Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vietnam, Volume I

174. Special Report Prepared by the Operations Coordinating Board¹

Washington, June 15, 1960.

POSSIBLE ACTIONS TO IMPROVE THE SITUATION IN VIETNAM

1. In 1960 the Republic of Viet-Nam faces an increased threat from the Communist regime in North Viet-Nam. Since the beginning of the year, that regime has promulgated a new constitution and held its first elections since 1946; its third Party Congress since 1930 will be held in September. The theme surrounding all these political events is the overthrow of President Diem and the reunification of Viet-Nam. Concurrently, the activities of the Communist guerrillas (Viet Cong) in the South have increased seriously, particularly south of Saigon, and the Communists can be counted on to exploit popular dissatisfaction with Diem’s Government, especially any rumors that the United States would like to replace Diem.

2. Diem’s Government has lost some prestige due to increased popular resentment of official corruption and highhandedness and the shortcomings of its security forces in coping with stepped-up guerrilla activity.

3. Difficulties between the Thai and Vietnamese Governments on the one hand, and the Cambodian Government on the other, continue. Viet-Nam needs the cooperation of Cambodia if the use of Cambodia as a safehaven by the Viet Cong is to be even partially interdicted.

4. On the positive side, Diem has taken the following steps to strengthen the government’s position in the area south of Saigon: (a) given increased authority to the military commander of that district; (b) rapidly executed a program to consolidate the populations of troubled areas into large garden towns (“agrovilles”) for better protection; (c) constructed more canals and airstrips in the area; and (d) building up a 5,000 to 10,000 man commando force using personnel taken from the Army and other sources. Actions of this kind place additional strains on the Vietnamese budget. If coupled with substantial and continuous reductions in U.S. aid, severe reactions on the Vietnamese economy might result.

5. The United States is continuing its military and economic aid programs. We have changed our Military Aid Program to make more communications equipment available for military use in the field, and action is being taken to speed up deliveries. The publicly known increase of our MAAG from 342 to 685 Americans has demonstrated our support. We are placing 36 specialists in MAAG for anti-guerrilla training. On the diplomatic front Ambassador Durbrow has recently made extremely strong démarches to President Diem² indicating our knowledge of and concern over corruption in the government. He has also made it clear that if the government does not make a real effort to improve its relations with Cambodia, we may consider holding back some of our aid. On several occasions recently the Ambassador has also urged on Diem and top officials the importance of strengthening the government’s popular support. The Ambassador has made specific suggestions, such as regular radio addresses by President Diem and better explanations to the people of government programs in which they are involved, calculated to give them hope for the future, and has warned Diem not to require excessive amounts of unpaid labor. The French Ambassador also has urged the President to make radio talks.

While it is early to judge Diem’s reaction to the various suggestions, he recently held a press conference in which he recommended constructive criticism from the press. The government has also indicated to us that it intends to give the population a better understanding of government programs, to slow the rate of construction of agrovilles (mostly built by unpaid labor), and to see that those who build the agrovilles are the ones who later live in them.

6. In addition to the above, increased emphasis might be given to the following activities which would be helpful in improving Viet-Nam’s ability to resist Communist pressure:

a. Show our continued public support of the government, on the grounds that it is independent, anti-Communist, and generally responsive to the needs of the people, by such methods and at such times as our Ambassador may select (see last sentence, para. 1).

b. Continue to encourage the growth of more representative government and of an increased sense of public participation.

c. Continue to maintain the best possible intelligence on corrupt activities so that our Ambassador will be in a position to bring pressure to bear on the Vietnamese Government for corrective action.

d. Continue to press Diem on the necessity of improving relations with Cambodia, particularly with respect to border control. Explore with Diem the danger for Viet-Nam of a policy calculated to throw Sihanouk into the arms of the Communists or cause his downfall. Make a continuing review of types of aid which might be withheld from Diem if such sanctions become necessary.

e. Cooperate with the representatives of friendly governments which are working along the lines described in 6. a.–d.

f. Continue emphasis on counter-guerrilla training for both ARVN and the Civil Guard.

g. Supply special equipment necessary for use by the Armed Forces in anti-guerrilla operations. (For example, programming actions are in process to provide six H–34 helicopters and four small, air-propeller boats. Additionally, program actions are under way to adjust and accelerate the delivery of communications equipment.)

h. Continue efforts to strengthen the economy through adoption by the Government of Viet-Nam of a positive economic policy, emphasizing initially exchange reform in conjunction with sound fiscal, credit and development policy. In this connection, we should discreetly support the economists who will be sent by the Brookings Institution to work with the Vietnamese Government on long-range programs (see last sentence, para. 4).

i. Increase emphasis on helping to train government administrators of high caliber (see para. 2).

j. Step up propaganda to show the weaknesses of the North Viet-Nam regime.

1. Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Vietnam. Secret. According to a covering memorandum by Bromley Smith, the OCB approved this paper at its meeting of May 25 subject to resolution of differences between the Departments of State and Defense over anti-guerrilla training of Vietnam’s Civil Guard. According to notes prepared in the White House on OCB activities of possible Presidential interest, May 27, the Southeast Asia Working Group of the OCB prepared this memorandum. (Eisenhower Library, White House Office, Project “Clean Up”, Staff Memos)

   At the OCB meeting of June 8, Merchant reported that the differences between the Departments of Defense and State were resolved:

   “As promised, Mr. Merchant reported to the Board on a State–Defense attempt to resolve the issue of supervision of ten added instructors in anti-guerrilla training. He said the two Departments had arrived at an interim satisfactory understanding and that it was being proposed to Ambassador Durbrow, Admiral Felt and ICA Washington. The seemingly feasible proposal would be to have USOM hire directly ten qualified civilians who would be added to the staff training the Civil Guard. The MAAG would continue its present Civil Guard training in this field and would try to arrange that certain Civil Guard training would be effected outside the country, for example, Okinawa and Taiwan. The working group would arrange to amend paragraph 6f of the Special Report on Viet-Nam for approval by the Board Assistants.” (OCB Notes by O’Connor, June 8; Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430, Preliminary Notes IV)

   In a letter to Durbrow, June 15, Anderson explained some of the background to the difference of opinion in Washington over the Vietnamese Civil Guard program:

   “I have meant to write you about the Civil Guard training program and the delayed reply, Deptel 2230 of June 10 [Document 172].

   “You have gathered that this question was the visible part of the larger iceberg representing CINCPAC’s suggestion that MAAG take over the whole Civil Guard program. JCS was seized of this question and for some time couldn’t come up with a position. Thus DOD was in a state of inarticulate frustration; they couldn’t say ‘yes’ and they couldn’t say ‘no’. At about that time the President asked the NSC whether the U.S. was doing everything possible to improve the situation in Viet-Nam. We were accordingly requested to draft a special OCB report on the situation in Viet-Nam (two copies being pouched to Saigon). Since Civil Guard training was one of the problems concerning our relations with Viet-Nam, we had to put it in the paper. Thus the question was raised to the OCB level where it was agreed that the matter should be settled quickly and that Messrs. Merchant and Irwin would work it out. Their attempts to do so were then delayed by the SEATO Conference. Eventually Messrs. Merchant and Irwin did meet, and the June 10 telegram referred to above was sent out. DOD indicated they still might raise the larger question of unifying all internal security, but they didn’t make much of a point of it as they realized that this would involve changing our OISP policy worldwide. I hope the reply will alleviate your problem.” (Ibid., Vietnam Working Group Files: Lot 66 D 193, 102.–VN 1960 Civil Guard)

2. See Document 160.