Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

611.94/2–1552: Telegram

No. 513
The United States Political Adviser to SCAP (Sebald) to the Department of State

secret
niact

Tokyo, February 15, 1952.

1689. Reptd Secretary of Defense CX 63631. This is Sebald’s 1689. No. 22 from Rusk. Coming next message is proposed text amended Art 2 and exchange of notes subject third sentence our original para 1. It now seems clear that we can get more satisfactory commitment reference third sentence our para 1 in public exchange of notes simultaneous with signing admin agreement than we can get on face of agreement itself. Both Okazaki and our State Dept lawyers consider that status and validity of an agreement registered in exchange of notes is same as admin agreement itself. Okazaki says Jap practice is same as international law that documents accompanying each other registering agreement on same subject are “part and parcel of same agreement”. Dept will wish assure itself this point.

Question then arises as to why Japs are unwilling to include commitment in Art 2 itself. Reasons which have been given by Japs are:

1. Our third sentence means to many Japs that occupation merely continues into post treaty period; it is of utmost importance to Japs that it be clear occupation ends on effective date peace treaty, that holding of property by US forces for 90 days under Art 6 peace treaty is under that treaty and not under occupation procurement demand, and that otherwise use of facilities and areas by US forces is on basis agreement with Japan.

2. Our third sentence would greatly disturb many Japs, including many otherwise friendly to US, who have grave doubts about degree of urgency US forces will feel in placing arrangements on new basis of agreement. In this connection Okazaki, who states many Japs are expressing doubts our “integrity” on this point, has emphasized desire Jap Govt place itself in best possible position to counter actual or incipient anti-American sentiment which being systematically provoked on this point by Commies and other elements unfriendly to US.

3. Subject is one of provisional nature which will be overtaken by processes of agreement and adjustment; exchange of notes can lapse when agreements have been completed and would not, therefore, be appropriate to main body admin agreement.

4. Bulk of facilities and areas should and can be agreed within period indicated; commitment to US should assure Japs that we are talking about exceptional cases and not bulk facilities now held by occupation. Comment: Exchange of notes involves no limitation on numbers of “exceptional cases”. Even Japs like Okazaki have stated publicly that Japs should expect that US forces will remain in large proportion of facilities now being used. However, “exceptional cases” will undoubtedly prove to be those in controversy, involving conflict of interest between US military requirements and pressures on and by Jap Govt to obtain release. If considerable proportion facilities required by our forces prove to be in this category, we must expect Jap charge not only that we are doing violence to concept of exceptional cases in exchange of notes, but also that we are abusing peace treaty itself. Argument would concern choice urban, industrial and commercial installations on which pressures are likely to be strong. Unless we are prepared to rest our case for continued use of such unagreed facilities on exceptional character and essential need, exchange of notes has in it seeds of future trouble, but I see little prospect that we can improve our position by present unequivocal commitments on face of agreement that leaves matter solely in US hands.

5. Exchange of notes will not encounter sustained interest and objection Jap Diet and public opinion as would same commitment in agreement.

We have tried various drafts Art 2 with Japs to get core this commitment in art itself, including considerable window dressing in effort make more palatable. Japs fully recognize issue is who has decision on continued use facilities not yet agreed and appear determined not give flat commitment to US in agreement though willing do so exchange of notes. Their drafts Art 2 this point continue to insist “consultations for these arrangements shall be completed at the earliest possible date and not in any case later than 90 days after the coming into effect on [of] this agreement”.

Based on experience and impressions this visit I have no misgivings about determination US military authorities here to give urgent attention and make bona fide effort conclude satisfactory arrangements facilities and areas earliest possible date. There is no lack understanding such authorities of political as well as military elements this problem. Jap misgivings are natural until more info is available and in view some cases tactless talk or action by subordinate officials in dealing with local Jap owners or officials. Although subject will be difficult, I see no reason why bulk (numerically) of necessary agreements cannot be reached within 90 days effective date treaty.

In view of importance this commitment to us, I recommend that we agree to obtain it in public exchange of notes and not try to insist upon our proposed method.

Further, I recommend that if exchange of notes is used, we use draft submitted which contains essential commitment we need in language which Japs will agree. Please reply niact.¹ Johnson has seen.

Sebald

1. For the reply, see Topad 2272 to Tokyo, Document 525.