Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

110.15 AL/12–552

No. 620
Report by the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison)¹

[Extract]

confidential

[December 5, 1952.]

Observations of John M. Allison on his Tour of U.S. Missions in the Far East, September 26 to November 16, 1952

. . . . . . .

Japan

It was interesting to get to Japan after the Peace Treaty had gone into effect. On the whole I was quite favorably impressed with General Clark and what he has done. He has a political sensitivity which some of his predecessors did not have. Also the close relationship which exists between General Clark and Ambassador Murphy is most helpful.

The Japanese themselves are to some extent still living in a dream world. They are comparatively prosperous right now. I noticed a great change in the personal appearance of the people from a year ago. They have more spirit and life and appear healthier. They are making progress in cleaning up and reconstruction has gone ahead at a tremendous rate. This, however, is a prosperity built to some extent on sand which may run out when UN special procurement and our troops are moved out. There is not a great deal of evidence that the Japanese are really taking steps to get prepared for what will happen when the present situation comes to an end. Mr. Ichimada,² Governor of the Bank of Japan, is worried about these things and thinking about them. Prime Minister Yoshida said they were going to follow the Dodge line but that taxes will have to be reduced. He has only a rudimentary appreciation of economics and economic factors. This was corroborated by Ichimada who said the difficulty in Japan was that political leaders have no knowledge of economics. Ichimada is conscious of the problems facing Japan, I think, and as far as he can, is doing something about them. Yoshida is wobbly about rearmament. He gives lip service to the necessity for some form of Japanese defense force but does not recognize the realities or know how to start. The younger people in the Foreign Office seem to be more aware of the true nature of the problem.

Another item of importance discussed was the status of forces agreement.³ The Japanese want to work out something, not in writing but as a gentleman’s agreement. While I was there a meeting was held by Ambassador Murphy with the heads of all the Commonwealth countries,⁴ General Doyle Hickey, the Chief of Staff, and the Japanese Foreign Ministers.⁵ The Commonwealth people were very pleased with the results because of the fact that Murphy was present and had taken a very strong stand, The Japanese have a real problem politically and I believe there will be no signed agreement concluded before next April 28th when the U.S. Japan Administrative Agreement comes up for possible revision. I believe the Japanese will insist oh the U.S. agreeing to the NATO formula and that they will then readily agree to giving other UN forces equal treatment.

There is a great reluctance on the part of the Japanese people to rearm because of the economic burden. I suggested to them that if they could get an agreed plan, even on a small scale, the people might see it would not be as bad as they anticipated. They are also still worried about building up a military caste which will take over the Government. I tried to point out in a speech I made at the American-Japan Society⁶ that it should be possible to build up a military system which would be their servant and not their master. That appealed to some but others are emphatically against it.

The Japanese relations with Korea are extremely bad, although they are ready at the present time to make very real concessions to the Koreans, according to what they said. They are ready to have their Foreign Minister pay a personal call on President Rhee, but not unless there is some assurance that he can come back with some agreement. Rhee is completely unreasonable and he is convinced there is a group in the American Embassy in Tokyo which wants to give Korea back to Japan. Rhee says they cannot have any agreement with Japan unless Japan in this agreement or along with the agreement formally and publicly renounce the treaties of annexation of 1910; and the Japanese say they cannot do that. The Japanese feel that these treaties have been superseded by the Peace Treaty and they do not want to bring up the past but prefer to settle the situation as it now exists.

Reparations is another problem confronting the Japanese. They realize they have to do something. Defense measures and reparations are the main problem worrying them and sooner or later, I believe, we will be involved in them. We must make up our minds what can and should be done and try to bring it about. Waring, our Economic Counselor, has been thinking about the problem of reparations and has submitted a suggested solution which deserves study.⁷ We will have to take a more active part both on the Korean and reparations problems, I fear, if we are to keep things on an even keel.

The military people and Ambassador Murphy are worrying about the recent flurry of overflights of Soviet planes over Hokkaido. Comparing present Russian activity with that over the past six months, one can see that it has increased tremendously over northern Japan and the Kuriles.

There is a constant tendency on the part of the Japanese finance people to cut down appropriations for the National Safety Forces and also for the Maritime body, which disturbs Ambassador Murphy and others concerned. There is also a general feeling among our Commonwealth friends that they will not be informed about Japanese rearmament plans, but will be confronted by a fait accompli. I think we should keep the Commonwealth informed and sufficiently ahead of time so that it will not appear to be routine. If we do this, I believe we can obtain their acquiescence if not their active support.

The Japanese are worried about trade restrictions, particularly as they might affect their trade in Southeast Asia. They are worried about the British and the British are worried about the Japanese. There seemed to me to be a willingness on the part of many Japanese businessmen to make a real effort to line up to internationally accepted fair trade standards as well as a recognition that Japan would have to prove its good intentions if it expected to regain its trading position in the world.

It is difficult to make any quick, easy statement about whether the situation in Japan is good or bad. All sorts of things could go wrong politically, economically and other ways. The Yoshida government is not too strong and there is some feeling that there will have to be another election next spring and that Yoshida might not survive such an election. Hatoyama is in bad physical condition and it is doubtful that he could take over as Prime Minister, but he still has great influence. The Japanese feel that the results of the election as far as throwing out the Communists was concerned should not be interpreted too optimistically because they believe the large increase in representatives of the Left Wing Socialists was largely made up of people who are in fact Communists. A professor at the Tokyo University said that a year ago or so all his students were going Communist. The professor himself is very antiCommunist but in spite of his teachings, the students were taking the opposite line. This year the situation is different and the students are very anti-Communist. The professor says this is due to the fact that the Communists had not been able to push the Americans out of Korea, but had been thrown back, and that the U.S. was more active in supporting the Chinese Nationalist government on Formosa. While this may be an oversimplification, it does represent a typical Oriental way of looking at things.

1. Attached to a covering note dated Dec. 5 from Allison to Young, which reads: “There is forwarded for your information notes of a brief report I made on my trip to the officers in FE. This is not to be considered a definitive report about conditions in the area but is merely putting into written form the stenographic notes of my oral statement.”
2. Hisato Ichimada.
3. That is, on the status of UN forces in Japan. An agreement was not signed until Feb. 19, 1954; see Document 738.
4. The heads of all the Commonwealth missions in Japan.
5. A memorandum by Jules Bassin, Legal Attaché of the Embassy in Japan, of a conversation held on Nov. 12 among all those mentioned (with the exception of General Hickey), is in file 740.5/11–1252.
6. For text of this address, “Japan and Free Asia”, made in Tokyo on Nov. 1, see Department of State Bulletin, Dec. 1, 1952, p. 857.
7. Documentation on this proposal has not been found in Department of State files.