Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, China and Japan, Volume XIV, Part 2

611.94/2–1552

No. 512
Memorandum by the Acting Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the President

secret

[Washington,] February 15, 1952.

Subject:

• Interim Policy with Respect to Japan

1. Attached as Tab A is a draft memorandum for your approval containing interim policy guidance with respect to Japan. This guidance is designed primarily to anticipate political, military and administrative questions that may arise in the development of the post-Treaty relationship between the United States and Japan.

2. This Interim Policy is supplementary to, and does not supersede, the current policies on Japan established by the National Security Council. If it meets with your approval, we suggest that you submit it to the National Security Council for its information, and that at the same time you request the National Security Council to prepare a policy report on Japan as soon as possible. If approved by you, the attached draft memorandum should be considered interim national policy on Japan pending the completion of the National Security Council policy report.

3. Attached as Tab B is a proposed Interim Directive to the Commander in Chief, Far East concerning the Joint Committee provided in the Administrative Agreement with Japan. The proposed directive is intimately related to the Interim Policy and incorporates it by reference. If approved by you, it will be issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East as interim guidance and authority concerning facilities and areas in Japan for use by United States forces.

4. It is important that there be interim policy guidance for those who are conducting United States relations with Japan in this difficult period of transition before the Treaty of Peace becomes effective. The attached documents will provide that guidance.

5. It is recommended:

a. that you approve the Interim Policy (Tab A) for immediate implementation by the Secretaries of State and Defense as appropriate.

b. that you transmit this Interim Policy to the National Security Council for its information and request the National Security Council to prepare a policy report on Japan as soon as possible, and

c. that you approve the draft directive to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Tab B).¹

• James E. Webb
• Robert A. Lovett

[Tab A]

Memorandum by the President

Subject:

• Interim Policy with Respect to Japan

On the recommendation of the Secretaries of State and Defense, I have approved the following interim policy with respect to Japan. This interim policy is supplementary to, and does not supersede, the current policies on Japan established by the NSC. It will be in effect pending the completion of a policy report on Japan which the National Security Council will now undertake to complete.

1. The security of Japan is of such vital strategic importance to the United States position in the Far East that the United States cannot permit hostile forces to gain control of any part of the territory of Japan. United States forces in Japan will be performing a security mission of the highest importance to the United States national interest.

2. The overriding requirement for United States policy affecting all post-Treaty arrangements with Japan is the necessity for preserving and strengthening the voluntary and strong commitment of the Japanese Government and people to a close association and to joint action with the United States and the free world. The United States can attain its long-range security objectives in the Far East to the fullest extent only if Japan, in its own self-interest, fully recognizes its stake in the free world, develops close political, military and economic cooperation with the United States and other free nations, particularly in Asia, and assumes its fair share of the common burdens of the free world.

3. In as much as U.S. forces in Japan will be undertaking a security mission of vital importance to the security of Japan and to the United States, post-treaty arrangements for United States forces in Japan must ensure that such forces are able to carry out their military mission, and in particular, that the Commander-in-Chief, Far East, is afforded the latitude and authority necessary to carry out his responsibilities in case of hostilities or the threat of imminent hostilities. The arrangements for the defense of Japan should be such as to permit all security forces in Japan immediately to meet an attack on Japan which could be launched without warning. The effective execution of this military mission will depend, to a great extent, upon the continuing agreement and consent of the Government of Japan.

4. To encourage Japan to become an effective, responsive and cooperative partner, the United States must accord Japan the courtesy and consideration to which her potential future role and her sovereign position entitle her. The United States attitude toward Japan must constantly show a tactful regard and a sympathetic understanding in all relations with the Japanese in which the questions of prestige, equality, status, sovereignty and “face” are involved, in view of the particular sensitivity of the Japanese to various forms of discrimination. The United States should in general accord to Japan the same relationships which exist between the United States and other friendly allies in whose territory United States forces are stationed. On the other hand, the United States should not create problems for itself in other countries by making exceptionally favorable arrangements with Japan.

5. At the same time, the Japanese must be led to understand that the United States-Japanese security arrangements are a common enterprise in which the Japanese should be even more vitally interested than we, that they are being assisted in meeting a responsibility basically their own, and that it is incumbent upon them to do everything possible to reduce or remove irritations and obstacles standing in the way of complete and cordial cooperation in this field. Full use should be made of experience in other areas to show the Japanese what “self-help and mutual aid” mean in terms of joint action, joint contribution, and joint responsibility.

6. Post-Treaty relationships between the United States and Japan will have an important bearing upon United States relations with other Governments and peoples in Asia and the Pacific. A genuinely voluntary United States-Japanese partnership will add greatly to United States prestige and influence throughout Asia; conversely, it will be disastrous if it should develop that the presence of the United States forces in Japan is contrary to the wishes of the Japanese themselves and appears to the people of Asia to be an expression of “western imperialism.”

7. United States programs and courses of action with respect to Japan should be designed to promote Japan’s economic development, political stability, and military contribution to the collective security of non-Communist nations in Asia. To this end, the United States should seek to preserve the positive accomplishments of the occupation to the greatest extent possible; assist Japan in building up its industrial and agricultural resources, in developing and maintaining a strong trading position, particularly with Southeast Asia; and support the establishment of Japanese military forces consistent with the requirements of a sound economy and the needs of collective security in the Far East.

8. All post-Treaty arrangements with Japan must be conducted in such a way as to maintain and advance the prestige of the United States and its representatives in Japan since such prestige is fundamental to satisfactory United States-Japanese relations. It will depend upon many factors including the political, economic, and military strength of the United States, Japanese confidence in our continuing adherence to underlying moral and political objectives which are in harmony with those of Japan, the unity of view presented by United States officials to the Japanese, and the respect and admiration for Americans as individuals.

9. Post-Treaty arrangements for United States forces in Japan should be such as to maintain the dignity, health, morale and prestige of these forces while in Japan. On the other hand, every effort should be made to prevent the security mission, the presence of United States forces in Japan, and the security arrangements with Japan from becoming a domestic political issue in Japan. Every reasonable effort should be made to allay the anxieties of non-Communist elements regarding these matters, including opposition parties, labor and intellectual groups. Both United States and Japanese authorities should make continuous efforts to develop cordial relations between the Japanese people and United States personnel in Japan.

10. The principle of consultation between appropriate United States and Japanese authorities on matters involving post-Treaty arrangements and agreements should be observed. Minor irritations might be disposed of by friendly and timely consultation on a local basis. Many questions of prestige and public relations can be handled by evidences of joint responsibility for action taken.

11. The latter portion of Article I of the Security Treaty is a provision against an emergency arising from indirect attacks upon Japan by outside powers. This article does not authorize interference by the United States in Japanese domestic political affairs.

12. A continuous and intensive orientation and information program shall be conducted among all United States military and civilian personnel in Japan in support of the policies and principles outlined above, in order to foster an attitude and conduct on the part of Americans which will strengthen friendly relations between the United States and Japan.

13. Dealings with Japanese labor should be such as to preserve, and to encourage the Japanese to preserve, the labor reforms achieved by the occupation, and in particular to encourage as far as suitable the development and strengthening of free labor union movements as the collective bargaining agencies of labor.

[Tab B]

Interim Directive to CINCFE Concerning the Joint Committee Provided in the Administrative Agreement With Japan

1. This directive consists of interim guidance and authority for conducting the United States participation in the Joint Committee provided in Article XXIV of the draft Administrative Agreement with Japan, and for the negotiations in this committee concerning facilities and areas in Japan for use by United States forces as set forth in Article II of the above agreement. At an appropriate later date a more comprehensive directive concerning post-treaty relationships between the United States forces and Japan may be issued. It is expected, however, that such a comprehensive directive would not essentially modify the provisions of this directive. All previous instructions in conflict herewith are rescinded.

2. General:

a. An Administrative Agreement, called for in Article III of the security treaty, is being negotiated between the Governments of the United States and Japan. The United States draft of that agreement has been furnished you separately. The final version as agreed upon by the two governments will be considered as being incorporated by this reference in this directive.

b. The interim policy guidance with respect to Japan which was approved by the President on———is incorporated by this reference in this directive.

3. The Joint Committee (Article XXIV of the draft Administrative Agreement):

a. You are authorized to designate the United States Representative and Staff of the Joint Committee for the conduct of negotiations in the Joint Committee on matters within the Joint Committee’s functions. However, prior to the coming into force of the United States–Japan Security Treaty, the Joint Committee will have no authority to make decisions in the manner intended by the Administrative Agreement;

b. You will keep the United States Government informed of negotiations in the Joint Committee by reports to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Directives will be transmitted to you by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on all matters arising in the Joint Committee which require such directives;

c. Upon the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, you will keep the United States Ambassador fully and currently informed of all negotiations in the Joint Committee. The United States Ambassador will furnish political advice to you on matters before the Joint Committee and will designate a political officer to assist the United States Representative on the committee;

4. Facilities and areas (Article II of the draft Administrative Agreement):

a. Your arrangements concerning facilities and areas for the use of United States forces in Japan should at all times be consistent with the following considerations:

(1) The efficient execution of your military mission;

(2) The availability of funds to support such arrangements;

(3) As little interference as possible with the economy of Japan; and

(4) Minimization of irritations inherent in the stationing of United States troops in a sovereign Japan;

b. Consistent with subparagraph 4 a above, you should endeavor to find facilities and areas for the use of United States forces within the following categories:

(1) Facilities and areas formerly used by Japanese armed forces;

(2) Facilities and areas designated for joint use by United States and Japanese security forces; such joint use might be actual, or contingent upon the further development of Japanese security forces;

(3) Facilities and areas specifically built for military use since 14 August 1945;

(4) New construction;

(5) Facilities and areas owned by the Japanese Government; and

(6) Facilities and areas which are available on a commercial basis.

c. United States military installations should be located to the extent feasible, within the limitations prescribed in subparagraph 4a above, outside of the down-town areas of large metropolitan centers in Japan such as Tokyo, Yokohoma, Nagoya, Kyoto, Osaka, and Kobe;

d. In anticipation of the ratification of the peace treaty, appropriate steps, consistent with subparagraph 4 a above, should be taken toward:

(1) Placing United States forces in Japan in areas planned for their post-treaty occupancy; and

(2) The early return to Japanese control of the largest feasible number of important buildings and facilities in the metropolitan and industrial areas;

e. If there are inescapable delays in the necessary readjustments, you should arrange for full and timely explanation to the Japanese governmental authorities;

f. You will keep the needs of the United States forces for facilities and areas under continuous review with the objective of returning promptly to Japan such of these facilities and areas as are no longer required; and

g. You will keep under continuous review facilities and areas temporarily not being used by the United States with the view that interim use may be made thereof by the Japanese, where in your opinion such use is not harmful to the purposes for which the facilities and areas are normally used by United States armed forces.

1. In a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense and the Acting Secretary of State dated Feb. 20, President Truman approved both the Interim Policy and the Draft Directive, directed the implementation of each, and stated that he was requesting the NSC to prepare a policy report on Japan for his consideration. (611.94/2–2052)

   On Feb. 21, the President’s memorandum, and the memorandum printed here, with both enclosures, were circulated to members of the National Security Council as NSC 125, “Interim Policy With Respect to Japan”. (S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351)