Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

400.949/8–452

No. 584
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Young) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson)

secret

[Washington,] August 4, 1952.

Subject:

• Brief Résumé of the Five Country Meeting on Export Security Controls¹

The work of the conference fell into two parts—(1) the multilateral discussions and (2) bilateral discussions with the Japanese regarding the future level of Japanese controls on trade with Communist China.

It became clear at the first substantive meeting of the full conference that the United Kingdom, France and Canada would not agree to the establishment of a separate Far East organization. In fact, Berthoud, the British representative, had very inflexible instructions on this point.² The remainder of the multilateral discussions were devoted to an attempt to reach agreement on the establishment of a permanent working group to be established by COCOM on instruction from the Consultative Group. In these meetings the United States attempted to obtain as much autonomy for this committee as possible, while the other three Western countries attempted to tie it closely to COCOM. Japan would be invited immediately to join the Consultative Group, the COCOM and, as a country having a substantial interest in trade with China, the new China Committee.³ The Japanese took little part in these discussions. The recommendations of the five participating countries are set forth in the attached memorandum entitled “Agreed Recommendations to Member Countries of the Consultative Group”.⁴

The other agencies were greatly disappointed in their inability to obtain a separate Far East organization and they believed it to be more necessary than ever to obtain a side commitment from the Japanese to the effect that Japan would continue to maintain substantially its existing level of controls on trade with Communist China. In fact, Colonel Moffatt received instructions from the Secretary of Defense directing him to obtain such a commitment as a condition precedent to agreement to something less desirable from their point of view than a separate Far East organization.

Mr. Takeuchi had indicated in a conversation with Mr. Linder on July 28 that the Japanese Government assumed that the level of Japanese controls would be a proper subject of discussions in the five-country meeting. When they were informed that this was not a proper question for discussion, they requested immediately a bilateral discussion. Mr. Takeuchi said that his instructions were to discuss the level of control question in the multilateral meeting and if this could not be done it would be necessary to have some kind of a side understanding. The proposed discussions were agreed to and have progressed amicably. Tentative agreement has been reached in principle. Complete agreement depends on a mutual examination of the commodities not included on the United States Security Lists to determine whether they should be embargoed or be subject to the administrative discretion of the Japanese.

Mr. Linder informed Mr. Takeuchi on July 31 that because the United States was not going to succeed in obtaining the agreement of the other countries in a separate Far East organization and because the other agencies of the United States Government believed strongly that such an organization would assist in maintaining adequate export controls against Communist China, they were insisting upon some assurance that Far Eastern controls would not be weakened. For that reason, he said, it was necessary for him to have an exchange of letters with Mr. Takeuchi under which the Japanese would commit themselves to (1) embargo items on the United States Security Lists, (2) embargo an additional list of items found to be readily determinable as of strategic importance to Communist China and (3) license items suspected to be of strategic importance to Communist China in return for essential commodities. Mr. Takeuchi protested against giving such a commitment as the price of obtaining membership in COCOM and, it was only after intense pressure brought by Mr. Linder, Mr. Waring and Mr. White, together with a telephone call by you, that at 2:00 a.m. Friday night, Mr. Takeuchi agreed to the exchange of letters (Attachment II).⁵ Mr. Takeuchi was greatly disturbed because he said that his instructions were “primitive” and in doing so he was acting in large degree upon his own responsibility.

Mr. Takeuchi said it would be extremely helpful to him if he could have “a side agreement on Hong Kong”. The points included in Attachment III⁶ were tentatively agreed to by Messrs. Waring and White and accepted by the United States Delegation in a meeting on Saturday morning.

Mr. Takeuchi wished to release to the press immediately information regarding the items on which agreement had been reached that Japan could relax controls. All of the members of the United States Delegation thought this would be very undesirable. Mr. Takeuchi was requested to wait at least a week before making the public release on this point in order to avoid the implication: (1) that the Japanese Government was taking action as a result of a decision reached at the five-country meeting or (2) in agreement with the United States. If the impression were received by the United States public and Congress, pressure might be brought on the interested agencies which would cause them to take an excessively restrictive position in the bilateral negotiations. Mr. Takeuchi refused, despite considerable pressure, to change his press release or delay the timing of its issuance. He did agree to delete two phrases which would indicate the action was being taken in agreement with the United States. (See Attachment IV)⁶

1. The meeting took place in Washington July 28–Aug. 2.
2. In telegram 396 from London, July 22, the Embassy listed the following points as the basis of the British position: “(1) Jap requested admission COCOM and if it is to be member of free world request should be granted. (2) If general Far Eastern trade were discussed Japan would inevitably be in position make its agreement on controls subject to guarantees by free world of supplies normally obtained from China. (3) While desirous have Japan accept US-UK standards, emphasized that no controls higher than those which were generally agreed could be maintained for more than a short time since maintenance would result in sacrifice by one PC of trade which would be taken by another without gain in denial to bloc.” (460.509/7–2252)
3. The decision to establish this committee had been taken at the five-country meeting.
4. Not printed. Its principal recommendations were that Japan be invited “immediately” to join the Consultative Group and the COCOM and that the China Committee be set up.
5. The exchange of letters, dated Aug. 2, did not represent final agreement, which was reached on Sept. 5. See circular telegram 321, Document 599.
6. Not printed.
6. Not printed.