Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

213. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

June 8, 1959.

SUBJECT

• French Problems

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. Robert Murphy, Deputy Under Secretary of State
• General Lauris Norstad, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
• Mr. Foy D. Kohler, Acting Assistant Secretary, EUR
• Mr. Ivan B. White, Deputy Assistant Secretary, EUR
• Maj. General John S. Guthrie, Director, European Region, OSD/ISA
• Mr. Robert H. Knight, Deputy Assistant Secretary, OSD/ISA
• Mr. B.E.L. Timmons, Director, EUR/RA
• Mr. Robert H. McBride, Director, WE
• Mr. Alfred G. Vigderman, Acting Director, GER
• Mr. Russell Fessenden, Deputy Director, EUR/RA

Aid Policy Towards France. There was general agreement to follow General Norstad’s recommendations regarding Tartars: i.e., there should be specific understanding that the ship being equipped with Tartars would be earmarked for assignment to NATO and that the equipment would remain with the ship only so long as it continued to be so earmarked. It was agreed that this could be accomplished in the customary way through an exchange of letters between the Chief of MAAG, France, and the appropriate French authorities.

On the question of nuclear-capable delivery weapons, there was general agreement with General Norstad’s recommendation that there be a specific reassurance that French forces in Germany equipped with such weapons remain NATO-committed or recoverable by the U.S. should the unit be withdrawn. In discussing his second condition (for specific French agreement that NATO atomic stockpile arrangements are accepted for supplying and servicing this equipment in Germany) General Norstad said that this requirement was actually fully endorsed by the French at a high level. General Norstad also said that similar conditions are not required for nuclear-delivery equipment for other NATO countries, since the equipment for other countries is serviced by NATO stockpile arrangements. [8-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

Mr. Murphy commented that we would appear to be bound to make the conditions for our aid clear to the French in a clear and “businesslike” manner.

Bizerte. General Norstad said that he agreed there were advantages in providing for an exception in the case of Bizerte if this would be helpful in bringing about Franco-Tunisian settlement of the Bizerte question. His concern was that he not have to play a role which would require him to “perjure” himself in the light of the French Mediterranean fleet withdrawal. He would therefore prefer a solution which would provide for extension of the infrastructure credits for Bizerte without, however, requiring an initiative by him.

Redeployment of Nine Squadrons. General Norstad said that the die was cast on the nine squadrons.¹ The Strip-Alert measures are already being put into effect, with a total of 36 aircraft now in Germany and 18 more to go. He has told General Everest of USAFE² to start discussing with the U.K. immediately redeployment details. The permanent redeployment will require about six months to carry out and will have the net effect of putting nine more squadrons into the U.K. Any permanent net increase in squadrons in Germany is not possible in view of the lack of facilities there. The permanent redeployment can be carried out in phases and in a manner that will not affect the military effectiveness of our NATO forces.

General Norstad said that the redeployment of the nine squadrons will have no real effect on De Gaulle’s attitude. Only the passage of time and the gradual education of General De Gaulle in NATO will change his attitude. There are some signs that this favorable process may have already begun, since General De Gaulle is showing signs of real concern about the effect on French forces of his NATO policies. The basic difficulty with De Gaulle, as is well known, is that nobody is really able to talk with him. General Norstad finds full support in the French Government for his problems all the way up the line to De Gaulle, but there runs into a complete road block.

Mr. Murphy commented that our basic problem is perhaps in this instance to let it be understood that, as much as we value French cooperation, if the conditions are too adverse their real estate is not always indispensable.

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/6–859. Secret. Drafted by Fessenden and approved by Murphy on June 22. The meeting took place in Murphy’s office in the Department of State.
1. Reference is the redeployment of nine U.S. Air Force squadrons from France; see Part 2, Documents 121 ff. Norstad’s report on the problem to the NAC on June 11 was summarized in Polto Circular 45 from Paris, June 11. (Department of State, Central Files, 711.56351/6–1159) The U.S. announcement to the NAC on July 8 of its decision to redeploy the squadrons was summarized in Polto 62 from Paris, July 8. (ibid., 711.56351/7–859)
2. General Frank F. Everest, Commander in Chief, U.S. Air Force in Europe.