Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

133. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Elbrick) to Secretary of State Dulles⁰

April 24, 1958.

SUBJECT

• NATO Defense Ministers Conference

Following in accordance with your request is a summary of the highlights of the April 15–17 NATO Defense Ministers Conference.¹ Mr. Timmons and Mr. Fearey of the Department attended as members of the U.S. Delegation.

The conference was held pursuant to the Heads of Government decision last December that “a military conference should be held at the Ministerial level in the early months of 1958.” The meeting was of a non-decision taking character and consisted (1) of briefings by the major NATO Commanders on their missions and force requirements as set forth in MC 70, “The NATO Minimum Essential Force Requirements”;² (2) of discussion of MC 70 in light of these briefings; (3) of discussion of the most effective means of coordinating research, development and production of modern weapons in Europe; and (4) of a progress report by General Norstad on the introduction of IRBMs in Allied Command Europe and establishment of the NATO Atomic Stockpile.

The most pointed of the questions following the Commanders’ briefings were put by U.K. Defense Minister Sandys, reflecting doubt on his part as to the utility of a major portion of NATO naval forces in the face of modern weapons systems and the probable short duration of a general war. Admiral Wright, Supreme Commander Atlantic, maintained in reply that the USSR could be expected to deploy its naval vessels in advance of a conflict, which the Soviets would of course initiate, so that they would not be likely atomic targets. The Soviet Navy would thus be in a position to continue sea warfare for a considerable period regardless of retaliatory damage to the Soviet homeland. If the sea war were lost it was doubtful whether NATO could carry on the war on land successfully, with the result that even though NATO forces might have devastated the Soviet homeland the Soviets would win the war.³

The exchange of views on MC 70 indicated a positive attitude on the part of most Defense Ministers toward achievement of MC 70 force requirements. The U.S. made a forthright statement in support of the document.⁴ There was general agreement among the Defense Ministers that MC 70 should be approved for planning purposes for the period 1958–1963, and that the country breakdowns set out in the document should be accepted as guidance for the 1958 Annual Review, covering the period 1959–61.

The discussion of modern weapons research, development and production coordination was somewhat inconclusive. Secretary McElroy stated that the U.S. had no objection to the matter being proceeded with through small groups of NATO nations, such as WEU and the French-Italian-German collaboration, provided that the work is carried out under the aegis of NATO. In that event the U.S. would be able to furnish technical and certain financial assistance.⁵

In his progress report on the deployment of IRBMs and establishment of the NATO Atomic Stockpile, General Norstad noted progress in preliminary discussions with the French military authorities on the establishment of IRBM in France; said that exploratory conversations with representatives of several other countries had not yet progressed to a point where detailed reports were appropriate; and stated that the attitudes displayed in the discussions which had been held led him to believe that requirements for IRBM in Allied Command Europe would be met. With respect to the NATO Atomic Stockpile, Norstad reported that detailed plans for the Stockpile had been prepared at SHAPE and were now under study by subordinate NATO Commanders. He expressed confidence that development of the stockpile system would keep pace with nuclear delivery systems deployments.⁶

In general the Conference had a firm, encouraging tone and should provide a good basis for the work that lies ahead in implementing the broad decisions taken at the Heads of Government meeting, which can be summarized as maintaining the strength of NATO’s defenses and equipping NATO forces with modern weapons.

A copy of the Communiqué issued at the close of the Meeting is attached.⁷

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/4–2458. Secret. Drafted by Robert A. Fearey and Benson E.L. Timmons, III, of the Office of European Regional Affairs, on April 24. Transmitted through the Executive Secretariat and initialed by John A. Calhoun, Director of the Executive Secretariat. The initials “CBE” in Elbrick’s handwriting appear on the source text, and another notation by Phyllis Bernau reads: “Sec saw, pdb”.
1. No request from the Secretary asking for a summary of the highlights of the conference has been found.
2. Not found.
3. Sandys’ questions and Admiral Jerauld Wright’s replies are reported in Polto Circular 22 from Paris, April 15. (Department of State, Central Files, 740.5/4–1558)
4. Reference is apparently to the “prepared statement” of Secretary of Defense McElroy, which he presented to the afternoon plenary session on April 15. (ibid.) The statement has not been found.
5. The discussion of modern weapons research, development, and production, including McElroy’s comments, is reported in Polto Circular 25 from Paris, April 16. (ibid., 740.5/4–1758)
6. Norstad’s progress report is summarized ibid. No written progress report has been found.
7. The communiqué, not attached, is printed in Department of State Bulletin, May 5, 1958, pp. 729–730.