Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

Secretary’s Memoranda of Conversation, lot 64 D 199

No. 781
U.S. Summary Minutes of the Third Meeting of United States Republic of Korea Talks, Washington, July 29, 1954, 2:30 p.m.¹

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Washington, July 29, 1954, 2:30 p.m.

Participants

• United States
• The President
• The Secretary of State
• Ambassador Briggs
• Mr. Drumright
• Mr. Young
• Mr. McClurkin
• The Secretary of Defense
• Admiral Radford
• General Hull
• Vice Admiral Davis
• Mr. Stassen
• Mr. Wood
• Mr. Hagerty
• Republic of Korea
• President Rhee
• Ambassador Yang
• Ambassador Limb
• Admiral Sohn Won-il
• Paek Tu-chin
• Dr. Choe Sun-chu
• General Chong Il-kwon
• General Kim Chong-yol
• General Choe Tok-sin

[Here follows discussion of a joint statement, a draft of agreed minutes, and President Rhee’s plan for the unification of Korea. For this portion of the minutes, see volume XV, Part 2, page 1849.]

3. Relations between the Republic of Korea and Japan

President Rhee said that he understood the United States representatives wished to talk about this question.

Secretary Dulles said that there are clearly a number of difficult problems to be solved but he believes Japan will make a real effort to put relations with Korea on a fair and honorable basis. Our working hypothesis in the Far East must be that Japan will become a reliable member of the Free World. Otherwise the whole balance in the Pacific could turn against us.

President Rhee said that it is correct for the United States to desire peaceful relations between Japan and Korea, but he hoped the United States Government would try to find out which party is right and which wrong. In a quarrel one party is wrong.

Secretary Dulles suggested that perhaps both might be wrong to some extent.

President Rhee rehearsed a number of his long-standing complaints against Japan. He said that Japan claims 85% of Korean property, and that Japan is insisting on regarding Korea as one of its former possessions despite the Peace Treaty.

Secretary Dulles said that he was not himself aware of any claim by Japan to 85% of the territory of Korea. Clearly that would be an outrageous violation of the Peace Treaty.

Ambassador Yang reported some of Kubota’s remarks of October 16, 1953² in the course of negotiations between the Koreans and the Japanese.

President Eisenhower said that the United States sent its men through the United Nations to protect Korea. He could not conceive how we can be accused of trying to make Koreans bow their necks to the Japanese. A clause in the Japanese Peace Treaty which Secretary Dulles negotiated specifically protects Korea. We will talk to the Japanese just as frankly as we do to the Koreans. He asked whether President Rhee would like us to begin an exploration of the whole tangled problem, perhaps leading to eventual adjudication. He thought we could produce people who would be completely fair. He concluded by referring to the desirability of good relations among Japan, Korea and Formosa.

President Rhee then brought up the question of the fishing line and detailed the history of this question, beginning with the MacArthur Line. He said it is necessary to have such a line if Korea is to live in peace with Japan.

Secretary Dulles said that this is a very difficult question. In a situation where there is the tension which exists between Korea and Japan something of the sort would seem to make sense. On the other hand, there is the problem of the traditional United States position with respect to freedom of the seas. Perhaps it would be possible to work out a sort of self-denying ordinance in which the Japanese would agree that they would not send any fishing boats into certain areas, but without doing violation to the general principle of freedom of access to the high seas.

He then went on to ask whether the ROK had any concrete suggestion. He said that we would be glad to do anything we can to help. He wondered whether the ROK would like to have some form of arbitration or to set up a panel of some kind or to refer the question to the World Court. Another possibility would be that we provide an individual to observe and to mediate if the Japanese also agreed to have such a person.

President Rhee said that the United States must tell ROK first whether we believe the Koreans are right or the Japanese are right.

President Eisenhower said that we cannot give such answers now because we have not explored these questions sufficiently. However, we will try to find out where justice lies.

Ambassador Yang referred to his discussions in Washington with Ambassador Iguchi and emphasized that the ROK is willing and anxious to settle these questions.

Secretary Dulles read the statement which Ambassador Iguchi had proposed the Japanese make publicly.

Ambassador Yang said that if the Japanese will consent to make that statement publicly, the Koreans would resume negotiations.

President Eisenhower said that if we are going to support our friends we cannot have them fighting each other. We have a great deal of sympathy for the Korean position with respect to Japan, but we do feel that friendly relations between the two countries are essential to the security of the whole area. If the Koreans and the Japanese can improve their relations by direct negotiations, so much the better. If it is necessary for us to participate, we will be glad to do it.

Secretary Dulles emphasized that the Koreans should not think that United States sympathies lie with Japan rather than with Korea, because they do not. We have not forgotten that Japan was our enemy, whereas Korea has been our ally. What has been said by the United States representatives in this discussion is the policy of the United States Government regardless of any isolated remarks by individuals on any other occasion. He added that he believes the Japanese have made a serious mistake by clinging to a rather tenuous legal claim in order to attempt to buttress their bargaining position. We can and will exert influence on the Japanese to deal with these problems in a statesmanlike way instead of on the basis of sharp trading.

1. Drafted by McClurkin on Aug. 2. Participants listed below include: (United States) C. Tyler Wood, Economic Coordinator in Korea, FOA; (ROK) Ben C. Limb, Ambassador at Large and ROK Observer at the United Nations; Adm. Sohn Won II, Minister of Defense; and Paik Tu Chin, Economic Coordinator. For additional documentation on President Rhee’s visit to the United States in late July 1954, see vol. xv, Part 2, pp. 1829 ff.
2. See footnote 6, Document 689.