Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

611.95B/10–3053

No. 717
The Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense (Wilson)¹

secret

[Washington,] November 19, 1953.

Dear Mr. Secretary: I have received your letter of October 30, 1953, informing me of your concern over the general trend of our relations with the Republic of Korea. You refer particularly to the action of the Republic of Korea in re-establishing the so-called “Rhee (fisheries) line” and the seizure of Japanese fishing vessels which you state is regarded as a challenge to the authority and responsibility of CINCUNC, and which, if not checked, might undermine the UNC–ROK command relationship. The Department of State, too, has been deeply concerned with these questions and has given careful study to your letter and to the memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff which you enclosed.

On the whole, I believe that our relations with the Republic of Korea have been improving. As late as mid-June, President Rhee was refusing to go along with the armistice on any basis despite the fact that he had been offered economic aid, the strengthening and maintaining of his military forces, and a mutual defense pact. Since President Eisenhower’s letter of June 6,² no United States concessions have been made to President Rhee except (1) my promise to go to Korea after the signing of the armistice to consult him about plans for the political conference and to negotiate the defense pact, and (2) our agreement to walk out of the political conference after ninety days if we consider the conference to be a sham. In the meantime, President Rhee has receded from positions repeatedly proclaimed to the Korean people and the world as unalterable, the armistice has been signed, prisoners of war desiring repatriation have been exchanged, and President Rhee has fulfilled to date his commitment not to obstruct the armistice. This commitment was given despite his failure to obtain assurances demanded of the United States which he considered basic and at a time when he had the greatest ability by unilateral action to disrupt the armistice negotiations and involve us in continued and possibly wider hostilities.

There are many outstanding problems with the Republic of Korea—as there are with the United Kingdom, France, Japan and various other countries. However, in none of these instances do we consider the situation to be such that all problems can be packaged for settlement on an all-or-none basis.

It is in light of the situation summarized above that the Department of State has considered the specific problem of the fisheries dispute between Japan and the Republic of Korea. I hope that we can find a solution to this problem without resorting to the measures suggested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and we are currently endeavoring to do so.

Current indications from our Embassies in Tokyo and Seoul are that both the Republic of Korea and the Japanese Government desire to find a peaceful solution to their problems including the fisheries dispute. Both Governments have urged the United States to provide observers to be present to offer practicable assistance during their negotiations which are expected to be resumed in the near future. The Department of State has accordingly agreed to provide United States observers if negotiations are resumed in an atmosphere which holds some promise of a satisfactory outcome. Both Governments have agreed to the designation as observers of our Counselor of Embassy in Seoul, Mr. Niles W. Bond, and the Special Assistant for Fisheries and Wildlife to the Under Secretary, Mr. William C. Herrington. It is hoped that participation of the American observers will result in a more conciliatory attitude on the part of both Governments and establish the basis for a satisfactory settlement.

I believe, therefore, that the approach we are currently making should be given time and opportunity to succeed before considering other measures.

Sincerely yours,

John Foster Dulles

1. Drafted in NA; attached to a memorandum dated Nov. 19 from Robertson to the Secretary, not printed.
2. This letter contains an offer of a mutual defense treaty in return for South Korean acceptance of an armistice; for text, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1953, pp. 377–380.