173. Telegram From the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow) to the Department of State1

3430. Reference: Embtels 3220, 3342, 32432 and Deptels 21863 and 2224.4 In last few days we have been questioned by several persons directly whether we have changed our policy re V-N and several inferred they understood we seeking replacement for Diem. Most important inquiries follow:

1.
Ladejinsky told me 10th about conversation with Diem in which latter expressed deep concern Americans seemed to be working with opposition groups. Ladejinsky told Diem he sure this not true and asked what Diem had in mind. Diem replied we in contact with opposition group through … . Ladejinsky replied he certain from conversation with me and others we not using … for contact opposition. In fact we could not understand why GVN permitted remain here so long. Furthermore Ladejinsky pointed out … had spread false rumors re aid program which had caused serious difficulties for Embassy and USG which should be proof we have no use for him.
2.
French correspondent at reception 10th asked me categoric statement whether it true we had made strong démarche to Diem, which in effect means we wished him step down. As I have done with other correspondents and with diplomatic colleagues, I replied this report completely false, that we still support Diem and are trying help him out in present difficulties.
3.
Coster called on Thuan 11th to discuss routine matters and latter raised question re possible change United States policy re Diem. Thuan referred to many rumors he has heard re changing US policy and inferred we seeking Diem replacement. Coster assured Thuan I had given instructions to all agency heads to pass on to their staffs that we still backing Diem and endeavoring assist him in present difficulties. Thuan replied pleased to hear this but referred to [Page 496] report he had that Embassy officer at recent reception spoke in derogatory terms of Diem inferring he should be replaced as we did with Rhee. Coster stated he could not understand how this could happen in view of strong policy directive I had issued to all Americans here and reassured Thuan our policy had not changed. Thuan referred to strong démarches, particularly re Islands, I had made recently, inferring these indicated change of policy. Coster replied his understanding these démarches had been made in order be helpful to Diem.
4.
In view ThuanCoster conversation I asked see Thuan immediately to put record straight. I told Thuan I very perturbed to hear of Coster conversation and assured him personally and officially that we are trying to do what we can to support Diem in present difficulties and reiterated I had issued instructions to all members and staff to quash contrary rumors. I reminded Thuan we stepped up delivery needed military equipment and I reminded him that I had made special point my speech inaugurating Route 21 to praise Diem’s past and present programs and progress made in country (Embtel 33185). I added while I had several frank talks with President recently I had done this as a friend in an effort to be helpful. Thuan replied that the President had noted friendly words I had used in inauguration but unfortunately President and others had heard growing number reports we changing policy. I assured Thuan I have made a point for several weeks to tell diplomatic colleagues and correspondents we still supported Diem and therefore these reports false. I added without divulging country of inquirer that Parsons had replied in similar vein (Deptel 2186) to similar questions raised Washington. I then referred to Ladejinsky’s report President perturbed about Embassy relations with … . I reminded Thuan that I had asked him last December why GVN still renewing … visa and reminded him of my recent conversation (Embtel 3243) in which I had made it clear to him we not using … in any way and would like see him leave.

Thuan then referred to recent ARVN successes and expressed opinion GVN gaining upper hand against Viet Cong. I agreed recent reports encouraging. Thuan then referred to continuing difficulties caused by Sihanouk’s attitude and particularly Sihanouk’s recent speeches and articles. I replied these certainly were not helpful and Sihanouk not only accused his neighbors of plotting his downfall but also accused United States. However, I pointed out that we had not reacted to latest blast and expressed hope that GVN would maintain [Page 497] press truce, Thuan added that GVN continued to maintain truce although many in GVN believe that GVN should react in kind. I expressed hope that now Sihanouk had won referendum he might calm down and therefore urged continue press truce. I added, however, matters such as Islands claims and fact that Free Khmer Radio had again gone on air June 5th gave Sihanouk excuse to blast his neighbors. I added I still believe firmly question of Islands is of minor importance and there is genuine dispute over them which might be submitted to World Court. I urged GVN concentrate on defeating Viet Cong and drop Island polemic. Thuan tended agree but said GVN must maintain its juridical position. Thuan assured me in most solemn manner that GVN has nothing to do with Free Khmer Radio. Thuan then told me as he had told Ladejinsky and Coster he had seen Diem immediately after my official démarche May 6 and he had never seen Diem so angry since allegations I had made were false (like Ladejinsky Thuan had specifically denied GVN ran Khmer Radio or had sent arms to Thailand. Thuan did not deny that Sam Sary was here). I replied whether GVN operating radio or not Sihanouk believes it is and propaganda put out by Free Khmer Radio is not Communist but is drafted in such a way as to give impression that it comes from Vietnam. (Since we have not yet been able pinpoint location radio, I could not categorically refute Thuan’s statement.) I added reports I had discussed with Diem were based on quite solid information. Despite Sihanouk’s blasts I urged GVN make serious efforts establish better relations which possibly could be done now that referendum matter is behind us. Thuan made no commitment.

In reverting to our continued support for Diem I said I wished reiterate friendly suggestion I had already made several times namely for Diem to make fireside chats and otherwise through press explain his programs, reasons for sacrifices, et cetera, in order bring masses closer to regime. Thuan agreed this is good idea and is urging Diem do this. (Ladejinsky told me Diem to make radio report to nation early July.)

Thuan thanked me for my assurances and said he would report them to Diem.

Durbrow
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/6–1160. Secret; Limited Distribution. Repeated for information to Bangkok, Phnom Penh, CINCPAC PolAd, and Vientiane.
  2. In these telegrams, the Embassy in Saigon reported instances in which U.S. officials in Saigon were asked whether the United States was still actively supporting Diem and if the rumors of American disillusionment with Diem were true. Telegrams 3220 and 3243, May 17 and 19; Ibid., 751K.00/5–1760 and 751K.00/5–1960, respectively. Concerning telegram 3342, see footnote 2, Document 168.
  3. In telegram 2186, June 3, the Department informed the Embassy of the conversation with French officials as reported in Document 168. (Department of State, Central Files, 751K.00/6–1060)
  4. In telegram 2224, June 10, the Department stated that it felt “no opportunity should be lost bring promptly and sharply to GVN’s attention our awareness and concern be any further moves exacerbate relations with RKG.” (Ibid., 651H.51K/6–1060)
  5. In telegram 3318, May 27, Durbrow reported that he was taking advantage of the official opening of Route 21 in Vietnam to give an official public endorsement of President Diem and his government. Durbrow noted that this ceremony provided a good opportunity because, in addition to Diem, much of the diplomatic corps and foreign press would be in attendance. (Ibid., 751K.00/5–2760)