Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

033.9411/10–2953: Telegram

No. 710
The Ambassador in Japan (Allison) to the Department of State

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Tokyo, October 29, 1953—9 p.m.

1110. Reference Department’s telegram 1009,¹ which received only late afternoon. Following are Embassy comments as FEC regretted time too short present coordinated views:

1. If in interests of speed I may repeat substance paragraph 9, Embassy telegram 1088² I think we have pushed Japanese as hard as is wise and what is required now is a respite to Jet them digest significance of our views.³ From over-all point of view our objectives and US-Japanese relations wind-up communiqué should indicate: (a) Exchange of views was profitable; (b) no agreements reached; and (c) intention resuming discussions at an early date. Important (b) be included since Ikeda will be charged with entering secret understandings and will need this. Okazaki in appearance before Diet Foreign Affairs Committee yesterday has already started putting out line that negotiations were only exploratory by denying that Ikeda has submitted any rearmament plan.

2. On ground-force build-up our order of preference is 1, 4, 3, 2 (your 1009, last paragraph). For reasons in paragraph 1, I believe it should be omitted entirely from any understanding or communiqué. Japanese ready to go ahead and preference 4 or 3 will only commit us to a ceiling and either tie our hands or put on us onus of once again pushing Japanese do what they themselves should do in own interest. There is nothing to be gained by committing ourselves now rather than a month or two months hence to preference 4 or 3. There is nothing to be said in my opinion for preference 2. We may at some point have to agree for time being to 180,000 but if so it would be preferable to have this come up from the Japanese side in the course of the next few weeks or months than as a result of what will be interpreted as American pressure on Ikeda in Washington. Believe actually pressures in Japan to settle problem on nation’s future security likely increase and conservative elements who now know what we want and why will become increasingly uneasy at lack of agreement on force goals.

3. Regarding GARIOA. I think it is impossible to get a settlement by the end of the year, and Ikeda is right in saying the Diet would repudiate it. Government in next two months will have to deal with consequences of rice crop failure.⁴ It would be suicidal for government to agree pay us at time it was resisting powerful Diet and public pressure to increase appropriations for farmers’ relief.

4. Department knows my views on difficulties under any circumstances of getting GARIOA settlement, especially one on straight financial lines. However, I think Department should not let this occasion pass without some definite indication of our serious intention not to let matter drag out any longer. I therefore suggest Ikeda be told that we expect government will make provision in FY 1954 budget either for fixed amount or blank amount. Budget now in intermediate stage of drafting contains provision only for reparations. If we get at least this put before Diet it will be gain in sense that it will be a recognition that GARIOA is now on agenda. Ikeda might also be told that we will present a note later asking for time to be fixed for negotiations. However, while as stated Embassy telegram 614⁵ GARIOA requires urgent settlement as matter of major importance which could lead to serious repercussions if not settled soon, nevertheless if we have to choose between GARIOA and force goals obviously latter of more importance to fundamental US objectives.

5. One reason for proposals in this telegram is that next two months will be crucial time for conservative forces and coalition maneuvers. It is desirable that coalition maneuvers should take place at same time as our views are being digested here.

Allison

1. Document 708.
2. Dated Oct. 27, not printed. (033.9411/10–2753)
3. In paragraph 9 of telegram 1088 Allison also stated: “As Department is aware this is first time Japan told precisely what we want.” Elsewhere in the telegram, the Ambassador mentioned learning from Izeki the latter’s conviction that Yoshida probably would not visit Washington because a conservative political coalition had not yet been formed and because “Ikeda talks proved more than exploratory and produced definite US position which involves little or no political kudos for Prime Minister.”
4. In telegram 1099, Oct. 28, the Ambassador reported on an estimated decline of two million tons in the current rice crop. “This will have adverse effect on national income, agricultural purchasing power, and balance of payments position.” (033.9411/10–2853)
5. Document 684.