Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

121. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France⁰

August 22, 1960, 9:05 p.m.

743. Paris pass USRO. Brussels for USEC. Below is Dept’s FYI analysis recent developments stemming from Adenauer–De Gaulle and Adenauer–Macmillan meetings,¹ followed by position which Dept spokesmen are taking when queried on this matter.

FYI. Difficult construct clear picture of exactly what took place or was agreed at Adenauer–De Gaulle and Adenauer–Macmillan meetings. Reports received from numerous sources, British, German, French, Dutch, and Italian, all seem to be more or less colored by special prejudices of source. However, after sifting evidence, Dept believes following summarizes French, British, and German positions and motives.

Re French position, it seems well-established that De Gaulle did propose to Adenauer new approach to European movement, with Council of Heads of Government of Six and with Ministerial Committees dealing with Foreign, Military, and Cultural Affairs. Although some reports indicate French appear to have proposed Ministerial Economic Committee, others indicate EEC and other institutions in Brussels would continue to be responsible for economic affairs, but with reduced pressure to expand their jurisdiction and with EEC no longer forming institutional basis for evolution of European political unity. De Gaulle is pushing more openly confederation of national states approach to European movement, rather than integration. As for French motives, appears that De Gaulle sees France as playing key role in bloc of six continental countries, with France representing Continent in councils of Big Three. To promote such a position for France within Six, De Gaulle has sought to exploit such factors as European (especially Adenauer’s) uncertainties about the continuation of present U.S. policies in Europe and Germany and Belgian disillusionment over U.S. policies on the Congo. At the same time, De Gaulle has continued to press for tripartitism with us and UK. These two policies mutually reinforce each other. If he can advance his claim as spokesman for Europe of Six, this strengthens his hand with us and British in claiming right to tripartitism. On other hand, if he can show Continental powers that France is on par with U.S. and UK as global power, this strengthens his hand with Six in claiming to be their spokesman.

British policy in present situation appears to be clear enough. There has been no change in British concern, for mixture of political and economic reasons, about effects of European unity movement. British may have moved a step closer toward recognizing the EEC as an economic and political reality, but what they appear to be doing at moment is attempting to exploit what they hope will prove to be significant change in Adenauer’s long-standing policy of all-out support for European unity and Franco-German solidarity. Further factor may be that recent Soviet behavior has caused British views on East-West matters to move closer to Adenauer’s.

Both the French and British positions today seem to be natural extensions of their well-known past policies. Key to situation is whether there has in fact been a change in Adenauer’s policy of fullest support for European integration and for Franco-German rapprochement.

Adenauer appears to have become disillusioned by De Gaulle’s policies in various fields. This includes De Gaulle’s push for preeminent position for France among Six and for tripartitism. There has apparently been friction over NATO issues as well. Germans are prime advocates of more military integration in NATO; French favor extreme opposite course. Adenauer also appears anxious to reduce strains in Anglo-German relations, which are accentuated by EEC–EFTA problems.

Dept does not believe, however, that Adenauer’s policies on European integration or Franco-German rapprochement have undergone fundamental change. Evidence seems to point to tactical rather than basic shift. Apparently Germans will continue basic policy in regard to goals of European integration, but no further acceleration beyond that already agreed likely in near future. Most important cause for this tactical shift appears to be 1961 election in Germany. Additional factors are dismay at De Gaulle views on NATO and tripartitism and natural desire to make some improvement in relations with British.

In conclusion, Dept does not believe that this situation calls for any basic modification in U.S. policies or for any major U.S. intervention at this time. One reason is that De Gaulle’s move is so patently in direction of French control on Continent that it has already aroused resistance from other Common Market members. End FYI.

Following points should be used in response to any inquiries re U.S. policy as result of talks:

1. In general, U.S. welcomes any exchanges of views between individual Allies. Any increased understanding that results from such exchanges is always valuable in contributing to over-all strengthening of Alliance.

2. U.S. understanding of Adenauer–De Gaulle and Adenauer–Macmillan talks is that no specific decisions were reached which would cause us to modify any of our basic policies toward Europe.

3. U.S. policy rests on view that NATO should be principal forum for cooperation and consultation among member nations, with this forum complemented in economic field by the OECD when it comes into being.

4. U.S. also continues to feel that European integration is of vital importance both for the member countries and as measure to increase over-all strength of the Alliance. Regarding relations between EFTA and EEC we continue to support discussions designed to ease economic difficulties between the two groups. Our strong support for the EEC has not reflected any hostility to EFTA, for which the U.S. indicated its support at a recent GATT meeting. Long-term solutions must be consistent with GATT and should not have the effect of weakening the EEC.

Dillon

0. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 651.62A/8–2260. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Fessenden on August 20; cleared by Kohler, White, Brown, Rewinkle, GER, U, and RA; and approved by Dillon. Repeated to Bonn, Brussels, London, Rome, The Hague, and San José.
1. Adenauer visited Paris July 29–30; Macmillan was in Bonn August 10–11. For the Chancellor’s account of his meeting with De Gaulle, see Erinnerungen, 1959–1963, pp. 59–67; for the Prime Minister’s account of the visit to Bonn, see Pointing the Way, pp. 317–320.