Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

215. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Countries⁰

July 10, 1959, 7:58 p.m.

41. Paris for Embassy and USRO, Thurston and West¹ for info. A. Polto 27, rptd info Athens 3.² B. Athens’ 41, rptd info Paris Topol 1.³

1. We have noticed evidence of certain misgivings in Europe, besides those mentioned in reftels, concerning US readiness use atomic weapons in defense of another NATO country if US itself is not attacked. Such misgivings are often based on theory that, now that USSR has ability to deliver nuclear weapons on US homeland, an atomic stalemate has been reached. According to this theory US is not likely to defend NATO territory by counter attack using US nuclear weapons because in so doing US would be inviting nuclear counter attack on itself. Thus, again according to theory, threat of US deterrent power is no longer protection for NATO area and Soviets know it. If use of large-scale nuclear weapons in European conflict is thus practically eliminated, Soviets, with greater conventional forces, would have advantage. Foregoing reasoning obviously also leads to loss of confidence in NATO defensive strategy of “sword and shield” since, it is argued, retaliatory “sword” is illusory.

2. Variation of foregoing is that indications of US or NATO plans for limited war in Europe prove thesis. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

3. Following sentence from Secretary’s testimony before Senate Foreign Relations Committee April 21 has been cited as confirming thesis: “Reducing that question to responsible individuals, I can’t conceive of the President of the United States involving us in an all-out nuclear war unless the facts showed clearly that we are in danger of devastation ourselves, or that actual moves have been made toward devastating ourselves.” This statement was made in context of series of questions dealing with hypothetical possibility whether deliberate shooting down of a US aircraft might be considered reason for precipitating nuclear war, time factors involved, and role of US Congress in declaration of war. Within context do no believe this passage should cause confusion. (Text being pouched to all addressees.) Of course interpretation that it confirms a reservation on part of US is wholly foreign to Secretary’s views and intent. Foreign officials may be so assured, as directed by the Chief of Missions.

4. In attempting to allay such doubts regarding US intentions, it is obviously undesirable to contend that the US will, under hypothetical circumstances, adopt a given military course of action. Type of action to be taken under given circumstances is matter for Presidential determination.

5. If queried, US officials authorized by Chief of Mission should thus avoid conjecture regarding specific nature of US military response, but should emphasize US determination to honor its NATO commitments. Most authoritative statement of US position is that of President at December 1957 Heads of Government meeting:

Begin Unclassified Verbatim Text.

“This is our resolve: Speaking for my own country, I assure you in the most solemn terms that the United States would come, at once and with all appropriate force, to the assistance of any NATO nation subjected to armed attack. This is the resolve of the United States—of all parts and of all parties.

Equally, I do not doubt that each of your nations would similarly respond should the United States or another NATO member be attacked. This, then, is the core of our partnership—an attack against one is an attack against all. In order to live in peace together, we are resolved to defend ourselves together if need be.”⁴ End Unclassified Verbatim Text.

6. In addition, authorized US officials may refer to US record since World War II (i.e. Truman doctrine, Berlin airlift, Korea, US stand in Taiwan Straits, Beirut landings), as well as to physical presence large numbers US forces in NATO area, as clear evidence our determination stand by allied countries subjected to armed aggression or threat of force.

Herter

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/7–1059. Secret; Limit Distribution; Verbatim Text. Drafted by John Y. Millar, EUR/RA; cleared with Fessenden, Murphy, Merchant, and OSD/ISA; and approved by Herter. Pouched to Geneva.
1. George L. West, Counselor of Embassy in France.
2. Polto 27 from Paris, July 4, reported that in response to a request from Spaak’s office, USRO sent him the text of Herter’s statement to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on April 21 regarding the resort to nuclear war, and added that because of concern on this matter the Department might wish to make a statement dealing with this subject. (Department of State, Central Files, 740.2/7–459) For text of Herter’s statement, see Nomination of Christian A. Herter: Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-Sixth Congress, First Session, on the Nomination of Christian A. Herter To Be Secretary of State, April 21, 1959 (Washington, 1959).
3. Telegram 41 from Athens, July 3, reported that Averoff told the U.S. Chargé that former Prime Minister George Papandreou and other Greek leaders [text not declassified] had expressed misgivings concerning Herter’s April 21 statement on nuclear war to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Averoff sought clarification of Herter’s statement. (Department of State, Central Files, 660.0012/7–359)
4. For full text of Eisenhower’s statement, December 16, 1957, see Department of State Bulletin, January 6, 1958, pp. 6–8.