Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

231. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

November 24, 1959, 8:30–9:10 a.m.

SUBJECT

• NATO Problems

PARTICIPANTS

• President Eisenhower
• M. Paul-Henri Spaak
• Secretary Herter
• Ambassador Burgess

M. Spaak began by saying that in Europe today there is some hesitation and doubt with respect to our general policies toward the Soviets. The United States must be very firm and clear at the December meeting in explaining the American position. There is a feeling that we are moving toward peaceful coexistence step by step. There is danger that Europe will think all problems have been settled, and therefore the military effort can be reduced.

M. Spaak said that in his view no problems are settled at the present time. The Soviets could return to the cold war, and therefore the American position in the military field is very important. It is right that the United States should say that Europe must bear a fair share of the effort. However, there is a danger that, if Europe thinks the United States wants to diminish its effort, some countries might use this as a pretext for diminishing their own.

The President replied that he has been trying to explain to the larger countries that they are not doing their full duty. When he had visited the NATO capitals in January, 1951, he had thought that, as far as American troop strength was concerned, we were carrying out nothing more than a stop-gap, temporary operation.¹ The Marshall Plan was already working at that time, although its full effect had not yet been felt. We knew, of course, that European military strength could not be instantly increased because those countries had had a hard time, but we thought that in due course they would carry their full weight. After all, there are fifty million people in Italy, something like forty-five million in France, about fifty-five million in West Germany, plus the people of the Low Countries and Scandinavia. That makes a total population of around 175 to 200 millions, without counting England, and those are skilled, cultured people.

It is true, of course that France has detached 600,000 troops and sent them south, but there are still a great many people in Western Europe. We ought to strengthen NATO and not weaken it, and in this way we can gain the stability and confidence we need. What the European countries seem to feel is that, ten years from now, the same United States strength will be deployed in Europe as exists today. The United States provides the nuclear bombs and the missiles, which are frightfully expensive. It provides much of the air force and the free world’s navy, including the submarines. Europe benefits by all this without the expense. Why, therefore, shouldn’t Europe get more inspiration from our example? The President said that, in 1951, he had never thought that the United States command of NATO forces would last as long as it has. He had thought that, in eight years’ time, an Englishman or a Frenchman would be in command, although he recognized it would be difficult for Europe to agree on the choice of a commander. In any case, the United States plays too big a part in it all. The President said that he certainly did not mean that the troop strength should be reduced, but at the same time we must make absolutely sure that Europe accepts its responsibilities.

M. Spaak said that he agreed completely. Europe is recovering economically, and therefore new discussions of the problem are needed. It would be dangerous, however, if the United States were to take a unilateral decision. The United States has a duty to explain conditions to Europe and to the world. The United States can point out that the United Kingdom is in a good situation, and so is Germany, and the smaller countries. The United States should speak very firmly to some of the smaller countries. M. Spaak said that, as Secretary-General, he finds it hard to discuss this openly, but the truth is that Norway, Denmark and Belgium are not making a useful military contribution. Their effort is declining year by year. The United States should initiate multilateral discussions on this matter. If the European countries suddenly come to the conclusion that the United States is going to withdraw its troops without discussion, they will think that the world situation is better, and will reduce their forces.

The President said that we must not put the cart before the horse. We must do things in the proper sequence. However, the fact remains that the other countries are not accepting their responsibilities.

M. Spaak said that the United States is too kind, too indulgent. Sometimes it is necessary to speak out with full strength. Otherwise the Europeans will think that the rich, strong United States will always be there to help. If however, the United States speaks clearly and firmly, saying that this situation cannot go on forever, and that Europe must provide for its own defense, it will be extremely useful.

The President remarked that he has been urging this policy for the past five years, but every year some new crisis arises, and people think that this is not the year for us to open our mouths.

At first Belgium had a two-year military service, but, when they saw that other countries had only 14 or 16 months’ service, they decided to reduce their own. There should be some country besides the United States that is ready to do its full share. There should be a government— not just an individual—which is ready to say: This is what we must do.

M. Spaak asked whether the United States will withdraw all its troops from Europe some day. The President replied that we absolutely would not do this.

M. Spaak noted that there is another problem—the position of De Gaulle—which is a great source of trouble for us in NATO. All that De Gaulle says about armaments is wrong. De Gaulle’s ideas are those of Merovingian times, but war has vastly changed since the days of the Merovingians. His attitude is extremely dangerous.

The President said that De Gaulle feels that an Army can have no morale unless it is defending its own country, yet in the Second World War, when a lot of us were fighting on foreign soil, it seemed we had good morale.

The President said that never in our lifetime will all our troops be withdrawn from Europe because it is important to carry the flag. We are contributing about 40 per cent of the infrastructure requirements. Our fleets are in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. There is a question as to the usefulness of the Sixth Fleet in a general war. Perhaps it is exercising a calming influence, but the United Kingdom and France should take on more responsibility in that area.

We must strengthen NATO by making Western Europe more self-dependent, but throughout our lifetime, we shall have token forces over there. We will have some naval strength, some ground installations and missile bases. We will contribute to the infrastructure requirements. But now we ought to say to Europe: You should be ashamed to have our troops over there.

M. Spaak commented that perhaps it would be well to say that in 1949 the situation was such that the United States had to undertake a large share of the effort. That was what was also said later in Lisbon.² But since that time the countries of Europe have made great progress, and therefore their share in the defense of NATO must be increased, and this is a problem which requires study.

The President said there is the matter of the way we approach the problem. We must do it diplomatically. We must tell governments that they must do more and give our reasons. Then governments can give instructions to their representatives as to the attitude they should take in NATO. If the representatives in NATO do not understand the situation, there will be complete confusion.

Secretary Herter said that the Europeans are beginning to understand our position. We must proceed by consultation, and not unilaterally.

The President said that he agreed. He added that one country, Turkey, is strained to the limit. Germany on the other hand, is holding back. M. Spaak said that Greece and Italy are making an effort. France is a special case. Germany is making slow progress, but is improving. Their position is strong, but the percentage of their income devoted to defense is small.

M. Spaak said some have suggested that perhaps it might be a good idea to ask the experts or the “Wise Men” to study the question, as had been done before Lisbon.

The President said that perhaps this could be done. We might present our position to governments, with a Wise Men’s report, and then have the NATO Council debate the matter.

M. Spaak returned to the question of the international situation. Some think that a new situation has arisen.

The President said that, with the Indian situation what it is, he had decided to visit India, as he had been wanting to do for the past four or five years.³ He hopes to awaken the countries that are not members of NATO to the need for unity. This is desirable because we had not merely to keep Moscow in a state of tension, but because we want to defend the same human values as they do, and to obtain coherence. The President hoped that this effort will be well received in NATO, and that NATO, instead of giving way to divisive influences, will be more solidly unified. However, De Gaulle’s strong position in France and his antiquated ideas on alliances are not good or healthy because French representatives must reflect De Gaulle’s views. We must reach the people. This is a big task, which will remain just as long as the Communist Manifesto remains and just as long as Russia and China pose a threat.

M. Spaak said that it is difficult to convince De Gaulle with arguments, but he is an intelligent man and a realist. If he is confronted with hard facts, he becomes more flexible. If in NATO the United States takes a decisive lead, all the other countries will follow, and France will stand completely alone. If De Gaulle refuses to agree, we shall act alone. There is no possibility of convincing De Gaulle.

The President commented that the problem still remains that De Gaulle is capable of making fantastic decisions. He might say that France would withdraw its forces from NATO and limit its military effort to Algeria.

M. Spaak said this is not the policy of France, but of De Gaulle. In France there is no Parliament; there is no Government; there is only De Gaulle, and his ideas are not those of France.

On the general international situation, the President said that, since the very beginning, he has been saying that we cannot negotiate from weakness, but only from a position of strength. There has been no change except that Khrushchev is not so belligerent as he was earlier, or as Stalin was. It is very bad if people are lulled into the belief that the Communist goal has changed just because there is a sweeter smile in the Kremlin. This is something we must counteract. On the other hand, if we are to seek fruitful negotiations with the Soviets, we must not indulge in name-calling. We must observe the normal decencies of diplomatic language. We cannot speak of Khrushchev’s hands dripping with Hungarian blood. It is, in fact, true, but we cannot speak about it.

M. Spaak agreed, but added that people are very fond of wishful thinking. In December there must be a firm statement, pointing out that nothing fundamental has changed, but that we must take advantage of the better atmosphere to try to improve our position. We cannot reduce our military effort before success has been achieved.

The President agreed that nothing could be worse. The United States has a two-year military service. It is fair to ask why Western Europe cannot do the same.

M. Spaak said that it is unfortunate that the EDC was rejected because Europe must accept the rule of uniformity. If one country has a two-year period and another only one, it is hard for the first country to maintain the longer period. Each Government should spend the same percentage of its income for the common effort. There should be standardization. This was the goal of the EDC, and it is a pity that it was rejected.

The President said that, in the spring of 1952, he swore, prayed, almost wept for the EDC. It was initialed, but after the French Parliament was through with it, there was nothing left.

Americans complain that we have our divisions over there, in addition to our other commitments, and yet Europe does nothing. England has cut down its effort and wants to cut it even more, although she might reconsider her cuts.

M. Spaak commented on the danger that Belgium may withdraw its troops from Germany. That would be foolish; NATO should strongly oppose the idea. There is no use in Belgium’s having two divisions in Belgium.

The President said that he agreed with Mr. Spaak. Our problem is how to accomplish this without causing alarm. The Secretary of State has been asked to explain the problem to governments, to explain how they are shirking their duty. Then we can speak of the great need of maintaining our strength. We must reinforce success, and not failure.

M. Spaak said that the NATO countries should be kept informed of what is planned. The arrangements for the December meeting are good, but the countries should be kept informed. The small countries in particular appreciate this sort of thing.

The President commented that you cannot negotiate with the Communists except from a position of strength. They respect you more if you are strong. We do not need to be belligerent or chauvinistic because we are strong. Quite the contrary. We can afford to make concessions if we are strong. M. Spaak agreed that there can be no success if little concessions are made to the Communists. We must keep our position very firm on the basic principles. M. Spaak asked if we expect success at the Summit Meeting, on the Berlin question. The President replied that Khrushchev might say that he will do nothing sudden in Berlin, that he will present no ultimatum. This would be a half-way retreat. He may give some pledge on Berlin which will not be wholly satisfactory, but which will allay fears. As far as nuclear tests are concerned, Khrushchev is worried by the cost of armaments. He says he wants to disarm, but that he can’t convince the United States to disarm on his terms. He has given much emphasis to “mutual trust,” but we will agree only if there is an adequate system of inspection and control.

The President agreed with M. Spaak’s comment that, if armaments are so very expensive for the United States, they must be so for the USSR also. The expense to the USSR is about half what it is to us, but the relative effort is about the same. The President stated that all this was foolish. Khrushchev says that there is a lot of talk about peace in the world, but what do the Russians do? Sometimes Khrushchev hints that he might agree to mutual inspection, but then he retreats. It may be agreed that we reduce the armaments burden, the President said, but he recalled what happened in 1922 in the Nine Power Treaty.⁴ Under Mr. Coolidge and Mr. Hoover we observed the letter of the law. We did not even elevate our guns, but all the time the Japanese were building ships. We cannot afford to repeat that experience.

The President concluded by agreeing with M. Spaak that we must strengthen NATO. There can be no security in any region unless the people of that region are determined to make the necessary effort. The United States cannot do the job all by itself, even with 40 Divisions. We can import troops, but we cannot import a heart, and people lose heart if they feel that everything depends on us. We must not minimize the over-all seriousness of the situation.

M. Spaak agreed that the President must be very severe in NATO.

(The conversation was concluded at 9:10 a.m.)

0. Source: Eisenhower Library, Staff Secretary Records, NATO. Secret. Drafted by Charles Sedgwick, interpreter, and Fessenden. The meeting was held at the White House. Attached to the source text is a memorandum of transmittal from Calhoun to Goodpaster, December 3. Another copy of this memorandum of conversation indicates that the White House approved it on December 7. Attached to this copy is a verbatim transcript of the conversation prepared by Sedgwick. (Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548, Europe 1959)
1. Eisenhower visited the NATO capitals January 7–26, 1951.
2. The NAC Ministerial Meeting was held in Lisbon February 20–25, 1952.
3. Eisenhower visited India December 9–14.
4. Reference should be to the Five-Power Treaty of 1922, which established naval ratios for capital ships of the United States, United Kingdom, France, Japan, and Italy. The Nine-Power Treaty of 1922 provided for the reaffirmation of the Open Door in China.