ The Secretary said we have a real problem which must be decided. He added he was sorry that it came out as it did in the military committee. Had it been raised from a political point of view, we would have said it differently. The Secretary then outlined three areas of difference as follows: (1) Mediterranean Fleet, (2) atomic stockpile, and (3) question of integrated command.

The Foreign Minister commented that perhaps there had been a leak (of the Twining statement). He said he wasn’t there and couldn’t know himself but he could not but believe that a leak had been made on purpose. In any case, the public interpretation is that there has been an American initiative to put the French “in the box”—to make France “the black sheep of NATO”. The Foreign Minister then added that he does not know if that is our intention. He said that General Twining’s statement goes a little far. He then read the section from the Twining statement which expresses the view that the activities of those countries which are not doing their full share in NATO increase the possibility of war. This, the Foreign Minister said, is going a little far even for a military man. The Minister then read the section from the Twining statement in which the General recommended that the audience keep working on the problem so that political decisions could be changed on the basis of military reality.

The Foreign Minister continued by saying that he knows from past talks that there are always the three problems (presumably those three mentioned by the Secretary). However, he doesn’t think that these problems really change the position of the Alliance nor make war more likely. These are not anything like basic differences and they do not affect the overall world position, which is what interests the French. What are worse than the military difficulties are the political difficulties. This political aspect is especially pertinent during the so-called détente and in view of the talks we are going to have with the Soviets. He commented nevertheless that we are disunited in Africa and the Soviets know it. The Soviets played their hand very cleverly in the GA on the Algerian item by saying nothing.

The Secretary intervened at this point to say he does not think that the Minister can properly say that we are disunited. He emphasized that we have supported General De Gaulle and France all along.

The Foreign Minister commented that he did not want the Secretary to misinterpret what he meant. He was not talking about the substance of the problem but about the interpretation by the public which is what matters. He said he is aware of the American position and knows it has not changed. It is the public impact which concerns him. The Twining statement is another step giving the public the idea that the situation is deteriorating. We must face the realities of the situation. In the five years to come, NATO is going to change in one way or another. The Americans have their problems and the French have theirs. He added he hopes the Algerian problem will be solved and that French troops will come back to France. The Germans, he hopes, will complete their military programs.

The Secretary said that we must be flexible but the important thing is not to weaken the NATO military posture at this time.

The Foreign Minister, referring to the Twining statement, said there were two aspects of it which concerned him. First, it was presented in a dramatic way, and second, it became public which gives it a different interpretation. It makes it appear that there is a basic crisis within NATO where he, in fact, does not believe such is the case. The Secretary agreed that there is not a real crisis but pointed out that whether there is or isn’t, in any given case the press will always build it up as though there were. The Secretary then informed the Minister that on the US side a thorough review had been made to attempt to find out whether an American might have been responsible for the leak. The results have been negative.

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1549. Secret. Drafted by Kidder and approved in S on December 19. The meeting was held at the Quai d’Orsay.
1. US/MC/8 is not printed. (ibid.)
2. See Document 233. According to Polto 1134 from Paris, December 12, Spaak pointed out at NAC that morning that Twining had said nothing very new or radical, but the difficulty was that his statement became public. Burgess remarked that Twining’s statement represented the opinion of the U.S. JCS, and that USRO had tried to make clear to the press that Twining did not mention De Gaulle and gave a military, not political, statement. (Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/12–1259)
3. See Part 2, Documents 129 ff.