163. Memorandum of Discussion at the 390th Meeting of the National Security Council0
[Here follow a paragraph listing the participants at the meeting and agenda items 1 and 2.]
3. December 1958 NATO Ministerial Meeting
Mr. Gray said he understood that Secretary Herter was prepared to talk briefly about the forthcoming NATO Ministerial Meeting in Paris. Governor Herter replied in the affirmative and said that he believed the NATO meeting would develop three main themes. The first of these [Page 367] was a military theme and would involve discussion of the MC–70 Plan.1 The U.S. would be obliged to fudge a little its own position in such a discussion. We will find it somewhat awkward to urge the other NATO Powers to fulfill their obligations to the letter while we ourselves may not plan, after Calendar 1959, to fulfill our own. Under the curcumstances, we would have to do the best we could.
Speaking very vigorously, the President inquired of Secretary Herter whether it ever occurred to his people that it was their duty to make the representatives of the other NATO nations realize that their national security cannot always and completely depend on the U.S. After all, when we deployed our six divisions to NATO, the deployment was never intended to be permanent and we informed Congress that this was a temporary measure, particularly related to the build-up of West German forces.
Secretary Herter said that the second theme of the meeting would consist of De Gaulle’s attitude toward the NATO alliance. He reminded the members of the Council of De Gaulle’s effort to set up in NATO a kind of directing triumvirate consisting of France, the U.K., and the U.S. De Gaulle seemed to be very insistent on this point and there have already been two meetings in Washington between the Secretary of State and the French and British Ambassadors to discuss the matter.2 In spite of the two meetings, we are still uncertain what De Gaulle really wants. Moreover, in the meeting yesterday the French came up with two further questions to ask of the U.S. Government while providing no answers to the questions which our Government had asked earlier. Secretary Herter added the further thought that this issue would be taken up with De Gaulle and with the Foreign Minister, Couve de Murville, in Paris this weekend. Meanwhile, many of the other NATO powers were very worried indeed over the possibility of some kind of tripartite domination of NATO.
Secretary Herter said that the third theme of discussion at the Paris meeting would be the situation in Berlin. This he described as still constituting a complicated and uncertain picture. As yet no firm policy positions had been taken by the four responsible powers, the U.S., the U.K., France, and the Federal Republic. There was still much soul searching for alternatives. One such alternative was, of course, simply to insist on maintaining the status quo. Such an alternative would require most careful planning. Another alternative was whether to open up the Berlin situation so that it involved a complete review of the German problem in its entirety. At the moment, thought Secretary Herter, with this NATO [Page 368] meeting coming up, no one here wants to get into an absolutely fixed position. The views of other NATO powers must be safeguarded.
The President said that he wished to talk with Secretary Herter and certain other officials on the Berlin problem at a meeting in his office after the conclusion of the Council meeting.3
Secretary Anderson inquired of Secretary Herter whether the latter believed that there was any link between the De Gaulle proposals on NATO on the one hand and the common market and free-trade area on the other? Secretary Herter doubted that there was any such link and said that he felt that De Gaulle’s attitude represented a throwback to the days when De Gaulle held a position inferior to that of Roosevelt and Churchill. In other words, it was a matter largely of prestige, with De Gaulle determined really to be one of the Big Three.
The President strongly agreed with Secretary Herter’s view and reminisced about some of De Gaulle’s past actions in which he had been involved, concluding that De Gaulle had always been restive under the knowledge that he did not, in fact, constitute one of the Big Three.
Mr. Gray turned to Secretary Herter and said that as far as MC–70 was concerned, he believed that we had certain commitments under the plan through Calendar Year 1959. The question, therefore, was what we do over the longer range. At the NATO meeting would we simply confine our discussion to this single year or would we be drawn into longer-range discussions of our commitments? Secretary Herter replied that MC–70 was, of course, subject to review at regular intervals. He thought that the basis of discussion of MC–70 would be that the other NATO powers could not or would not live up to their agreed commitments to MC–70.
The President, again speaking with considerable warmth, emphasized that the U.S. ought to insist that we will not always be the permanent foundation stone of the whole NATO alliance. Our original contribution of divisions and other forces to NATO was supposed to be temporary in character. Now we seem to be stuck with it permanently. We should ask when the hell these other people are going to do their duty. We have got to get tougher with them and it is on this subject that he wished to talk with the Secretary of State. These other NATO powers cannot go on forever riding on our coattails. After all, the Belgians, who originally had a period of two years of compulsory service for their newly drafted military personnel, have now got it down to twelve months and are agitating for even less. The same was true of the Danes. [Page 369] All of these nations seem to be trying to figure out how little they themselves can do and how best to leave us to do the rest of the job.
Secretary Quarles pointed out that through the next calendar year our U.S. commitment to MC–70 is firm and we will be able to meet this commitment. Down the road farther, however, the U.S. will fall substantially short of its MC–70 goals and the other NATO nations will fall even more short of their goals. The problem, as Secretary Quarles saw it, was really that the political elements of power in the NATO nations have not fully accepted the military requirements and the strategic concept on which the MC–70 was based. Accordingly, we must seek a political meeting of the minds in order to obtain agreed military requirements. Otherwise glaring short-falls are bound to occur in the future.
Secretary Herter observed that De Gaulle was really seeking a complete re-assessment of the entire NATO defense concept. The President said he understood this and that De Gaulle really wanted to broaden NATO to include all the world where Western interests were at stake. This was just a little crazy. NATO really had a specific mission if the member nations would just buckle down and carry it out.
The National Security Council:4
- a.
- Noted and discussed the subject in the light of an oral presentation by the Acting Secretary of State.
- b.
- Noted the President’s statement that the European Members of NATO must realize that they must increase their share in European defense. The President stated that he would speak to the Secretary of State about this matter prior to the Secretary’s departure for Paris.
Note: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to the Secretaries of State and Defense.
[Here follow the remaining agenda items.]
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by S. Everett Gleason.↩
- Regarding MC–70, see Document 131.↩
- See Part 2, Documents 77 and 78.↩
- For notes of the meeting with the President on Berlin, December 11, see vol. VIII, Document 97.↩
- Paragraphs a and b and the Note that follows constitute NSC Action No. 2017, approved by the President on December 12. (Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95, Records of Action by the National Security Council)↩