794.5/3–2752
No. 544
The Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs (Nash) to the Assistant
Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Allison)
Dear Mr. Allison: The questions outlined in your letter of 7 February 1952, which you indicated would serve as a basis for drafting an NSC paper on Japan, have been considered by this office, the staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Munitions Board, and other interested offices within the Department of Defense. Accordingly, the following information is submitted for use in preparing a draft NSC paper. It might be mentioned that these views are, for the present, informal and will be subject to further review at the time the NSC paper is circulated for comment. Some of the following information has already been furnished your staff in discussions with representatives of this office.
I. The effective potential over the next few years of United States and Japanese military forces in Japan in resisting attack.
- A.
- It is vitally desirable, from a U.S. security viewpoint, to defend
Japan against attack. This defense is desirable to the point of
acceptance of war in its accomplishment. It is probable that U.S.
forces in collaboration and cooperation with the Japanese National
Police Reserve will be able to maintain the security of Japan from
external aggression.
- 1.
- It is probable that all of Japan can be held against attack. Even if the island of Hokkaido were invaded and portions of that island occupied by Soviet forces launching an attack from Sakhalin, the mission of our forces will be to regain that territory.
- 2.
- A large part of Japanese production facilities would be unable to remain in operation in event of hostilities due to enemy air attack from nearby bases. It is believed that the nearness of enemy [Page 1220] air bases would pose a situation that would render it very difficult to prevent large-scale bombing of the Japanese industries. However, even with the mass aerial offensive by U.S. air during World War II large segments of Japanese industry remained in operation. Some guidance by the United States will be required in the restoration of Japanese industry in order that it be so located as to prevent large-scale destruction by hostile air.
- 3.
- The answer to this question will be supplied within the next week.
- B.
- The answer to this question appears in the memorandum forwarded to
the Secretary of Defense from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 12
December 1951, subject: High Level State–Defense Mission on Japanese
Defense Forces.1 This was transmitted to State Department
by the Secretary of Defense on 10 January 1952. (Further reference
to this document will be indicated by the abbreviation MJDF).
- 1.
- Four divisions now. Two more divisions by 31 March 1953. Total of ten divisions to be reached by 31 March 1954. The Japanese division equals in strength and armament one U.S. division with the exception of the omission of the divisional tank battalion. Regimental tank companies, however, are included. The Japanese division slice is approximately 25,000 men. For further information concerning this question see MJDF.
- 2.
-
a. Yes. See MJDF.
b. Yes. See MJDF.
c. No—not for the foreseeable future.
- C.
-
1. For the ground forces this cost will amount to 200 million dollars per year per division. It is estimated that the cost of maintaining U.S. Naval plus U.S. Air Forces in Japan will be approximately equal to the total ground forces cost.
- a.
- More than two-thirds. Primarily all house-keeping
facilities will be furnished by Japan.
(1) A maximum of one-third. When Japan develops an armament industry this amount will be greater.
- b.
- 180 million dollars per year (See Administrative Agreement).
2. For 1951 and 1952, 31 billion yen. For 1952 and 1953, 113 billion yen.
- a.
- The equipment for the first four divisions of the JNPR is currently being furnished to the Japanese. It is believed that the equipment which is not provided for in this year’s budget will probably be turned over to the JNPR as a result of troop withdrawals from Japan and Korea. In 1952 the Army expended 24½ million dollars in Japan.
- b.
- (1) No estimate available.
- c.
-
(1) Less than one-third.
(2) One-third.
II. Development and use of Japanese industrial capacity for the production of military supplies and implements of war.
- A.
- As has already been stated the equipment for four divisions of the
JNPR is already in Japan.
Equipment now being supplied to the JNPR is furnished from the budget of the U.S. Army and
this will continue until such time as Japan becomes a completely
independent state. After that time, what priority will be assigned
for delivery of military equipment to Japan is not known. However,
as has been stated above, U.S. forces withdrawing from Japan and
Korea will leave their equipment for the arming of Japanese forces.
This primarily refers to ground forces. However, certain equipment
and supplies will no doubt also be made available by withdrawing
Naval and Air Forces. Because of this situation scarcities and
delays in U.S. industrial production will not affect the ability of
the United States to supply forces in Japan as much as it will
affect our ability to supply forces elsewhere.
- 1.
- This question was answered to some extent in A above. Specifically, there is now a shortage of wheeled equipment such as the ¼ ton, ¾ ton, and 2 ½ ton trucks. The omission of the tank battalion from the Japanese division was not dictated because of shortages, rather it is because of the limited road net in Japan and the nature of the terrain which makes most of Japan poor tank country. The shortage of wheeled vehicles also will not be so disadvantageous to military operations on Japan as it would be in countries with highly developed road nets where the terrain is relatively flat.
- 2.
- 1954. It is believed that at that time and after that time it will be difficult to obtain direct appropriations for military aid to Japan.
- B.
-
1. It is believed that Japanese industry should produce certain types of ammunition for U.S. forces in Japan.
2. It is probably not realistic to expect Japanese industry to furnish military supplies and equipment for U.S. forces stationed elsewhere.
3. Japanese industry should furnish ammunition, clothes, equipment and all but the heaviest of weapons for Japanese security forces.
4. Other friendly forces in Asia can be supplied with ammunition and light military equipment by Japanese industry. This would be advantageous to the United States and beneficial to the economy of Japan.
- C.
- 1. Encouragement of Japanese light armament industry is necessary at the present time. It is believed that in the period following [Page 1222] a complete independence of Japan it will be more difficult as time progresses to discourage the Japanese from developing heavy armament industries. The United States will be in a position to some extent to curtail the developing of Japanese heavy armament industries through economic controls and the curtailment of exports of raw materials. However, it is too early to state that such discouragement would be to our advantage.
Sincerely yours,