Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

611.95B/10–3053

No. 711
The Secretary of Defense (Wilson) to the Secretary of State

secret

Washington, October 30, 1953.

Dear Mr. Secretary: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in a memorandum to me dated 9 October 1953,¹ referred to recent developments in connection with the fisheries dispute between Japan and Korea, and to actions by the Republic of Korea which have worked to the disadvantage and embarrassment of the United States Government and the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command.

There are several specific points made in the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum, a copy of which has previously been made available to your staff and an additional copy which is inclosed for your information. Specifically, the Joint Chiefs of Staff point out that the action of the Republic of Korea in re-establishing the so-called Rhee Line and the seizure of Japanese vessels constitutes a challenge to the authority and responsibility of CINCUNC which, if not effectively countered, might undermine the UNC–ROK Command relationship. The Joint Chiefs of Staff also point out that no public announcement of the United States position, which regards the Rhee Line as contrary to international law, has ever been made. An additional point of considerable significance is the dangerous precedent which the Rhee Line might set and encourage other countries in the area, such as Communist China, to undertake against Japanese fishing vessels on the high seas.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff point out in their memorandum that it is their belief, which is shared by General Clark, that further concessions to President Rhee would not achieve the desired results of reaching an accord on matters in which there is a difference of view between the United States Government and the Republic of Korea. They further point out that President Rhee’s attitude has had a deleterious effect upon the UN–ROK Command relationship and tends to compromise the future responsiveness of ROK forces to CINCUNC’s orders and detracts from the prestige of the UN Commander. They mentioned further that President Rhee’s attitude has embarrassed United States representatives in the field other than the military, referring to a message dated 19 September 1953 from Ambassador Briggs.² In this connection I would also like to refer to a joint message, dated 26 September 1953, from Ambassador Briggs, Ambassador Allison, and General Clark, in which it was indicated that we must either meet the issues involving President Rhee or permit him to continue to embarrass the United States Government and the United Nations Command.³

The Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that further measures should be taken in dealing with the fisheries problem in the context of an overall approach by the United States Government to bring about a more reasonable and cooperative attitude on the part of President Rhee and the ROK Government with respect to all prevailing problems which are of mutual concern to the Republic of Korea, the United States, and to the United Nations Command. Specifically, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that all possible pressures be brought to bear on the Japanese and Korean Governments to arrive at an agreement in their disputed fishing rights and, if these pressures are not successful, that the United States withdraw logistic support for the ROK Navy. They recommended also that the United States consider other measures which might be taken, including the withholding of economic aid and other benefits.

I fully appreciate the sensitivity of the problem of dealing with President Rhee. I further appreciate that the Department of State would not wish to force a show-down which could result in a breakdown in the relationships between the United States Government and the Republic of Korea and thereby possibly provide President Rhee with a basis to abrogate his agreement with respect to the Armistice Agreement. However, it is my view that permitting President Rhee to continue to act unilaterally to the military and political disadvantage of the United States places this Government in an untenable position. Further, unless it is made absolutely clear to President Rhee that we will not permit these conditions to continue, his actions will grow bolder and he will not hesitate to take more drastic actions which could lead to a dangerous situation with respect to the interests of the United States Government and to the security of the United States forces in Korea. Therefore, I strongly recommend that the Department of State give favorable consideration to the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum and to the course of action outlined therein.

Sincerely yours,

C. E. Wilson

1. Not printed. (Attached to the source text)
2. Telegram 237 from Seoul, not printed. (Attached to the source text)

3. Reference is to CX 65208 from Tokyo. The three men stated, with regard to difficulties experienced among the Republic of Korea, Japan, and UNC:

   “It appears to us that the time is rapidly approaching when we must either meet these issues squarely with the ROK government or let Rhee go on writing his own ticket with resulting continuous embarrassment to our government and UNC.

   “Allison particularly calls attention to the effect of US lack of action in these circumstances on the Japanese government which is closely watching US-Korean relations. If Rhee appears to be gaining his ends by continued intransigence, Japanese government will undoubtedly apply lesson in their own reaction to American desiderata in Japan.” (Attached to a memorandum from Walter K. Scott, Director of the Executive Secretariat, to Smith, Nov. 3, 795B.11/11–353)