Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

694.95B/9–2552: Telegram

No. 601
The Chargé in the Republic of Korea (Lightner) to the Department of State¹

secret
priority

Pusan, September 25, 1952—4 p.m.

384. Re Embtel 361, Sept 19.² Difficult situation re fishing areas between Korean peninsula and Jap greatly eased and we hope solved for time being as result prompt action by CINCUNC.

Afternoon Sept 23 Maj Gen Herren representing CINCUNC, Rear Adm. Gingrich³ representing COMNAVFE, and I called on Pres Rhee to outline proposal previously approved by Gen Clark. FonMin Pyun and Adm Sohn⁴ also present.

Gen Herren as spokesman expressed sympathy for Korean alarm with respect to Jap fishing and patrolling activities close to Korean coast; and after mentioning importance to all concerned avoiding incidents stated Gen Clark proposed to declare Korean coastal waters (shown to Rhee on map) as restricted mil zone barred to Jap fishing vessels. Proposed UNC restricted zone actually follows lines Jap recently announced wld be patrolled by them with exception sector along 34th parallel which UNC will revise so that line will pass well to south of Chejudo. Rhee probably not aware similarity new restricted zone to Jap patrol line. In any case he was delighted that CINCUNC prepared declare prohibited zone, so that removed main cause his earlier concern, viz., establishment of patrol line by Jap.

Pyun pointed out new zone did not in many places cover areas within “Rhee Line” and stated he assumed Korean Naval patrols wld still be able operate up to “Rhee Line”. It was pointed out to him that we did not want to relate restricted zone in any way to “Rhee Line” or to discuss “Rhee Line” at this time. Principal problem before us was to prevent unfortunate clashes between Korea and Jap over fishing and that under present conditions potential areas for such clashes were within restricted mil zone. We hoped that Korea and Jap wld get together soon to work out fisheries agreement which presumably wld involve discussion of “Rhee Line” or other demarcation line with respect to fishing areas (Adm Gingrich expressed the view privately after the conference that he was quite sure that Adm Sohn wld not continue to patrol beyond restricted zone).

Shortly before interview with Rhee I recd two long identical ltrs signed by FonMin and addressed to Secy Acheson and Gen Clark.⁵ Original for Secy being airpouched. Ltrs invite attn to “very grave sitn being created by Jap Govt sending massed fishing fleets to seas adjacent to Korea under convoy of patrols, in defiance our fishery conservation area established by our presidential proclamation based on well-established internatl precedents”. Ltrs convey in considerable detail most of the points Pyun had orally expressed to me on Sept 19 (see reftel). In addition FonMin suggested several alternative solutions involving expansion Korean Navy to cope with sitn, UN Naval Forces taking on task preventing Jap cross “Rhee Line” and steps to obtain internatl recognition of “Rhee Line”. If none of these suggestions acceptable Korean Govt reserved right take whatever steps sitn required.

Ltrs also referred to Rhee’s ltr to Gen MacArthur of July 14, 1950⁶ giving latter command auth over Korean Armed Forces during present hostilities. This commitment based on existence that time of MacArthur Line. Pres wld have given this command auth with some reserve if he had foreseen “that a freed Jap wld ruthlessly and provokingly threaten the back of Korea with studied planning at governmental level even before hostilities were over and that against this deliberate invasion of that freed Jap even our own naval patrols wld be prohibited from operating”.

Pyun stated after our mtg with Pres that his ltrs to the Secy and Gen Clark still stood and he hoped to receive written replies in due course.

While the heat now seems to be off this issue, anti-Jap furor continues unabated in local press and new development (reported separately)⁷ involving Prime Min Chang in alleged pro-Jap activities has hit headlines.⁸

Lightner

1. Repeated for information to Tokyo and to Maj. Gen. Thomas W. Herren and Rear Adm. Byron H. Hanlon, Commander and Deputy Commander, respectively, Korean Communication Zone.
2. In this telegram Chargé Lightner had reported that the Korean Government was preparing to carry out an instruction by President Syngman Rhee to seize Japanese fishing vessels found inside the “Rhee Line”, and that in a conversation with Foreign Minister Pyun Yung Tai he had tried to dissuade the Korean Government from this course. (694.95B6/9–1952)
3. Rear Adm. John E. Gingrich was Commander Task Force 95 (CTF–95).
4. Rear Adm. Sohn Won II, Chief of Naval Operations, Republic of Korea Navy.
5. Dated Sept. 22, not printed. (Enclosure to despatch 124 from Pusan, Sept. 24, 694.95B6/9–2452)
6. This letter and General MacArthur’s reply are UN Document S/1627, July 15, 1950.
7. In telegram 385 from Pusan, Sept. 26, not printed. (795.00/9–2652)
8. The Department replied in telegram 194 to Pusan, Sept. 25, repeated to Tokyo, drafted and approved for transmission in NA. It reads: “Dept appreciates efforts Embs Pusan and Tokyo in conjunction with CINCUNC and COMNAVFE to reach satis resolution Korea-Jap dispute over patrol fishing areas. Dept considers proposal contained Pusan’s 384 important contribution to establishment of peace and security area and avoidance continued Jap-Kor friction over issue.” (694.95B/9–2552)