Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Western European Integration and Security, Canada, Volume VII, Part 1

118. Briefing Paper Prepared in the Department of State⁰

Undated.

BRIEFING FOR JOINT COMMITTEE HEARINGS ON EURATOM AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION

Wednesday, June 22, 10 A.M., Room F88

The Atomic Energy Commission has asked the Department to provide political support for the AEC testimony on the “Additional Agreement for Cooperation between the U.S. and EURATOM.”¹ This agreement provides a limited amount of nuclear material to be made available to EURATOM for use outside the Joint U.S.-EURATOM Power Program. The materials are mostly for use in the Italian national atomic program but there are also small amounts of material which may be used in EURATOM’s own research effort. EURATOM and the AEC staff had negotiated a much more ambitious materials agreement, but the AEC Commission felt that in view of the desire to obtain approval of an agreement during this session of the Congress, it would be wiser to request only the amounts which could readily be identified for projects now underway. The AEC is particularly anxious to have a restatement of U.S. support for European integration and our estimate of the part which EURATOM plays in this movement.

U.S. Support for European Integration

The U.S. continues its strong support for the political and economic integration of the six countries (France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg) which signed the Common Market, Coal and Steel Community and EURATOM treaties. These three communities aim at a greater political and economic unity through a sharing of sovereignty in certain fields. While the Common Market, because of its greater scope—covering as it does the entire economies of the six countries—has assumed greater importance than the other two communities, the Coal and Steel Community and EURATOM are nevertheless integral parts of this movement and play their role in furthering the cohesion of the six-country area. (See attached talking points.)²

EURATOM Difficulties

EURATOM has run into perhaps more than its share of difficulties during its organizational period. With the impetus of the Suez crisis and under the urging of European and U.S. leaders, EURATOM chose to embark on a major nuclear power program with the U.S. as its first effort two years ago. The complete change in the energy situation since that time under-cut this effort and resulted in disappointment on all sides. In certain cases, this disappointment led to recriminations between EURATOM and individuals in the member states. These individuals feel that, with the urgency of developing atomic power removed, there is no reason to have EURATOM as an institution in existence competing for short funds with national atomic administrations. We do not believe that this opinion is shared by the politically responsible elements in the six countries. They continue to look to EURATOM to coordinate and enhance the individual efforts of the six countries both in atomic power development and in other nuclear fields. The example of the Italian Government making its request for fuel through EURATOM shows that there is still firm support for EURATOM in that country.

French-EURATOM Problem

France and EURATOM are currently engaged in a constitutional dispute. The French believe that there is nothing in the EURATOM Treaty that prevents the French Government from making its own bilateral atomic agreements so long as these agreements are presented to EURATOM for its opinion. EURATOM, on the other hand, states that Article 106 of the EURATOM Treaty calls for a “folding in” of all peaceful uses bilaterals made by member states prior to the entry into force of the Treaty. They hold this to be true particularly for agreements providing for the transfer of nuclear material. The U.S. has said that it will supply material for the French project in question—Rhapsodie—through either method but that this matter must be settled between France and EURATOM prior to the U.S. being asked to take definitive action.

Progress by EURATOM

The EURATOM Treaty authorized $215 million for an initial five-year research program. Of this amount nearly $116 million has now been programed. During 1960, it is expected that approximately $50 million will actually be spent on projects. Major items in the EURATOM Research Program are the creation of a common research center at Ispra in Italy, contributions to the Dragon and Halden OEEC projects,³EURATOM-Canadian work on heavy water reactors and fusion work being carried out by the French Atomic Energy Commission and the Karlsruhe Center. These are, of course, in addition to the amounts that EURATOM is spending in connection with the Joint U.S.-EURATOMResearch Program. The EURATOM Supply Agency has also come into effect and the Belgian Government has made the first request for materials through the Supply Agency for its research reactor at the University of Ghent.

Status of the Joint U.S.-EURATOM Nuclear Power Program

Only one firm proposal was made in response to the first invitation for reactor proposals. This was the Senn Project in Italy. The Joint Committee was informed last January that the AEC had decided to terminate the 1963 phase of the Joint Program with the inclusion of only the Senn Project. The Committee was also informed that at some later date an invitation would be issued for the two projects which the EURATOM Cooperation Act of 1958 permits for completion in 1965. The Committee appeared to react favorably to this decision. The two projects which appear to be most advanced are the Franco-Belgian Project, which will also have the status of “joint enterprise” under the EURATOM Treaty entitling it to special tax benefits, and the AKS Stuttgart Project. The latter group of utilities has already signed a first design contract with an American company.

Safeguards Issue

Although no question was raised by the Joint Committee during the long consideration of the original Joint U.S.-EURATOM Nuclear Power Program concerning the safeguards provisions, Chairman McCone has stated it is possible that this issue may be raised this time. The Department has advocated from the beginning that a EURATOM safeguards and control system should be accepted by the U.S. in place of its usual provision for unilateral U.S. safeguards. The Department has taken the position that our unilateral safeguards have very little validity in fact because of the inability or unwillingness of the U.S. to engage in the major task of adequate policing of such safeguards provisions. Thus, we welcomed both the proposal for developing international safeguards under the IAEA and also the provisions of the EURATOM Treaty which are now in full effect. There is a multinational inspection system now operating in the EURATOM area and a full and satisfactory reporting control system for all materials within the EURATOM area used for peaceful purposes. In connection with U.S.-EURATOM agreements, i.e. the original Joint Program and the new Additional Agreement now before the Committee, the U.S. has the right to verify the operations of this system and satisfy itself that it is operating properly.

The McKinney Study

We have not yet seen a copy of the McKinney Study which has been in preparation for more than a year.⁴ Mr. McKinney was commissioned by the Joint Committee to study the peaceful uses program of the U.S. in the foreign field. We understand that his conclusions generally put great stress on the impracticability of achieving economic nuclear power in the near future. He apparently will suggest that instead greater efforts be made to organize the general scientific collaboration within the free world and particularly provisions should be made to utilize unused scientific laboratory capacity in Europe. Mr. McKinney has been very critical of EURATOM activities. This stems partially from EURATOM’s concentration, to a major degree at U.S. urging, on a program to achieve economic nuclear power but also from difficulties which Mr. McKinney had as U.S. Representative to the IAEA in Vienna. He considered that U.S. support for EURATOM undermined the Vienna Agency. Mr. McKinney has also adopted many of the arguments used by national atomic authorities who, as stated above, have expressed criticism of EURATOM on grounds that it no longer has a useful function to play. If Mr. McKinney’s conclusions should be discussed before the Joint Committee and the conclusions should be along the lines indicated above, it is suggested that we reiterate our belief that EURATOM has a useful function to play and that the achievement of economic nuclear power within the next ten years is essential for the assurance of economic development and growing power needs of the industrialized areas of the world. (Monday’s announcement of U.K. cut-back in nuclear power development confirms this judgment.) The coordination of work which EURATOM has undertaken is beginning to bear fruit. Many of the national laboratories in the six countries are discovering that they are greatly over-committed to projects for which they have insufficient funds. There also has been an excessive amount of duplication which has been wasteful of the limited resources available. EURATOM has made a good start in beginning to sort out this problem. This has not been an easy task.

0. Source: Department of State, EUR/RPE Files: Lot 70 D 315, Congressional. No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the source text.
1. Signed in Washington on June 11; for text, see 11 UST 2589.
2. Not printed.
3. The Halden boiling water reactor was a joint EURATOM-ENEA project. The British Dragon project involved research on high temperature gas-cooled reactors.
4. On June 22, a copy of portions of the document was made available to the Department of State. Due to lack of time, however, officials were unable to review it prior to their appearance that day before the Joint Committee. (Memorandum for the File by Manfull, July 27; Department of State, EUR/RPE Files: Lot 70 D 315, Congressional) The report was subsequently published; for text, see Robert McKinney, Review of the International Atomic Policies and Programs of the United States: Report to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (Washington, 1960), 5 vols. No hearings were published.