Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

Tokyo Post files, 322.3 Ryukyus

No. 545
Memorandum by the Ambassador-designate to Japan (Murphy) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison)

secret

[Washington,] March 31, 1952.

Subject:

• Eventual Return to Japan of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands

I have now had informal talks with Secretary of the Army Pace, Assistant Secretary Earl Johnson, General Magruder¹ and General Hamblen, Chief of the Occupied Areas Office, in each of which I have touched lightly on the question of the eventual return of the Ryukyu and the Bonin Islands. In each instance the view was expressed that Defense is split on the question but that the Joint Chiefs, especially General Bradley, are most reluctant to move in the direction of the Department’s point of view. In each case I inquired why the distinction has been made between these lesser islands and the main Japanese islands; why the same arrangement for them would not be satisfactory. The explanation was given that General Bradley had felt strongly that no change in the status of the main islands should be made until after the termination of the war in Korea and that he and the Joint Chiefs went along most reluctantly under the pressure of a major political decision. The Joint Chiefs, however, are determined to stand fast regarding the Ryukyus especially, although there is considerable sentiment in other parts of Defense in favor of a relaxation, particularly as the Ryukyus are administratively and economically a burden. General Hamblen expressed the opinion that it would be necessary for a trial period to elapse in order to determine the effectiveness of our arrangements for the main Japanese islands. If a concession were made regarding the Ryukyus now and then a little later we were faced with failure of our arrangements for the main islands, we would be subject to double criticism for having yielded prematurely regarding the Ryukyus. The importance strategically of the latter islands to our defense establishment is too great to experiment with lightly. General Hamblen thought that a year’s trial would be an adequate period in which to determine the efficacy of the present arrangements. Incidentally, General Hamblen disclosed to me voluntarily that General Ridgway had made a recommendation to Defense favorable to the immediate transfer of the Ryukyus and the Bonin Islands under circumstances similar to those related to the main islands.

1. Maj. Gen. Carter B. Magruder, Deputy for Programs in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Army Staff for Logistics.