Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

209. Memorandum of Conversation⁰

USDel/MC/1

April 1, 1959, 5:45 p.m.

NATO MINISTERIAL MEETING

April 2–4, 1959

SUBJECT

• Dutch Views on Need for NATO Solidarity

PARTICIPANTS

• Dr. J.M.A.H. Luns, Foreign Minister of The Netherlands
• Dr. J.H. van Roijen, Ambassador of The Netherlands
• Mr. D.U. Stikker, Netherlands Permanent Representative to NATO
• The Acting Secretary
• Mr. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs
• Mr. Turner C. Cameron, Jr.—WE

Foreign Minister Luns opened the conversation by saying that he believed the NATO Ministerial meeting was coming at a very opportune moment since it would provide an important demonstration of continuing Western unity in the face of Soviet threats. He said that he thought it was well that world public opinion should be reminded that NATO was a continuing organization with well-defined objectives. This had been important throughout the history of NATO but it seemed to him to be of even greater significance at the present moment. Earlier in the year he had been concerned by signs of disagreement among the Western nations. He commented that Prime Minister Macmillan’s talks in Paris, Bonn and Washington had, in his opinion, done much to clear the air and to create a situation where NATO unity could be again demonstrated.¹ The Acting Secretary said that he, of course, agreed with the Foreign Minister’s emphasis on NATO solidarity. He commented that Mr. Macmillan’s talks had indeed been helpful and had taken place in a friendly atmosphere.

Foreign Minister Luns said that he was in the very fortunate position of being able to speak for a country which was entirely united on taking a firm stand on East-West questions. He added that the Dutch Labor Party strongly supported the Government in these matters. There was, however, he commented, a slight feeling that in developing the West position the views of the smaller allies had not received a sufficient hearing. This was an additional reason for welcoming the NATO meeting.

Referring to the forthcoming Foreign Ministers’ meeting,² Foreign Minister Luns said that if the US, UK and France agreed to Italian participation, the Dutch believed that Benelux should also be given a place at the table. He recalled that the Netherlands had been one of the original allies in World War II and that Italy had joined the Alliance a little later. He pointed out that the Netherlands was not one of the weaker allies. Its military contributions were significant, and its position on political questions was firm. The Acting Secretary said that we welcomed the firmness of Dutch public opinion on East-West matters. He added that, as the Foreign Minister knew, public opinion in the United States was also very solid on these questions. As for possible Benelux participation in the Foreign Ministers’ meeting he said that we preferred the four-power formula. Moreover we did not know how this matter would turn out since in their note of March 30 the Soviets left the question of Czechoslovakian and Polish participation to be decided in the Foreign Ministers’ meeting itself.³

Recalling his last visit to London, Foreign Minister Luns said that British political leaders had asked him what the Dutch would do in case a crisis developed over Berlin. The Foreign Minister said that he had replied that the Dutch would instantly mobilize. This was the position of the Dutch Government which had the full support of the Dutch people. He added that the Dutch were firmly united on the position that the West should not give in on Berlin or accept disengagement. He believed that any action along these lines would only increase the danger of war.

The Foreign Minister said that the Dutch Government was most unhappy about the French withdrawal of their Mediterranean fleet from wartime commitment to NATO. He was particularly concerned about the political and psychological implications of this move which struck directly at NATO unity and solidarity. He was also disturbed by the effect of this action on the continued integration of NATO forces in which the Dutch believed strongly. The Foreign Minister asked whether the Acting Secretary thought it would be desirable for the Dutch to raise this matter at the forthcoming NATO meeting. The Acting Secretary replied that the United States had also been seriously disturbed by the French action for much the same reasons which the Foreign Minister had mentioned. Although we did not wish to minimize in any way our concern at the French action, we were trying to play it down and do not believe that it would be desirable to raise it in the forthcoming sessions of the NATO Ministerial meeting. We thought it better to emphasize NATO unity in these sessions. In reply to a question, the Acting Secretary said that the French Foreign Minister had told him that the French Government contemplated no further moves against the NATO command structure in the near future.

Foreign Minister Luns asked whether the Berlin situation had not recently become more tense because of the C–130 incident.⁴ The Acting Secretary explained that the flight of the C–130 had been designed as a demonstration of our right to fly into Berlin at any altitude. Our military had been anxious to reaffirm this principle. Our new jet transports attain their maximum efficiency at an altitude of approximately 25,000 feet. We had, of course, never recognized a ceiling on the altitude at which our planes could fly. There had been protests from the Soviets but the discussion was still at the technical level. Foreign Minister Luns asked whether the Acting Secretary did not believe that it might be desirable to take certain military precautions in Europe. The Acting Secretary replied that we had indeed already made some moves in this direction. Certain of our military units had been strengthened. These moves had been taken in such a way that the Soviets would become aware of them. We did not intend to publicize these actions since we did not wish to increase uneasiness in Western Europe.

0. Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 64 D 560, CF 1235. Confidential. Drafted by Cameron and approved by Herter on April 6.
1. Regarding Macmillan’s talks in Paris and Bonn, see footnote 2, Document 197. For documentation on Macmillan’s talks in Washington March 19–24, see Part 2, Documents 355 ff.
2. Documentation on the Foreign Ministers meeting in Geneva May 11-August 5 is in volume VIII.
3. The March 30 Soviet note to the United States and the United Kingdom calling for a Foreign Ministers Conference and a Summit Conference is printed in RIIA, Documents, 1959, pp. 33–34. A similar but not identical note was sent to France.
4. On March 27, three Soviet fighters repeatedly “buzzed” a U.S. Air Force C–130 airplane, which was flying to Berlin at a height of 25,000 feet. The Soviet Government maintained that the Western Allies were not entitled to fly above 10,000 feet to Berlin.