Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

794C.0221/9–2252

No. 600
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (McClurkin)¹

top secret

Washington, September 22, 1952.

Subject:

• State–Defense Working Group on the Ryukyus

[Here follows a list of persons present (10). Sullivan led the Department of Defense group; Young that of the Department of State.]

The meeting was called to discuss a list of State Department questions concerning the Defense Department position on the disposition of the Ryukyus. A copy of this list is attached.

In summary, the position of the Defense Department is that political control is necessary for military control and that there should, therefore, be no change from the present status of the Ryukyu and Bonin islands. The Defense Department representatives made it completely clear that this position applies to the whole chain of islands including the Amami Oshima group and Parece Vela. The position is predicated mainly upon an assumption that Japan may conceivably adopt a neutralist position and that, if sovereignty over the Ryukyus is returned to Japan, such a position would make it impossible either legally or politically to operate effectively from bases in the Ryukyus in the event of general war.

Some of the advantages cited by the Defense representatives for the continuation of the present status for the whole island chain are summarized below:

1. From the point of view of the Air Force the bases in the Ryukyus are ideally situated to give a maximum bombing radius which covers all Asia and can even reach southern Russia. Seven air bases are planned and three of them are now in existence. The Amami Oshima group now has one radar installation, and there are other radar sites which have been surveyed. These radar sites are considered an indispensable part of the warning net.

2. The Navy requires the bases and harbors in the island group. These bases vastly increase the use which can be made of submarines since fueling and refueling can be done so much closer to operational areas. The Amami group is useful because there is a shelter anchorage there which will be better than Buckner Bay in the event of typhoons.

3. The ground forces count on this group as a primary staging area for the Pacific in the event of general war.

4. Some of the islands—for example, Parece Vela—are not worth much directly but in unfriendly hands would jeopardize the line of communications. In addition they may be useful for staging areas and to increase the element of deception in certain military and naval operations.

5. Various covert operations are now centered in the Bonin Islands.

6. If the Japanese have sovereignty over these islands, and consequently have a relatively free run of them, the security problem is increased.

7. If sovereignty and administrative control are returned to Japan, it would become considerably more difficult and time-consuming—perhaps impossible in some cases—to get agreement and authorization to extend a runway at an airport or to put in a radar installation at a new site.

In answer to a question about the utility of the bases if there were hostile air forces operating from the mainland and hostile naval forces including submarines operating in the area, the Defense representatives said that they believe that the islands are defensible now or with the anticipated build up in the event of an emergency.

The meeting adjourned with agreement to resume the discussion of the State Department question at 3:00 on Monday, September 29.

[Attachment]

State Department Questions Regarding Defense Department Position on the Subject of Disposition of the Ryukyus.

1. What are the factors of strategic importance which underlie the determination of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the disposition of the Ryukyus and the Bonins should remain in status?

2. Does the strategic importance of the Ryukyus, as determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, apply to the entire archipelago?

3. If not, would it be possible to consider Japanese assumption of administration as well as sovereignty over certain selected islands, particularly the Amami group?

4. If certain islands could be returned to Japanese administration, what are the military considerations as to timing and procedure?

5. What are the detailed legal rights and powers (jurisdiction, condemnation of land for air fields, removal of population in times of emergency, etc., etc.,) which the United States would have to be able to exercise in the islands which are of strategic importance in order to assure the utility of the bases?

6. What type of arrangements for military use of the Ryukyus is required in view of the determination of their strategic importance and the basic assumptions as to their use?

(a) Is it mandatory to continue to treat the Ryukyus as if they were United States territory in which United States forces have all rights, privileges and immunities granted by United States law?

(b) Would a 99–year lease be satisfactory?

(c) Would a treaty arrangement such as the wartime Anglo-Egyptian treaty,³ the United States-Cuban treaty regarding Guantanamo Bay⁴ or the arrangements concerning the Panama Canal Zone⁵ adequately provide for long-term use of the Ryukyus?

(d) What are some of the detailed considerations that lead to the conclusion, in the Joint Chiefs of Staff study, that a base rights agreement with Japan would be unsatisfactory?

1. Drafted by McClurkin.
3. For text of the Treaty of Alliance between Egypt and the United Kingdom, signed at London on Aug. 26, 1936, with Agreed Minute and Notes, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. clxxiii, No. 4031.
4. See the Agreement for the lease to the United States of lands in Cuba for coaling and naval stations, signed at Havana Feb. 16, 1903, and at Washington Feb. 23, 1903. See also the Agreement for the lease of coaling or naval stations, signed at Havana July 2, 1903. Texts are in Department of State Treaty Series (TS) Nos. 418 and 426, respectively.
5. Arrangements concerning the Panama Canal Zone as of 1952 were governed by the Isthmian Canal Convention, signed at Washington on Nov. 18, 1903, and a number of subsequent arrangements. For text of the original Convention, see TS No. 431.