Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

225. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Policy Planning (Smith) to Secretary of State Herter⁰

October 29, 1959.

SUBJECT

• Force Cuts Discussion with DOD on October 24, 1959

I have read the memorandum of the conversation which you had on October 24 with Secretaries Anderson, McElroy and Gates about the possibility of force cuts abroad.¹

Having given a good deal of attention for some years to the subject matter of that conversation, I thought that a few observations might be of some use.

I gather that the real argument for force withdrawals is based on economic pressures and that the military arguments given are more or less rationalizations. If economic factors require us to weaken American military influence abroad, I think it is most important that we not fool ourselves by rationalizing such retraction as being warranted by the military situation.

Secretary McElroy is reported as having commented “... that as long as the US was committed to the principle that any war with the Soviet Union was general war, the need for NATO defenses diminished.”²

You are aware that the principle relied on by Secretary McElroy has in the past several years come under increasingly heavy fire. Almost two years ago Foster Dulles on a number of occasions told the Secretary of Defense and the President that he believed this principle was obsolescent and that we should be developing a new strategic concept and military posture to implement it.

The drift of Secretary McElroy’s thinking seems to be that it is in the US security interest to more and more depend on the total war nuclear deterrent. For example, Secretary McElroy is reported as saying that “there is a need to modify the shield and sword concept.”

This can only mean that he favors a modification in the direction of the “trip-wire” concept which requires fewer conventional forces and places a heavier deterrent burden on the general war strategic bombing capability. The NATO military authorities believe just the opposite. They are pressing for a build up of the shield forces.

This problem is directly related to your efforts during the past year to reduce America’s dependence on the total war threat and to restore some balance in our military establishment. As a result of your efforts, a small advance in this direction was made in Basic National Security policy this year.³ I believe that any move which will increase our dependence on the strategic bombing deterrent would be contrary to the new emphasis on maintaining balanced forces which the President approved only a few months ago.

I am struck by the likely effect of the force cuts on our limited war capability. Irwin touched on a very sore point indeed in stating “by moving air strength out of Europe, we would limit US capability for responses to problems in the Middle East, and in the Far East would reduce flexibility to meet local situations there.” Such limitation is completely at odds with the policy which you have urged many times of beefing up our capability to meet limited situations.⁴

I think there is a good deal of sense in Irwin’s point that there is a degree of “schizophrenia in at one and the same time moving in the direction of nuclear test suspension and pursuing a trend toward increased development and dependence on nuclear weapons as a result of budgetary and balance of payment pressures.”

The statement on page 7 of the report referring to “our growing dependence on nuclear weapons in limited war situations” seems to fly in the face of the recent Presidential decision calling for greater “balance” in our military establishment.⁵

There is no comfort in Secretary McElroy’s stated belief that in a limited war situation the “use of tactical nuclear weapons would not necessarily start a general nuclear war.” If there is even a 50–50 chance that their use would start a general nuclear war, I would think that they would be completely ruled out as limited war weapons by the dictates of common sense.

I share Tom Gates’ expressed feeling that perhaps the courageous thing to do would be to raise taxes rather than permit budget considerations to reduce our military power.

There seems to me to be no greater problem facing this Government than whether or not to warp our military doctrine and stunt our military establishment to meet temporary economic pressures. We face the alternative of whether to run an uncertain risk of some loss of confidence in the dollar or the certain risk of loss of confidence in America’s determination to make common cause with its allies and maintain a rational and credible deterrent to communist aggression. If this happens, the standing of the American dollar and a great deal more besides will inevitably be prejudiced.

I hope that you will urge this line vigorously upon the President. It seems especially important that American military influence abroad not be reduced at this time of pre-Berlin negotiation and post-Khrushchev visit.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 711.5/10–2959. Top Secret. Initialed by Smith.
1. Document 224.
2. Ellipsis in the source text.
3. Reference is to NSC 5906/1, “Basic National Security Policy,” approved by the President on August 5; it is scheduled for publication in volume III.
4. In the margin next to this paragraph is the notation in what appears to be Secretary Herter’s handwriting: “With this I concur.”
5. Reference is to the President’s approval on August 5 of NSC 5906/1. In the margin of this paragraph is the notation in what appears to be Herter’s handwriting: “I agree.”