Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

Secretary’s Staff Meetings, lot 63 D 75

No. 585
Notes of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting¹

[Extract]

secret
SM N–55

[Washington,] August 5, 1952—9:30 a.m.

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Japanese Export Controls

3. Mr. Bohlen reported that there is an NSC paper on Japan,² part of which concerns export controls which Japan should adopt. State and Defense have a basic disagreement which probably will not be resolved in the NSC Senior Staff, and there may be a split paper going to the NSC itself. Defense is not willing to accept the exchange of letters which we have prepared to use with the Japanese.³

4. Mr. Linder reviewed the recent five-power meetings and the bilateral meetings which were held with the Japanese on export controls. We were cognizant of Defense’s desire to have Japan retain all export controls which it had prior to its independence. We tried to move generally in that direction and were successful in getting Japan to agree to control items which are on the U.S. security list and to negotiate on a sizeable number of other items for possible control. Three categories of matériel are affected: (a) strategic materials which the Japanese would be required to embargo, with occasional exceptions; (b) lesser strategic materials which would be embargoed with administrative discretion; and (c) all other materials which the Japanese could do as they wished. We feel that we have gone as far as we can with the Japanese and the remaining items involved must be left up to bilateral negotiations. Mr. Bohlen pointed out that the Defense Department will not accept this position because they feel that this position would control fewer items than were formerly controlled. We feel that it is hopeless to go back to this former control listing. Mr. Linder pointed out that if we attempt to obtain a more rigid listing of materials, undoubtedly the Japanese would appeal to the British and French, which, of course, would involve us in other problems which we hope to avoid at the present time.

5. Mr. Martin pointed out that if we get a longer list it would create problems when Japan becomes a member of COCOM, because at that time Japan will see the less rigid listing of materials which affect the Europeans. Also, they will see how this operation is used to subsidize certain aspects of the European economy and the Japanese may ask for some assistance. Mr. Bruce felt that we had been extremely successful in our negotiations with the Japanese, especially in view of the fact that the Japanese accepted a far more extensive listing than any of our European allies have accepted. He asked for a memorandum on this subject.

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1. Acting Secretary Bruce presided at this meeting.
2. NSC 125/1; see Document 579.
3. See the memorandum by Young, supra.