Tokyo Post files, 500 Japan
No. 780
The Deputy Chief of Mission in Japan
(Parsons) to
the Acting Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs
(McClurkin)
official–informal
Dear Bob: In your Notes for the week ending July 17,1 item 13 (and by the way we find these Notes increasingly informative and useful), you mentioned the President’s statement regarding Japan’s foreign trade position.2 You also referred to background material now being prepared by a public relations group for use by national commentators in indicating the necessity for more liberal trade relations between Japan and the United States. We understand the desirability and even necessity of informing people at home concerning Japan’s difficult trade position and the need to safeguard ourselves and Japan against increased economic dependence upon Communist China and the Soviet bloc. We also appreciate the great importance of obtaining Congressional approval of a 3–year extension of the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act.
Although such a campaign is useful and even essential for home consumption, it is interesting and significant that it is having a very different effect in Japan. Japanese newspapers have been saying that recent developments in Indochina and at Geneva would force the United States to reappraise its Far Eastern policies and [Page 1686] would increase the importance of Japan in the new program to be developed. Credence in this assumption has been greatly augmented by the President’s remarks concerning the importance of Japan to the United States, with its corollary of preventing Japan from slipping behind the iron curtain. Similar statements of other United States officials and editorial echoes in some of the newspapers at home have served to strengthen in Japanese minds their concept of the essentiality of Japan in United States Far Eastern policy. We sense that there is a growing assurance among Japanese officials that our renewed emphasis on Japan greatly enhances their bargaining position. The attitude appears to be developing that, if they adopt a sufficiently rigid position, the United States will be forced to meet their demands for assistance whether in the military, economic, or political fields. They seem to believe that they are now leading from strength rather than weakness because, in their opinion, the United States believes it must have Japan as an ally in the Pacific. Naturally, this change in attitude will complicate our negotiations with the Japanese on many matters, including their defense appropriation for next year, the amount of their yen contribution in support of United States forces, the GARIOA settlement, and the utilization of the $10 million grant fund. It may also make them less willing to adopt that degree of austerity essential to the success of any program of self-help.
We seem to find ourselves in a dilemma, i.e., statements designed to be helpful in promoting United States policy at home are proving detrimental to that program abroad. In consequence, we are wondering whether a word of caution would be inappropriate. Specifically, we offer the suggestion that future statements dealing with the economic plight of Japan might make it clear that, although the United States realizes its importance and desires to be helpful, such assistance to be effective is dependent upon the efforts of Japan first to do all within its power in its own behalf. If future statements can carry the implication that United States aid (of whatever type) is contingent upon the adoption of a program of self-help by Japan and in fact can only be effective under such circumstances, we believe it will have a sobering effect and may make the Japanese more amenable. We pass this thought on for your consideration in the belief that, if feasible, its application would be salutary.
Sincerely yours,
- Not found in Department of State files.↩
- See Document 772.↩