Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

033.9411/10–1854: Telegram

No. 814
The Ambassador in Japan (Allison) to the Department of State

secret

Tokyo, October 18, 1954—10 a.m.

927. Regarding Department telegram 798 on Yoshida.¹

[1.] So long as opponents unable to get together on a successor, I am not ready to agree that Yoshida is about through although he will face major Diet crisis November. However, lack of alternative is now almost sole important reason for his political viability.

2. New serious elements of weakness have been added to debit side since June Diet riots, to wit:

(1) Increasing tendency of financial and industrial leaders to withhold monetary support and agree time has come to force Yoshida out;

(2) Ever greater reliance on Palace guard (particularly unpopular Ikeda) because so many others now intriguing regarding alternatives instead of sticking staunchly with Yoshida. Contracting circle of the faithful is gradually isolating him. (In view importance business leaders’ attitudes, am lunching Tuesday² with Ishikawa, head of Federation Economic Organizations and other key figures).

Last major positive element of strength (as opposed to negative one of Conservative disunity) is lingering belief Yoshida better than anyone can obtain American support for Japan. Even this double-edged because of deeply-rooted Japanese instinct for freedom from foreigners. Current trip is, of course, crucial from this point of view. To date, I think trip has worked in his favor because it has given Japan new prestige abroad (at least in eyes of Japanese who have been outcasts so long). But brilliant reversal of his fortunes extremely unlikely unless we hazard effort to do this for him. In my view, this would be both unwise and expensive.

It is Japanese themselves who must achieve long-term political stability; selection of their leaders must be left to them. If and when crisis comes, Conservatives will come together in rough proportion to seriousness of crisis. They are too hard-headed not to assert their dominance which is bolstered by money, by a near monopoly of experience in governing, by Japanese feudal respect for authority, by peasant conservatism and by lack of mass Communist-inclined base as in France or Italy. It is, therefore, not necessary to conclude that if Yoshida goes, something much worse for US will inevitably emerge. Also, even though scandals, et cetera, have probably increased electoral strength Socialists, I doubt that Conservatives have been weakened to point where they could not muster majority or plurality, as reference telegram suggests, in an early election.

View foregoing, although no one can be sure, I am increasingly of opinion that statement made in paragraph 9 of enclosure to Embassy despatch 1641³ correct namely that “broader-based Conservative government without Yoshida (or with him in elder statesman role) is preferable in terms of US interests to continuation of Yoshida as head of weaker government”. My principal qualification on this is that immaturity of Japanese political parties and system is such that there is relatively greater dependence than in West upon a leader who commands respect. Failures of present government have been more apparent and more detrimental to US interests since foregoing was written. This too is supported by Embassy studies pursuant to my memorandum of September 9 to Secretary. But I am all more convinced that as Embassy despatch states “our policy should be one of studied neutrality in which we neither go out of way to help Yoshida stay in office or to oust him”. In other words, intervention in my view is dangerous and not warranted, at least not now. This does not mean, however, that we should forego any opportunity to stress to Japanese advantages, in fact imperative necessity, of Conservative unity in Japan’s own interest both external and internal. We should constantly say that it is none of our affair by whom Japan is governed, that the important thing is that the country be governed.

In light of foregoing, I am in agreement with that part of paragraph 5 of reference telegram which prescribes a final Yoshida visit communiqué designed to stress our interest in Japan, especially in Japanese “self-support” programs, and am not in agreement with implication in same paragraph that we should somehow conspire to help Yoshida choose his successor. In my view, we should suit our actions to developments and only where clearly appropriate take steps to ease and shorten period of Japan’s readjustment of her internal affairs, desirable as this objective is.

Will forward separately staff comments on specific paragraphs of reference telegram.⁴

Allison

1. Document 812.
2. Oct. 19.
3. The enclosure is an Embassy study prepared in anticipation of Yoshida’s (cancelled) June visit. (611.94/6–754)
4. These comments were forwarded on Oct. 18 (with the Ambassador’s concurrence) in telegram 940 from Tokyo. The comment on paragraph 1 of telegram 927 reads: “Concur principal purpose Yoshida visit is attempt strengthen his position Japan with view remaining Prime Minister. Believe also that he considers substantial ‘present’ from US essential to achieve this aim.” (033.9411/10–1854)