FE files, lot 55 D 480
No. 811
Memorandum by the Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Drumright) to the
Secretary of State
secret
[Washington,] October 12, 1954.
Subject:
- Embassy Tokyo’s Views on Policy Toward Japan.
- 1.
- Attached as Tab A is a memorandum dated September 9, 19541 which was prepared by Embassy Tokyo and
discussed with you in Tokyo by Ambassador Allison. The principal points of
this memorandum are:
- a.
- To persuade the Japanese to make a greater budget expenditure for defense in JFY 55–56 will require a major effort which could greatly strain United States–Japan relations.
- b.
- Our decision on this issue must be made in the light of growing neutralism in Japan, our estimates as to the imminence of war with the Soviet Union or Communist China, our strategic concepts for Japan in view of nuclear developments, the value of a large mobilization base in Japan, Japan’s economic weakness and lack of internal security.
- c.
- The Embassy recommends that our policy toward Japan be reappraised and that we seek to emphasize economic strength and internal security rather than developments of Japan’s defense capabilities.
- 2.
- FE is in general agreement with
Embassy Tokyo’s excellent memorandum but does not think that it
represents as sharp a departure from existing policy as the Embassy
apparently does. We have the following specific comments:
- a.
- Overemphasis by us on Japanese defense measures could easily be self-defeating. The United States should continue its policy of negotiating on the basis of what the Japanese themselves propose in the way of defense measures, attempting of course to expand the Japanese effort where feasible but without going so far as to strain our relations.
- b.
- Japan’s defense plans for the next fiscal year provide for a modest increase of Japan’s defense forces, although the defense budget is not scheduled to be increased. We believe that agreement on our part to accept a sizeable reduction of Japan’s contribution to the support of United States forces, presently $148,000,000, might help us to get a comparable Japanese budgetary increase which would finance a reasonable increment of Japan’s forces. However, this will probably require some pressure by us.
- c.
- Economic development and internal security are essential for Japan and should be given higher priority in the review of our [Page 1743] basic policy toward Japan shortly to be undertaken than they have in the present policy paper.
- d.
- Japanese reluctance to take stronger internal security measures should not be underestimated. Pressure by us on the Japanese to do more about internal leftism and anti-Americanism could be self-defeating, as has to some extent been the case with our efforts to force stronger defense measures, and would be used by Japanese critics to show we have no interest in the progress of democracy in Japan.
- e.
- Our estimates as to the imminence of war and the effect of nuclear developments on our strategic concepts are obviously important factors in appraising Japan’s defense effort. These considerations would not however appear to suggest any diminution of Japan’s effort or modification of our plans to assist Japan’s military build-up to the extent practicable.
- 3.
- Ambassador Allison states that Embassy Tokyo is now drafting a suggested reappraisal of United States policy toward Japan along the lines of paragraph one above. The Ambassador has indicated he desires to discuss this reappraisal should he return to Washington later this month in connection with Prime Minister Yoshida’s visit.
- 4.
- I suggest that in any discussion with the Ambassador on this subject you may wish to stress the considerations set forth in paragraph two above. Mr. Robertson has seen and concurred in the comments given in paragraph two.