Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

033.9411/10–1254: Telegram

No. 812
The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in Japan¹

secret

Washington, October 12, 1954.

798. Following our tentative views on attitude Yoshida. Your comments requested.

1. Estimate Yoshida’s performance and utility for achievement our objectives, his political strength and likely alternatives essential to decisions for handling Aichi, Okazaki and Yoshida. In our view Yoshida seeking strengthen position Japan probably with view remaining Prime Minister and when he decides transferring power acceptable successor.

2. Re performance Yoshida has provided greater stability and continuity than Japan experienced modern times even under militarists. Though unpopular with press has great rallying power and ability confuse and split opponents. His Diet record last session reflects high batting average. Believe he eventually willing lead Japan into Pacific defense arrangements despite constitutional muddle. Has pushed unpopular austerity program and been willing negotiate on politically explosive GARIOA issue. Internal security measures weak but fact remains Communism impotent as direct political force. Has resolutely stuck with US and West in Korean operation, various treaty arrangements, export controls and flat rejection Commie political overtures. In summary feel deficiencies listed your August 30 memo² serious but outweighed by achievements even if only recent difficult past considered.

3. Alternatives to Yoshida unimpressive. Hatoyama most likely but his strongly conservative views probably implemented by inflationist Ishibashi less conducive US interests particularly in fields economics and international cooperation than continuation Yoshida policies. Ogata as indicated your 690³ appears real possibility and from US point of view probably most desirable but doubt he has strength and stature remain long as Prime Minister. Ikeda equally good but his chances appear less promising. Other leading conservatives like Kishi or Shigemitsu appear undesirable.

4. Last paragraph your 679⁴ indicates Yoshida remains politically strong in which estimate we generally concur. If opposition should dethrone Yoshida by nonconfidence vote he likely dissolve Diet and force election in which we do not foresee conservative opposition as able muster sufficient strength attain majority or effective plurality. Only Socialists likely to profit substantially and new general election probable after short time. This confused situation unlikely further US interests.

5. Not sure how much our assistance would help Yoshida or conversely our refraining from assistance might hurt him. On balance believe preferable if press release at close Yoshida visit, although emphasizing US-Japanese friendship not US support for Yoshida, contain practical evidence which could be cited among conservatives and important business circles as US support of Japan. Believe this would serve important US objective by assisting Yoshida in ability transmit political power desirable successor and forestalling and possibly shortening inevitable period readjustment following his departure as major political figure.

6. Department therefore giving attention content press release which might achieve such objective. Agricultural program offers best opportunity and we inclined think major decisions can be made this month culminating in public announcement during Yoshida visit Washington. Another possibility might be invitation Japan participate international atomic energy planning.

Hoover

1. Drafted in NA, cleared in substance with Murphy, and approved for transmission by Drumright.
2. Not found in Department of State files.
3. Dated Sept. 22, not printed. (794.00/9–2254)
4. Dated Sept. 20, not printed. (794.00/9–2054)